Confluence

Editors Team

Confluence is locally printed at East Van Graphics, Vancouver BC. It is supported and organized by the International Studies Student Association. It is funded by Simon Fraser University's International Studies program.

Letter from the Editors

This project fell into our laps last year, when the International Studies Student Association (ISSA) decided that the *Confluence Journal* deserved another shot. It has been re-imagined and re-organized by many different passionate groups over the years but has not published regularly in nearly a decade. It has been a journey putting this journal and team together over the summer and a privilege to work with such a wonderful group of people. Without all of them, this publication would not have been possible. In particular, we would like to extend our gratitude to the following people.

First, to Rowland Lorimer, from CISP Journal Services at SFU. Without his initial guidance and advice, we would not have known where to start. Craig Vandermeer, of Insight Global Education, who was part of the ISSA when Confluence was publishing regularly and was able to provide insight and helpful contacts from previous issues. Kevin Stranack and Kate Shuttleworth, SFU's Open Journal System's Librarians, who oversaw every part of the process and graciously volunteered their time to hold private meetings with us, as well as organize an Editors Workshop. Brenda Lyshaug, Tamir Moustafa and Ellen Siew Meng Yap, of the International Studies department, for agreeing to fund and support the journal. Our wonderful team of editors, for their commitment to *Confluence* over this summer. And finally, to our readers. We hope that you enjoy Confluence's first edition and that you'll take the time to share it with your friends and family. We have long believed that the International Studies Program at SFU is home to some of the brightest and most insightful. We are so excited that they will finally have an outlet in order to share their worldly experiences, their wide range of perspectives and their academic thoughts on issues affecting our world today.

Sincerely,
Katia Hammond & Landyn Imagawa
Journal Managers, *Confluence 1*.

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The Evolving Capabilities of Terrorism on Social Media

Kelly Grounds

Introduction

In a coordinated attack on September 11th, 2001, al-Qaeda agents boarded and hijacked four East Coast commercial planes. Two of these planes crashed into the World Trade towers, one hit the western side of the Pentagon, and one crashed into a field in Pennsylvania after passengers attempted to take back control of the plane from the hijackers (History Editors, 2011). This attack fundamentally changed how the world viewed acts of terrorism and the groups that carried out said acts. However, the attack also changed how different terrorist groups conducted their operations and evolved their scope of influence and ability to operate under increased scrutiny. This paper intends to show how the rapid expansion of the internet and social media platforms allowed terrorist organizations to expand their scope of influence and flourish despite governmental resolve to eliminate the threat that they pose.

This paper will begin with a review of the existing literature surrounding modern-day terrorist organizations. The literature review will provide a structure for the case studies selected. All of the literature reviewed in this paper focuses on secondary sources and media reports that explored high profile terror arrests and independent investigations. The summary will examine three groups that fall within the existing theories and will show how each group used social media to expand their scope of influence. To conclude, the discussion will focus on the implications of mobilization through the use of social media for terrorist networks as technology continues to rapidly evolve.

Literature Review

The ability to observe how different groups use social media in real time proves to be a useful tool in creating different categories for understanding the functions of these networks. This review will examine the use of social media by using three distinct categories: influencing the narrative, raising funds, and appealing to vulnerable individuals. Taking into consideration the diverse range of terrorist organizations and the differing methods and ideologies, these categories provide a general understanding of how they operate. With such a diverse range of terrorist groups and variation of methods and ideologies, it would be a daunting task to explain how every group has tailored their actions to achieve their goals.

Influencing the Narrative

The largest obstacles different groups face during their campaigns are the risk of counter narratives and mass media turning the public opinion against said groups (Tufekci, 2017). Throughout the 20th century, mass media has controlled and directed the mainstream discussion in society and this gives them the power to choose what was and was not discussed (Tufekci, 2017). [A1] Because of this dominance, there was little opportunity for terrorist groups to promote their agenda to a larger audience. For instance, al-Qaeda had limited success in using media network, Al Jazeera, as a platform to promote their agenda to a larger audience, as their appearance on the platform was not without critical follow-ups by the network (Soufan, 2017). The act of being criticized by the very networks that broadcast them can best be explained by Joseph S. Tuman's explanation of critical media theory. Critical media theory considers the monopoly that

mass media has over the news cycle to be a result of mass media's (?) ability to set the agenda of topics covered, as well as how these topics are framed (Tuman, 2010).

The narratives selected are based on viewer interest and the prospect of higher ratings. An excellent example of this selectivity was the lack of coverage and therefore a lack of a reaction to the bombing of the USS Cole by al-Qaeda in 2000 (CNN, 2018). Ali Soufan explains that at the time of the bombing, America was captivated by the upcoming Supreme Court decision on the Clinton administration and therefore all major media outlets focused solely on that, ignoring the USS Cole Bombing and provoking al-Qaeda to attempt a larger attack to regain the attention of the media (Soufan, 2017).

However, the introduction of social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter have allowed different groups and individuals to share their own narratives with a wider audience. Zeynep Tufekci describes a historical shift in the ways that social groups operate due to the ever-expanding reach of the internet. Groups have started to set their own agendas and rewrite the narratives around their actions while simultaneously amplifying their movements on a level that could not have been imagined in 2000 (Tufekci, 2017). The ability to move beyond relying on mass media to share their narratives has ironically made the actions of terrorist groups one of the best ways to capture the attention of an audience. As a result, mass media has begun to rely on the accounts given by the groups about their actions, placing these narratives at the center of every major news cycle (Tuman, 2010). The change in media priorities has created an environment that has allowed groups to flourish on social media without the constraints of traditional media outlets. This phenomenon has amplified the scope of their narrative to include actions that go beyond the spread of ideology.

Raising Funds

A determinant for the success of a terrorist group is their ability to access necessary resources. In order to obtain these resources, groups must obtain a consistent source of funding. Without that source of funding, the group will either dissolve or be forced to amalgamate into a larger group.

Historically, there have been three ways that groups have been able to access funds as listed in Steven Everson's House Committee testimony: mock charities, money-laundering through corporations, and the use of banks to move money quickly through different countries (House Committee on Oversight and Investigation, 2002). However, all three methods allowed governments to trace the sources of their income and freeze their accounts (Levitt, 2003). Coupled with increased global cooperation in the wake of 9/11, counterterrorism coalitions have been able to hack different groups and disrupt their sources of income (Nance & Sampson, 2017).

Faced with the possibility of losing all sources of funding, groups turned to the internet to appeal to their supporters for donations. Weimann explains that this change in sources of funding is not a new tactic, but the natural step in the evolution of the modern-day terrorist organization (Weimann, 2006). Many of the same approaches are still used, but are framed in a new light. For example, the group Hezbollah uses a charity format that is similar to that of World Vision, in which they create fundraising campaigns claiming to raise donations to support orphans of killed soldiers or to support the rehabilitation of an injured soldier (Weimann, 2006). Aside from the fact these funds are framed to appeal to the donor's sense of humanity, they also provide a level of anonymity. Programs such as PayPal allow payments to be processed quickly and securely with no

information to track and it also introduces the option for groups to set up fake profiles in order to further avoid detection (Jacobson, 2009).

Appealing to Vulnerable Individuals

In the 20th century, the ability to recruit new members to different terrorist organizations was limited by geographical restraints and the inability to effectively spread one's ideology. A group was typically limited to small regions where one actor would draw others to them like a lightning rod. Any potential for cross-border expansion was only possible through chance encounters between organized terrorist groups, lone wolves, and individuals that are vulnerable to radicalization. Soufan categorizes Osama bin Laden as a lightning rod actor, citing his ability to draw others toward him in Saudi Arabia and uniting them under a common goal (Soufan, 2017). A chance encounter between bin-Laden and Saif al-Adel gave bin-Laden access to the resources and connections al-Adel had which allowed him to spread the influence of al-Qaeda throughout the Middle East[A2] (Bandy & Smith, 2005).

The potential for chance encounters to expand a group's recruitment and growth has been replaced by targeting vulnerable individuals who would be susceptible to a group's ideology. This is commonly referred to as 'radicalization' and involves the process of an individual adopting the ideology of a terrorist group that is fundamentally opposed to the society that the individual lives in (Neumann, 2013). Radicalization creates lone wolf terrorists who adopt the ideology of terrorist groups and are motivated to attack their own society in the name of those groups (Weimann, 2012). However, despite their allegiance to a group, the lone wolves are able to maintain a level of anonymity that the

group does not have. This allows them to carry out devastating attacks across the globe while typically catching emergency and counter-terrorism units completely off-guard (Weimann, 2012). The emergence of lone wolves and radicalization has allowed groups, to not only spread their influence across the globe, but also to gain plausible deniability should an attack go wrong (Spaaij, 2010).

Case Selection

For the purposes of this paper, we have chosen to explore three distinct terrorist groups: al-Qaeda; Boko Haram; and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Each group has created a distinct presence on social media and has become adept at using the techniques of one of the three previously mentioned categories. Raising funds will be explored by examining al-Qaeda's methods and how they have evolved since 1990. The ability to influence the narrative will be explored by examining Boko Haram's struggle to change public opinion in Nigeria. The process of appealing to vulnerable individuals will be explored by tracing ISIL and analyzing how the rapid acceleration of their social media presence drew individuals towards them.

The different social media platforms that we will be referring to in this paper are Twitter and YouTube. Throughout the initial analysis of the literature, these two platforms came up as the preferred for the groups that will be examined and therefore are the most applicable to the study.

Al-Qaeda

Prior to the 9/11 attacks, al-Qaeda was getting its funding from contributions of both members and supporters, corporations and Islamic charities, kidnapping and physical bags of cash brought to them (Abuza, 2003). However, the war on terrorism quickly began to disrupt the flow of funds with many assets being seized or frozen (Levitt, 2003). This naturally created an issue for the group and when combined with the relentless bombing of Kandahar by US forces, al-Qaeda was looking at potential defeat by resource exhaustion (Soufan, 2017). However, there was hope in the methods demonstrated by Babar Ahmad and Sami al-Hussayen in the late 1990s (Jacobson, 2010).

Babar Ahmad used his technical skills to create websites advertised as charities in order to secure funding for al-Qaeda beginning in 1997 (BBC, 2005). The websites used scare tactics like urging all Muslims to use their resources to prepare for Jihad by claimed that training for war was obligatory and encouraging them to carry gas masks and nuclear suits to protect themselves against the coming attacks (BBC, 2005). The use of scare tactics and sensational, grand statements captured subscribers' attention by preying on their fears and unwillingly caused subscribers of the website to become emotionally involved. By preying on the fears and emotions of vulnerable peoples, Ahmad created a new standard for fundraising that would become highly influential in the coming years (BBC, 2005).

But Ahmad was not the only individual attempting to use the internet to generate funds for al-Qaeda. Sami al-Hussayen, who was a computer science graduate student at the University of Idaho at the time of his arrest, was also arrested for raising money to fund terrorism (The Washington Post, 2003). While he was never convicted of aiding

terrorism, Hussayen's websites did support the use of suicide bombings and was closely associated with another al-Qaeda charity front, *Support the Needy* (Egan, 2004).

These new approaches to fundraising through false online charities became one of the core sources of funding for al-Qaeda Weimann, 2012). As the financial sector of the Internet advanced and payment processing became more secure, al-Qaeda expanded its false charity methods, heavily promoting themselves under names such as *Muslim Aid* (Williams-Grut, 2015). The most important part of this method is that it brings in an incredible amount of money for the group with their yearly operating expenses estimated to be $10 million, and while not all of that funding comes directly from false charities, a high portion does (David, 2017).

But the real issue here is that all governments and counter-terrorism task forces have known that this is where a high amount of al-Qaeda's funding has come from. So why haven't there been any large-scale crackdowns on the donors or any halts on transactions? This is because encryption programs, such as SSL/TLS Protocols and Tokenization, have made eCommerce payments incredibly secure (Wrobel-Konior, 2018). Any type of code written to bypass the current encryption system poses a risk to the financial security of the rest of the eCommerce sector. This is the same argument that Apple used in 2013 when they refused to write a code to bypass an iPhone's security system in the case of the San Bernardino terrorist, where they argued that any code written would create a permanent possibility for a security breach that spy agencies and hostile countries could abuse (Khamooshi, 2016). This same threat is now proving to be a major factor in the fight against al-Qaeda and a major win for al-Qaeda as they can take

comfort in knowing that unlike their courier and physical donations, their digital funds will not be halted in the near future.

Boko Haram

Boko Haram is best known for the 2014 kidnapping of more than 200 schoolgirls from their school in Chibok, Nigeria (Abubakar, 2014). Regardless of the presence of social media, this story made global headlines due to its horrific nature. Yet Boko Haram uses social media to ensure that all of their operations and messages reach a wide audience within Northern and Eastern Africa. Their main goal has been to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the Nigerian government while also instilling fear in the population to ensure that no one will dare to rise up against the group (Ogobondah & Agbese, 2018).

Initially emerging in 2002 as a part of a less successful regional branch of al-Qaeda, Boko Haram remained far below anyone's radar until 2009, when the group attacked police forces in Maiduguri (Ogobondah & Agbese, 2018). This incident provided Boko Haram with a platform to officially declare their Jihad against the government of Nigeria as a result of the government's shift to secularism and corruption permeating every level of office (Ogobondah & Agbese, 2018). Immediately after declaring their jihad, Boko Haram began their propaganda campaign grounded in radical discourse on Twitter. Part of the group's success on Twitter has been attributed to the lack of regulations about the content tweets and the Twitter's general reluctance to actively moderate dangerous content and proactively delete accounts associated with hate speech. The lack of moderation has allowed Boko Haram to freely attack the Nigerian government (Chiluwa, 2015).

What has made Boko Haram so successful in the jihad against the Nigerian government has been their focus on changing the pre-existing opinions held in Nigeria that the government is good and Boko Haram is the enemy (Chiluwa, 2015). But Boko Haram has also created a name for themselves on YouTube by publishing videos of the group beheading innocent victims that they claim are acting against them (Ogobondah & Agbese, 2018). The combination of these two tactics has given the group a terrifying reputation that has led many in, not only Nigeria, but the world to fear them. If these two tactics were used alone, the group would most likely have turned the group's image into that of a ruthless group with a sole focus on violence, but Boko Haram have managed to avoid this.

A large part of Boko Haram's digital discourse is centered around undermining the Nigerian government. This discourse has two main focuses: blaming the underdevelopment of Nigeria on government corruption and reducing the credibility of the government by highlighting every mistake that they make (Onuoha, 2012). One of the group's most public attempts to delegitimize the government came in the immediate aftermath of the 2014 schoolgirl abduction. Due to an extreme miscommunication, the Nigerian government claimed that there were approximately eight school girls missing the day after the abduction when in reality, the total was over 200 (BBC Africa, 2014). Boko Haram used that mistake to perpetuate their views of the government as a weak and untrustworthy entity (Ogobondah & Agbese, 2018).

This is part of how Boko Haram takes control of the narrative in Nigeria; they capitalize on every opportunity that they get, to either make themselves appear strong and stable, or to make the government appear weak and corrupt (Ogobondah & Agbese,

2018). But the issue is that this strategy is working, because of the lax monitoring on Twitter and YouTube, and the disinterest of the companies in controlling hate speech that has begun to flourish on both platforms. Until this policy changes, Boko Haram and other similar groups will continue to share their propaganda and ideology undeterred.

ISIL

ISIL began as a sub-group under al-Qaeda before breaking ties in 2013 to pursue their goals undeterred (Berger, 2014). Their tactics gave the group a reputation for being brutal and built on bloodshed. But this view does not explain the thousands of Westerners going to Syria and Iraq to fight for ISIL, including both Canadians and Americans (Shane & Hubbard, 2014). What accounts for the mass recruitment is the group's social media savvy methods, especially on Twitter (Shane & Hubbard, 2014)?

ISIL's focus on the radicalization of vulnerable individuals has only strengthened them, with each new recruit bringing in new funding, a resolve to fight and an appearance of diversity to highlight on their social media (Gates & Podder, 2015). This element of diversity is critical to ISIL's social media strategy because it enables the group to craft their own narrative to appeal to a range of potential recruits. These sides range from videos of journalists being executed, to how the members find inventive ways to charge their smartphones, to a group rejoicing after finding a jar of Nutella in a store (Klausen, 2015). ISIL's ability to come across as a sort of brotherhood allows them to reach individuals who may feel alienated or out-of-touch with their own society and are therefore more susceptible to the idea of becoming a part of something bigger than themselves (Shane & Hubbard, 2014). This has been extraordinarily effective in recruiting

young men who feel insecure about their prospects of success in their own society by making them feel as though they will achieve some form of greatness by joining ISIL's fight (Gates & Podder, 2015).

One of the most frustrating aspects of ISIL's media strategy is the pure volume of posts that go up on a daily basis. The volume peaks at times when the group actually involved in the most conflict. One clear example is that on the day that ISIL marched into Mosul, they tweeted approximately 44 000 times (Farewell, 2014). An important note on that number is that it is not including all of the accounts that retweet ISIL tweets or mention ISIL accounts in their own tweets. Nor does it include the tweets from the personal accounts of radicalized individuals (Farewell, 2014). The pure volume of content being produced on a daily basis has the potential to reach millions of other accounts with the potential to radicalize each of them and encourage lone wolf terrorism (Liang, 2015). It also creates an issue that is similar to the one in the case of Boko Haram wherein the platforms that are being mobilized by these groups have very lax or non-existent hate speech monitoring, allowing the group's influence to spread (Klausen, 2015).

The utilization of social media also presents a problem for governments looking to halt the spread of ISIL propaganda because very often, ISIL accounts use fake names and locations to protect the identities of the members and, when an account is shut down or removed, the user can simply create a new account and continue to spread propaganda (Liang, 2015). As a result of the rapid regeneration of ISIL twitter accounts, counterterrorism groups are being forced to redesign their approaches to countering this type of terrorism as censorship and account deletion have proven ineffective at halting the sources of propaganda (Liang, 2015).

Conclusion

Terrorists on social media present a problem similar to that of the Hydra. If you cut off one head, two more will take its place. It you shut down one ISIL tweet, delete one Boko Haram video or freeze one fake al-Qaeda charity, two more will be created to take their place. Naturally, this is incredibly frustrating and has created a sense of paranoia. After all, you don't actually know what you neighbour does on their computer nor do you know what charities your colleague donates to or even what the barista at your favourite coffee shops watches in their spare time. But this paranoia should not consume the everyday lives of individuals nor should it prompt them to retaliate against those that they assume to guilty of these crimes. But as technology evolves and terrorists expand their scope of influence, the scope of hate and fear within societies expands as well, hurting individuals on the basis of assumed crimes.

One of the more depressing aspects of this analysis is that only three groups were covered when in reality, there are hundreds of active terrorist groups operating on a daily basis. These groups all have their own media strategies and goals. To even try to understand the motives of every group would be futile as there is a common theme of groups connecting, breaking apart, being assimilated, rising up and disappearing. But they are still out there and while they may not have the resources or capacity to carry out the world's next 9/11, they still have the ability to carry out distinctive acts of violence against the respective communities.

The conclusions of this paper are not optimistic. The abilities of terrorists will continue to evolve and expand as technology evolves and expands. Governments and counter-terrorism units will most likely be playing catch-up for the foreseeable future as

well. But it would be a mistake to assume that there is no chance of us winning the war on terror and there is no excuse for letting paranoia and fear consume us for, a society that is divided will not stand. After all, the hydra was eventually defeated. It just took some time to understand how.

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Exploitation Abroad: The Canadian Mining Industry in Mexico

Michelle Gomez

Introduction

Extractivism, or the process of extracting natural resources from the earth to sell for profit, has occurred around the world for centuries, with one of the most common forms being mining. Canada has the largest mining industry in the world, with much of its outward investment targeting Latin America (Gordon & Webber, 2008).

It is often argued that foreign investment and extractivism have greatly benefitted the economies of Latin American countries. Petras & Veltmeyer (2014) note that "Latin America changed from being a relatively marginal location for north-south capital flows… into an important and dynamic destination" (p. 22). However, as this paper will reveal, there is great inequality between those who reap the benefits of this system and those who bear the consequences. This paper will examine extractivism in Latin America, focusing on Canadian mining companies in Mexico. I argue that the predatory and exploitative nature of Canadian mining in Mexico is in part due to neoliberal reforms by the Mexican government, but is mainly due to the support that these mining companies receive from the Canadian government, which includes negligent laws with regards to the prosecution of human rights abuses abroad.

This paper will begin by outlining the nature of Canadian mining in Mexico with specific examples, as well as how these companies present themselves in a positive light through Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) strategies. It will then briefly look at the history of Indigenous land rights in Mexico. Next, the current case study of the Huichol people against First Majestic Silver in the Wixarika region of northern Mexico will be examined with reference to David Harvey's (2003) theory of accumulation of

dispossession. This paper will finish by exploring how the laws and policies of both the Canadian and Mexican government allow these practices to occur and will offer my opinion on where to go from there.

The Nature of Canadian Mining in Mexico and Corporate Social Responsibility

In most cases, mining cannot occur without people "being dispossessed of their land, natural resources, and livelihoods" (Gordon & Webber, 2008, p. 68). Unfortunately, the people that are most affected by these practices are often small, poor, rural communities, especially agricultural and indigenous communities (Tetreault, 2015).

Tetreault (2015) examines the environmental and social consequences of Canadian mining in Mexico, stating that "open-pit mining completely destroys the land that contains minerals, leaving behind gigantic craters and heaps of contaminated rubble that emit toxins into the environment" (p. 51). He gives the example of the residents of Cerro San Pedro, located in San Luis Potosí near Canadian company, New Gold's mine. The area had been designated a protected area for natural conservation by the government of San Luis Potosí in 1993, however, permission to build the mine was granted to New Gold by Mexico's SEMARNAT (Secretariat of Environment and Natural Resources) and Ministry of Economy (Tetreault, 2014). This mine will likely lead to the destruction of land for wildlife, loss of agricultural opportunities for locals, and possibly damages to local infrastructure due to explosives used (Tetreault, 2015). Activists who

have spoken out against this project have been subjected to death threats, physical aggression, and murder attempts (Tetreault, 2014).

In Mazapil, Zacatecas, Goldcorp's large gold mine, Peñasquito, entails the process of leaching, which uses "large quantities of water, often depriving local communities of the water they need to carry out small-scale agricultural activities" (Tetrault, 2015, p. 51). The leaching process also involves toxic chemicals (cyanide, in the case of gold), which can contaminate the local water supply and environment (Tetreault, 2015). Furthermore, smelting that occurs in this mine causes large scale air pollution and enormously drains local aquifers; it is predicted to lead to the destruction of about 4000 hectares of land that is used by local small-scale farmers (Tetrault, 2014). As compensation to those affected by the mine, local communities were promised plentiful jobs by Goldcorp during negotiations. While Goldcorp claimed to have directly created 8000 jobs, only around 70 men from nearby communities were employed at the height of the development phase. These men worked mostly as construction peons and got paid on average under US$400 per month. Meanwhile, about 2000 local livelihoods based on farming and ranching have been destroyed (Tetreault, 2016, p. 649). In total, only about 0.031 percent of the profits of the Peñasquito mine has gone to local residents (Tetreault, 2015).

Most Canadian mining companies are careful to put forward a clean public image of their activities abroad, presenting themselves as friends of local communities by creating jobs and building schools. Through Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) strategies, these companies often gloss over the environmental and social damage to nearby areas caused by their mines and exaggerate their positive contributions, making

vague and unclear statements. For example, the webpage for Goldcorp's Peñasquito mine states that this mine site contains "a plant that processes sulphide ore using a high-pressure grinding roll circuit and has an average gold recovery of 66%" (Goldcorp, 2018). This refers to the smelting facility, however, the word "smelting" is not used, likely due to the negative connotations associated with the word.

Heidrich & Blundell's (2013) policy brief is an example of how Canadian mining companies make vague claims regarding their contributions in CSR reports, using ambiguous language and sweeping generalizations. The report states that "mining is a well-paying industry" and compares the mining industry to the car manufacturing industry, "which has traditionally been seen as a harbinger of economic growth and good jobs" (Heidrich & Blundell, 2013, p. 2). In the report, these broad statements are used to reach the conclusion that mining abroad must be beneficial to the host country. They use the two examples of Andean and Patagonian mine sites to explain the fact that since these sites are so remote, it is not feasible to bring in foreign workers, and therefore they hire and train locals. While this might be the case in these two specific sites, the authors allude to the fact that most mining companies hire and train locals, which is an enormous generalization. Many of their sources are CSR reports taken directly from Canadian mining companies, which are likely curated by expert PR personnel. Despite the efforts of mining companies to present themselves a certain way, "corporate social responsibility amounts to a discursive public-relations strategy, backed up by minimal amounts of cost-effective spending on the local level" (Tetrault, 2016, p. 644).

Overall, many Canadian mining companies operating in Mexico are involved in environmental damage, human rights abuses, and trickery. Tetreault (2016) notes that CSR:

> is merely a discursive strategy to gain entrance into territories and to legitimize extractive activities. It is backed up with relatively small amounts of cost-effective local-level spending on social projects, as well as a media campaign to justify mining in terms of job creation (p. 649).

Unfortunately, those who bear the consequences of these activities are most often poor smallholder farmers and indigenous groups living near these mining operations (Tetrault, 2015).

Case Study

Bartra & Otero (2005) look at the history of land struggles between Mexican peasants and the government. During the rule of Mexican president General Porfirio Díaz in the late 1800's, also known as the *Porfiriato*, the Díaz government passed a law to allow the process of primitive accumulation, and thus 'after the liberal reform laws and during the *Porfiriato*, the Indian communities were deprived of 90 percent of their land' (Bartra & Otero, 2005, p. 385).

However, the Mexican revolution that challenged the regime of Díaz and ended with the 1917 Constitution "protected the legal rights of indigenous peoples and enshrined those rights in the ejido system, which allowed land to be collectively held and used" (Harvey, 2003, p. 133). Many years later in 1991 under the Salinas

government, the privatization of the ejidos was suddenly encouraged, thus ignoring "the basis for collective security among indigenous groups" (p. 133). Many were displaced from their land, unemployed, and close to starvation in overcrowded cities (Harvey, 2003). There was incredible resistance to this reform, on the part of various *campesino* groups and the Zapatista movement (Harvey, 2003).

Fights between Indigenous communities in Mexico and the Mexican government alongside mining corporations are still seen today. There is currently an ongoing struggle between the Canadian mining company, First Majestic Silver, in the Wirikuta/Catorce region of San Luis Potosí and the Huichol people of western Mexico. Certain groups of the Huichol people make yearly pilgrimages from their western Mexico community to Wirikuta, which is seen as sacred and thus mining is considered unacceptable on this land (Boni et al., 2015). On the other hand, however, many locals who live full-time in the Wirikuta region are in support of First Majestic's mine, largely due to their promised "community projects" (Boni et al., 2015). The Huichol people argue that this support comes from the local's dire need for social programs, and thus locals have little choice but to support the project (Boni et al., 2015).

Wirikuta was declared a culturally and historically significant site as well as an area under ecological conservation in 1994 and was also declared a sacred natural site by UNESCO (Tetrault, 2014). The Hauxa Manuka Accord, signed by President Felipe Calderón in 2008, promised to respect and protect the sacred sites of the Wixrika people. "The mining concessions granted to First Majestic Silver by the Ministry of Economy blatantly violate this accord… [which] explicitly prohibits any kind of mining activities" (Tetrault, 2014, 185-186).

The Huichol people, in tandem with a diverse group of other NGO's, have formed the Frente en Defensa de Wirikuta (FDW), which has engaged in peaceful protests, recruited the help of national and international organizations for support, and generated a lot of public attention (Boni et al., 2015). The three main demands that the FDW have made to the government are: to cancel all mining concessions held by First Majestic; to implement development programs for the local Wirikuta communities; and to completely forbid future mining concessions in the area (Boni et al., 2015). Although the Huichol have seen partial success, the struggle is ongoing.

What is interesting about this conflict is that the Huichol people are demanding both that their culture be respected and that their land be recognized by the federal government. While many scholars make the mistake of examining Indian peasant movements in terms of either their material or their identity demands, Bartra & Otero (2005) argue that "in most social movements, but particularly so in the case of indigenous peasant struggles, material (land) and identity (culture) demands are inseparable" (p. 383). Although Bartra & Otero (2005) look at a different type of peasant movement, many of their theoretical ideas are still applicable to anti-mining movements, and specifically to the Wirikuta case. They note that "Indigenous ethnicity and culture are simply the anchoring points of the struggle for land" (Bartra & Otero, p. 383), and it is for this reason that the protection of the Wirikuta region is so important for the Huichol people. The physical space in the Wirikuta region is extremely important to the culture of the Huichol people, and allowing mining in this region is therefore disastrous to their beliefs, culture, and tradition.

Accumulation by Dispossession

Gordon & Webber (2008) note that "David Harvey's concept of accumulation by dispossession is a useful framework for understanding the predatory activities of Canadian mining companies in Latin America" (p. 63). Harvey's (2003) theory of accumulation by dispossession is particularly relevant to the situation of Canadian mining companies in Mexico as illustrated by the case studies presented above.

Accumulation by dispossession is based off Marx's idea of primitive accumulation, which involves the:

> privatization of land and the forceful expulsion of peasant populations; the conversion of various forms of property rights (common, collective, state, etc.) into exclusive private property rights; the suppression of rights to the commons; the commodification of labour power and the suppression of alternative (indigenous) forms of production and consumption (Harvey, p. 122).

Harvey (2003) notes that there are many different forms of accumulation by dispossession, and that it can occur both illegally and legally. Gordon & Webber (2008) explain that whether it is legal or not, accumulation always involves displacing some group of people: "the creation of new spaces of accumulation is not an innocuous process; it inevitably involves the forceful and violent reorganisation of peoples' lives as they are subordinated to the whims of capital" (p. 63).

Tetreault (2014) contextualizes this idea in the framework of mining in Mexico. He explains that neoliberal reforms have facilitated accumulation by dispossession, "first, by transferring public resources in the form of mineral rights and state-run

mining companies to the private sector; and second, by dispossessing smallholder farmers and indigenous of land and water resources in order to allow mining companies to carry out their activities" (p. 173). While Tetreault (2014) places the blame on Mexico's neoliberal policies, Harvey (2003) attributes these practices mainly to United States (US) imperialism as well as Washington-based international organizations such as the WTO and the World Bank.

Canadian Government

Gordon & Webber (2008) analyze the predatory nature of Canadian mining in Latin America and explain how deeply involved the Canadian government is in these exploitative practices. The authors use the example of Colombia, which like the Mexican government, has welcoming policies and conditions for foreign mining companies. The Colombian neoliberal mining code of 2001 greatly benefits Canadian mining companies. This was no coincidence; the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Canadian Energy Research Institute (CERI) played a central role in developing the code since 1996 when the project was first initiated (Gordon & Webber, 2008). Another example of the Canadian government pushing for the interests of Canadian mining companies in Latin America was in 2002, when CIDA invested $9.6 million in the Mineral Resources Reform Project in Peru. The purpose of the project was to support Peru's Ministry of Energy and Mines to improve the management of mining in Peru (Gordon & Webber, 2008). "These actions are defended as contributing to 'development' and 'poverty reduction', but they facilitate the Canadian mining presence, whose contribution to these things… is non-existent" (Gordon & Webber, 2008, p. 69).

The Canadian mining industry has been successful at imposing their wishes on governments in Latin America, as many resource-rich countries including Mexico "have adopted mining codes that unambiguously favour foreign corporations over indigenous people, the environment and labour rights, and allow corporations greater ability to repatriate profits to their home economies while significantly reducing royalties imposed on them" (Gordon & Webber, 2008, p. 69).

In addition to creating favorable conditions for Canadian mining companies abroad, another factor that contributes to exploitation "is the Canadian government's flat-out refusal to impose any kind of human rights standards on Canadian companies' actions outside Canada" (Gordon & Webber, 2008, p. 69). Instead, the Canadian government pushes this responsibility onto other governments, claiming that it is the responsibility of host states to manage human rights laws on their territory. The Canadian government does not indicate any intention to pursue legislation to allow the persecution Canadian companies operating abroad, and "claims that there is no international norm for socially responsible behaviour that can measure a company's deeds" (Gordon & Webber, 2008, p. 69). The Canadian government implies that its contribution to the World Bank and IMF shows their support for human rights while at the same time refusing to sign the United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Gordon & Webber, 2008).

"In Mexico, the Canadian Embassy's support for Canadian-based mining companies is virtually unconditional" (Tetreault, 2016). In the case of Calgary-based Blackfire Exploration, their mining operation in the state of Chiapas resulted in the murder of a local anti-mining activist, Mariano Abarca (Tetreault, 2016). Throughout

this process "the Embassy continued to defend the company to Mexica state officials and provided it with information on how to sue the state of Chiapas under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) for closing the mine" (Tetreault, 2016, p. 646-647).

Rather than regulating mining companies in a legitimate way through passing laws and policies, the Canadian government instead promotes voluntary corporate social responsibility on the part of mining companies and pushes the burden of legislation on the host states of mining operations (Tetreault, 2016). Not only has the Canadian government overlooked human rights abuses committed by Canadian mining companies, but they have pushed for favorable mining conditions abroad and have facilitated an environment where these abuses occur. "This has fostered a value transfer from degraded mining regions in Mexico to affluent metropolitan neighborhoods in Canada, the habitat of mining entrepreneurs and their high paid professional staff" (Tetreault, 2016, p. 647).

Mexican Government

The Mexican government has welcomed the investment from Canadian mining companies, often to the point of turning a blind eye in the face of malpractices. Petras & Veltmeyer (2014) state that the Mexican government "is clearly aligned with both the neoliberal policy agenda and US imperialism—and it has one of the most *entreguista* regimes in all Latin America, particularly as regards mining capital" (p. 23). In other words, Mexico has one of the most open market economic systems in Latin America

with regard to mining, and this is a result of US dominance. In this case, Canadian companies have benefited from Mexican policies conforming to US neoliberalism.

In response to Mexico's 1982 debt crisis, the federal government introduced a series of neoliberal reforms in the 90's and early 2000's. 'These included the elimination of taxes on the exportation of metals and minerals, the reduction of tariffs on the importation of mining machinery and equipment, and differential discount rates for production taxes' (Tetreault, 2016, p. 645). Many of the reforms occurred during Salina's presidency in 1989-94, in which the mining sector was privatized and subsequently opened to foreign investment. This involved making changes to mining laws as well as the Constitution to stop post-revolutionary land distribution, allowing foreign-owned mining companies to operate in Mexico, and allowing unlimited spatial extension on mining concessions as well as extending the length of concessions from 25 to 50 years (Tetreault, 2016). Tetreault (2016) explains that this "gives the federal government the legal basis for expropriating *ejidal* and communal land in order to hand it over to mining capital" (p. 645), thus "dispossessing smallholder farmers and indigenous communities of land, water, and cultural landscapes in order to allow mining companies to carry out their activities" (Tetreault, 2015, p. 48).

Tetreault (2015) notes that these neoliberal policies enacted by the Mexican government "give transnational mining capital access to the country's mineral resources for next to nothing, allowing them to use environmental destructive technologies that undermine the basis for sustaining rural livelihoods and cultures" (p. 59). Tetreault (2016) believes that in the attempt to grow Mexico's economy with extractivism, Mexico has allowed certain segments of their own population to be harmed.

Closing Remarks

Petras & Veltmeyer (2014) state that "while the neoliberal agenda can be seen as an imperialist project promoted by the US government and Washington-based international financial institutions, it was adopted and implemented by the Mexican government in such a way as to privilege the accumulation of nationally-based mining capital" (p. 195). They explain that these policies put in place by the Mexican government have favoured transnational corporations, and Canadian mining companies in particular, "largely because of the various forms of support they receive from their home government" (p. 195). Similarly, Tetreault (2014) fails to hold the Canadian government accountable, and instead focuses on the Mexican government's neoliberal policies. Thomas (2017) agrees with the above authors, noting that neoliberal economic policies have caused an "unprecedented level of environmental destruction at the hands of the mining and petroleum industries" (p. 18). However, he acknowledges that these policies were advocated for by countries of the Global North, countries with much more power and resources than Mexico.

While this paper acknowledges that both the Canadian and Mexican governments contribute to the conditions that allow these predatory practices to occur, it is the Canadian government that has the power to impose regulations upon these companies. As Mexico is attempting to grow their economy and attract foreign direct investment, they are not in a position to be placing restrictions upon companies that strengthen their economy. Due to the power and economic imbalance between Canada and Mexico, the responsibility should therefore fall on the Canadian government to ensure the upkeep of adequate human rights practices. We must look at the activities of Canadian mining

companies and the Canadian state within the context of "global capitalism and, in particular, the relations between countries of the global North and those of the global South" (Gordon & Webber, 2008, p. 64).

Conclusion

'The interests of Canadian mining companies and the Canadian state, on the one hand, are irreconcilable with those of the people across Latin America resisting Canadian mining development in their communities, on the other' (Gordon & Webber, 2008, p. 64). While many of the authors that this paper draws upon have proposed change through reforms on the part of the Mexican government (Tetreault, 2014), Indigenous peasant resistance (Gordon & Webber, 2008), or through global ideological challenges (Thomas, 2017), I argue that the most conceivable and concrete way to solve the issue of exploitative mining practices is through government regulation. Unless there are strictly enforced laws regulating how mining companies can operate abroad, there is no incentive for these companies to regulate themselves. Unlike governments, mining companies are not accountable to citizens; they are commercial enterprises existing in a free-market capitalist system. While the issue may lie within the mining companies, it must be solved through government laws and policies.

Furthermore, the Mexican government placing restrictions on the flow of capital would not stop Canadian companies from continuing these same practices in other states as there are many other countries in Latin America and beyond that have similar neoliberal policies. If Mexico created obstacles for Canadian mining companies, these companies would simply take their business elsewhere. It is for this reason that it is

crucial that the restrictions are placed upon Canadian companies by the Canadian government, rather than by host countries.

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The Growth and Impact of the BDS Movement: Linking Local to Global Context

Fatimah Younes

Abstract

Beginning in 2005, 170 Palestinian civil society groups launched the Boycott, Divestments, and Sanctions (BDS) movement against the Israeli government (Morrison, 2015, p. 245). The objective of this movement was to compel Israel to comply with the mandates that were specified to them from the International Court of Justice. This was specifically in regards to the building of illegal settlements on Palestinian land and neglecting the right of return for Palestinian refugees (Barghouti, 2011, p. 215). Under the initiative of Omar Barghouti, Palestinian civil society groups worldwide have opted to launch this non-violent boycott to place economic and socio-cultural forms of global pressure as an attempt to compel Israel to comply with international law (Barghouti, 2011, p. 50). The aim of this paper is to explain the expansion and growth of the BDS movement by using political process theories and theories of contentious politics to explain degradation of Israel's legitimacy as a democratic and Jewish state (Barghouti, 2011, p. 10).

Introduction

The Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement that began in July 2005, was the result of an alternate solution to push the state of Israel to comply with international law after backlash from the international community at the conclusion of the Second Intifada, or the second Palestinian uprising. The work of this movement includes over 170 Palestinian civil society groups worldwide in order to bring attention the "collective responsibility of the international community" (Barghouti, 2011, p. 5) to

fight injustice, similar to movements of the indigenous people of South Africa during the apartheid era. This coalition of civil society groups has compiled a list of corporations and products that either provide funding to the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) or contributed to the normalization of settlements, that are illegal according to international law, in the West Bank.

The aim of this paper is to explain how the BDS movement occurred as well as the factors that contribute to its current rate of success through the use of Political Process Theory and Contentious Politics Theory . By using these theories developed by Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, and Doug McAdam, is to use a historical and political outlook to explain the factors that has led to the current leadership and political opportunities of the BDS movement. This includes framing the Israeli occupation of Palestine as an issue that continues to affect the lives of Palestinians, whether they are residing in the Occupied Territories, refugee camps in neighbouring states, or in the West. Moreover, this movement has the potential to provide Palestinians, in addition to human rights groups, a platform to educate and raise awareness for an occupation that continues to have an effect.

Theoretical Framework

Political Process Theory:

Political process theory began in the mid-1970s. It acted as a critique of previous social movements theories and as a new theoretical framework for exploring the reasons behind social movements (Meyer & Lupo, 2010, p. 112). Political process theory was initially used to "emphasize the role of political opportunity structure in the growth of

domestic movements" (Bob, 2002, p. 397). Likewise, political process theory focuses on collective actors as the subject of the growth of social movements.

Political process theory was influenced by Max Weber's focus on the role of beliefs and ideas in shaping interests and facilitating mobilization (Meyer & Lupo, 2010, p. 113), while also taking into account the state's role as the highest and most important source of authority (Meyer et al., 2010, p. 121). In assuming that the highest authority belongs to the state, political process theory then focuses on groups that are marginalized from mainstream society. Along with this assumption, political process theory also looks at the overall structures of the political institutions and the historical development of the social movement.

In relation to the BDS movement, social movement theories, such as Political Process Theory , are used to explain how the lead up to the movement occurred. This theory provides a framework that places the Palestinians as the targeted group and Israel as the aggressor, who holds the highest concentration of power. Since this is the case, the Palestinians, through a coalition of Human Rights groups, activists, and global civil society groups, are able to increase their ability to raise awareness of the effects of occupation (Buecheler, 2012, p. 277).

Contentious Politics Theory:

Contentious politics theory was devised by the same theorists who developed political process theory in an attempt to expand beyond "the classic social movement agenda" (Smith & Fetner, 2010, p. 15). The inspiration behind the development of this theory is the Marxist thought on class conflict (Tarrow, 2011, p. 17). While it is considered an extension of political process theory, contentious politics consider "the

episodes of contention" which are the mechanisms that lead to build-up of the social movement (Buecheler, 2012, p. 422). In other words, the focus in contentious politics is the preceding events that led to the political opportunity for mobilization, rather than the political opportunity itself (Smith & Fetner, 2010, p. 19). Furthermore, contentious politics theory "emerges in response to changes in political opportunities and threats when participants perceive and respond to incentives" (Tarrow, 2011, p. 16).

The various types of mechanisms that can be used in contentious politics include brokerage mechanisms, which are used to bring disconnected "social sites or groups" together (Buecheler, 2012, p. 423) to bring the issues of the conflict to the forefront of human rights issues. Furthermore, identity is used as a mechanism to recognize the targeted or disenfranchised groups and those in power who also create these inequalities of power (Tarrow, 2011, p. 20). In the case of identity, social class is seen as a root cause for collective action. Which is an integral part of the formation of the social movement in Political Process Theory. Whereas, in contentious politics, identity is used to distinguish the actors in the movement from whom the actors are communicating their grievances towards. Often it is not one group that is part of the movement, rather, it is collection of different groups, which has the possibility to extend internationally.

Likewise, another difference between contentious politics theo y and political process theory is the use of discourse in contentious politics . Discourse analysis is a tool in contentious politics which reviews the trajectory of social movements. This requires examination of the historical background to understand what could have caused the social movement (Smith & Fetner, 2010, p. 25). Due to the cyclical nature of history, understanding the discourse of a social movement provides the potential to predict the outcomes of social movements (Tarrow, 2011, p. 23). These two social

movement theories will be used to explain the BDS movement and its global appeal. The following section will analyse the political opportunity of the BDS movement, its historical context, and its mobilizing structures amongst other aspects.

Case Study: Boycott Divestment and Sanctions

The Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement formally began in 2005 at the conclusion of the Second Palestinian Uprising (Morrison, 2015, p. 233). This was prior to the global call to boycott Israel and debunk the Zionist myth of "a land without a people, a people without a land" (Barghouti, 2011, p. 4). As Suzanne Morrison notes, civil society groups have been at the forefront of this movement as well as the global appeal in supporting BDS. Likewise, support has been growing steadily within the field of academia (Barghouti, 2011, p. 35). Academics and intellectuals from a variety of different backgrounds have signed what came to be known as the "Declaration of Independence from Fascism" in response to the Israeli government's passing of the amendment to the Citizenship Act (Barghouti, 2011, p. 12). The amendment to the act requires non-Jews wishing to apply for Israeli citizenship to sign a "loyalty pledge," that accepts Israel as a Jewish democratic state (Barghouti, 2011, p. 12). This petition, circulated by global civil society groups, shows that there has been diffusion within the global community. In addition to this, crimes that Israel has committed includes, but are not limited to, the incarceration of children under military law instead of civil law, the continued expansion of illegal settlements, and the separation wall in the West Bank, despite condemnation from the International Court of Justice (Barghouti, 2011, p. 65).

The Point of Contention for the Rise of the BDS Movement

The BDS movement can be summarized as "a historic moment of collective consciousness" and the release of information from "almost a century of struggle against Zionist settler colonialism" (Barghouti, 2011, p. 5). The movement was inspired by the boycotts against the apartheid system in South Africa and these similarities were first brought to light in 2006 in an article published in *The Guardian* (Barghouti, 2011, p. 64). The article compared Israeli policies to those of South Africa during apartheid, and how the idea of comparing the two states is disconcerting towards Israel as a state and its citizens, because they see it "as a step closer" to being compared to Nazi Germany in relation to their Nuremburg laws (Barghouti, 2011, p. 63). In making these comparisons, the article shows that the BDS movement is partly following the discourse set out by the African National Congress (ANC), while at the same time it is creating new forms of discourse globally.

When the movement was first launched on July 9th, 2005, the response was polarizing (Hallward, 2013, p. 1). On one hand, it gave a non-violent solution near the end of the Second Intifada. However, because Palestinians were dispersed between the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the pre-1948 borders, there was a sense of distrust and "disparate aims" (Hallward, 2013, p. 2). This lack of unity and cooperation was part of the reason why it has taken a long time for the movement to gain global support. Another reason for the delay in the boycott was the United States (U.S.) granting support to the Israeli state, especially during the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1973. However, in response to the bombing campaign towards Gaza in 2008 and 2009, relations between Israel's Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and U.S. president, Barack Obama, became strained (Morrison, 2015, p. 4). This has given the BDS

National Committee (BNC) the political opportunity to expand their networks and further their call for the BDS movement.

Point of Contention

There has been a cycle of contention for the BDS movement. The first point of contention dates back to the end of the first Palestinian uprisings with the Oslo Accords signed in 1994. The Accords outline the details of a Palestine-Israel peace agreement, and for the Palestinian Authority to recognize Israel as a state in exchange for further discussion of the possibility of an independent Palestinian state (Morrison, 2015, p. 245). In the period following the Accords, Palestinians grew frustrated from the lack of leadership from their government, and the continued ill treatment from the Israeli government and forces.

Therefore, frustrations led up to the Second Intifada, which had occurred as a response to the lack of political responsibility of the Palestinian Authority and the continuation of the status quo prior to the First Intifada. During the Second Intifada, there were divestment campaigns that began in the U.S. from student groups, which were targeted as a response to what was considered the most violent Intifada (Hallward, 2013, p. 27). This later grew and was organized into the "Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel" by academic scholars to boycott Israeli academic and cultural institutions in response to Israel's illegal occupation and colonization of the Palestinian territories (Hallward, 2013, p. 28).

The official call for BDS, however, came one year after the International Court of Justice ruled that the separation wall to be built between Israel and Palestine was illegal (Hallward, 2013, p. 28). The beginning of the BDS campaign began with calling Israel to

halt the building of the wall and later its mandate expanded to include the illegal building of settlements, and the right of return for Palestinian refugees (Hallward, 2013, p. 34). However, a point of contention in expanding the BDS movement in the U.S. was whether protesting against Israel's policies would be considered anti-Semitic (Hallward, 2013, p. 34). However, this internal debate derails from the greater issue of unequal distribution of power and oppression towards the Palestinians.

The Political Opportunity for Boycott

Even though the call for a cultural and intellectual boycott began during the Second Intifada, the political opportunity to expand the BDS movement began when relations between the U.S. and Israel began to strain under the Obama-administration (Barghouti, 2011, p. 4). During this time, the U.S. began to see the state of Israel as more of a burden, rather than an ally (Barghouti, 2011, p. 4). The first reason for this was from the coverage surrounding the attacks and subsequent blockade on Gaza in 2008-2009, which shows the different levels of Israel's oppression towards the Palestinian population (Barghouti, 2011, p. 206). The report from the United Nations Human Rights Council showcased that the blockade and siege imposed on the Gaza Strip was pre-meditated, calculated and executed without error (Barghouti, 2011, p. 38). This brought up serious concerns about Israel's human rights abuses to the forefront, and has led many scholars, including Richard Falk, an expert on human rights issues, to support BDS. The siege against Gaza renewed the global call for a cultural, economic, and academic boycott against Israel.

The Role of Global Civil Society

Global civil society groups have been at the forefront of promoting the grievances of Palestinians and calling on multinational corporations to change the location of their operations if goods were being produced in illegal settlements, rather than being produced within the borders of Israel proper. Global civil society groups, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, provided reports and condemned the state of Israel through naming and shaming campaigns. Furthermore, global civil society groups, in partnership with Palestinian civil society, have created a network that has expanded the scope of the movement from local to global. This was done through committed research on multinational corporations that operate in illegal settlements in the West Bank and then placing pressure on these same corporations, in an attempt to change their practises.

Conclusion

Although the BDS movement began with one set of actors, it grew to encompass other actors and civil society groups, which were able to put pressure on states to address the human rights abuses in Israel. With the help of global civil society groups, Palestinian civil society groups are able to expand their networks, their message, and call for boycott, divestment, and sanctions to Israel. At this time, the movement has successfully been growing steadily, with Ireland passing a bill in 2019 to ban Israeli settlement goods (Middle East Monitor, 2019). These victories, although they may seem minor, are accomplishments that have the potential to persuade other states to answer the call for boycott. Inspired by the boycott movements in South Africa, the hope of the

BDS movement is to address the apartheid conditions that Palestinians are living in, and to put an end to these conditions.

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Political Life in France

Alexandra Senchyna

It was the beginning of December, the streets of Paris had been transformed from their usual grey, albeit rather beautiful, buildings into something straight out of a Hallmark Christmas movie. Christmas markets had been set up throughout the city allowing Parisiens and tourists alike to stop and browse the stalls or have a cup of *vin chaud* before continuing with their evening at surrounding bars and cafés. It was a Saturday. The weekends were typically the busiest days to visit Paris, yet for the past few weeks the streets every Saturday were eerily quiet. Store windows had been boarded up, restaurants had pulled their chairs in and locked their doors, tourists were advised to leave the city, and local parisiens had opted to stay inside for the day. As we wandered through the city, we happened upon numerous blocked streets. Police sirens blared in the background, echoing off the buildings of the narrow roads. Stumbling upon a Christmas market, alive and untouched in a city that had essentially shut down, felt almost like walking onto a movie set.

The year that I moved to France to do my exchange was one of the most politically tense years that I could've chosen to live there. France is a very politically engaged country and is no stranger to civil disobedience and unrest. During the two semesters that I studied in France, I experienced this political tension firsthand. Since mid-November of 2018, French people had taken to the streets to protest both in Paris, and in various major cities throughout the country. They called themselves the *"Gilets Jaunes"* or "Yellow Vests" after their attire: a yellow vest that every person in Europe is required by law to carry in their car. What began originally as a protest against the

increasing taxes on gas, quickly became a demonstration against an accumulation of issues that had frustrated the lives of the general public. The protesters came from both the political left and the right, united in a movement of the working people against the French elite. From economic inequality and housing insecurity, to resentment with the governing elite, the demands of the *Gilets Jaunes* were exhaustive, disorganized, and not entirely coherent. However, what was clear was that this was a development that was gaining momentum and that there was no foreseeable end to the public demonstrations and violence that had come to characterize the movement.

We had only been walking through the Christmas market for a few minutes before we saw the first group of people running around the corner. Screaming voices bounced off the walls of *le centre pompidou* and the Christmas stalls, lingering in the adjacent square. Without hesitation store owners began closing their doors, boarding up their windows and locking the customers inside. *"Fermez les fenêtres!"* a shopkeeper yelled at her neighbouring Christmas stalls, grabbing the notebook that I had been looking at out of my hand and scrambling to roll down her window. We had been careful to avoid the *Avenue des Champs-Élysées* all day knowing that that was where the epicenter of protests, and police retaliation was taking place. We were unprepared to get caught in midst of the conflict, in a Christmas market of all places. The *Gilets Jaunes* came running down the street, not marching peacefully as we had seen in other parts of the city earlier in the day. Right behind them white police vans followed, with riot police marching together, shields raised in anticipation of violent clashes with the protesters. My friend grabbed my arm and pulled me into the crowd of fleeing onlookers. We ducked into the nearest metro station, catching a train to the other side of the Seine

away from the conflict. We then got off in the Latin Quarter and found the nearest café with a TV. For the next couple of hours we watched the news attentively, continuously refreshing our twitter feeds for updates on the clashes between the *Gilets Jaunes* and the police in the street where we had stood just moments earlier.

Although the *Gilets Jaunes* protests were undoubtedly the most violent during the winter of 2018, the movement has continued to take place every weekend for several months well into 2019. Each time something significant happened within French society, it encouraged the protests to endure further.

On March 15, 2019, thousands of students in cities around the world skipped school and took to the streets to protest climate change and the lack of accountability and action taken by governments to address this issue. Though I was not in Paris the day of the march, I was able to attend the event in my city, Reims, where high school and university students alike left class to participate. At noon, a crowd gathered in front of the cathedral, megaphones and cardboard signs in hand. We made our way from the cathedral, to the mayor's office, then finally downtown, with our signs in the air, chanting in unison.

"Et un, et deux, et trois degrés, c'est un crime contre l'humanité"
(And one, and two, and three degrees, it's a crime against humanity)

"Rejoignez-nous, ne nous regardez pas."
(Join us, don't look at us)

In contrast to the violent *Gilets Jaunes* protests that had been taking place every weekend for the previous 5 months, the climate march was peaceful, student-led and had clear expectations of the government. Started by 16-year old Greta Thunberg in Sweden, the climate protests have become a global initiative to urge the international community to take immediate action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and curb the negative effects of climate change. It was an ambivalent feeling, marching with my fellow classmates, as local representatives and the press watched from the sideline. On one hand, there was a sense of optimism as the students rallied behind a unifying cause that has been one of the greatest social issues since the day we were born, and will ultimately affect us for the rest of our lives. On the other, you could feel the frustration and desperation as we gathered around the mayor's office, feeling that our cries were falling on deaf ears. Following the original protest on March 15th, student-led climate marches have continued to occur around the world, indicating the ongoing battle to make climate change policy a top priority within local and international politics.

The final incident that marked the end of my experience living in France was the devastating fire at the *Notre Dame de Paris*. On April 15th around 6:30 pm, a fire broke out on the roof of the cathedral, destroying the majority of the wooden roof and the central spire. Within seconds, there was an outpouring of grief on social media, as media outlets and individuals around the world mourned the loss of one of the world's greatest architectural and cultural structures. In the moment, the conversations surrounding the fire were ones of disbelief and heartbreak. Upon reflection, many people online began to critique the public sentiments and statements put forward by prominent people in regards to the fire. While the Notre Dame burned in Paris, the Al-Aqsa Mosque in

Jerusalem, the third holiest place for Muslims, raged on with very little media attention or public outcry. That same energy that people used to express their sorrow at the loss of the Notre Dame was lacking on social media when three historic Black churches were targeted and burned down within 10 days in Louisiana just two weeks earlier. Traditional media coverage, and discussions on social media tend to prioritize certain global stories over others. While it is understandable that stories closer to home will receive more coverage than those that have little connection to where we live, what becomes an issue is when we put more of our thoughts and sympathy towards a physical building than the loss of human life. According to Vox Media, as of April 17th 2019, over one billion dollars had been raised in support for the Notre Dame Cathedral. [1] While it was a devastating loss to French culture, religion, and history, not a single person died or was injured in the fire. In contrast, when Cyclone Idai hit the Southeast region of Africa last March, killing hundreds of people and forcing thousands more to be displaced from their homes in Mozambique, Tanzania, and Malawi, the international community failed to raise the same type of funds that the Notre Dame had received to support aid relief.[2] The Notre Dame fire precipitated a global discussion on the types of issues that are most important to global audiences. The fact that so much money was raised in so little time in support of reconstructing a building, yet millions of people remain displaced, below the poverty line, or subject to persecution demonstrates how the billionaires of the world prioritize the use of their money. Many cultural heritage sites around the world do not have the same privilege of being rebuilt when they are destroyed. The culturally rich sites in Aleppo destroyed during the Syrian war, or the cultural heritage destroyed in the 2003 invasion of Iraq didn't receive billions of dollars from celebrities or the political elite to be restored. While mourning the loss of a French

church, and mourning the lives of people killed by climate-related storms in Mozambique are not mutually exclusive, it is important to recognize the social and cultural factors at play that influence people to post a picture on Instagram or Twitter grieving the loss of one over the other.

If the past year living in France has taught me anything, it is that there is no excuse not to be politically engaged and aware of issues taking place around the world. With the technology we have today and social media playing a huge part in our daily lives, we are more connected than ever before with people across the globe. One student's personal protests in Sweden can spark a global movement in hope for a greener future thanks to the internet's power to mobilize mass groups of people. Conversely, the ability for mass mobilization can lead to violent demonstrations such as the "*Gilets Jaunes*" with no comprehensible motives or foreseeable end in sight. Finally, international journalism is much more accessible thanks to the influence of social media. Thus, there is really no excuse for ignorance, or only following news that pertains to one part of the world. Within seconds, anyone can find information about news in any country, not just taking place in major cities such as Paris.


There Is NO
PLANET B
WE WONT WAIT
OR A POLITE
RANSITION

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Militarized Femininity in Israel

Mariam Ali

Introduction

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has turned Israel into a militarized society that militarizes the femininity of Israeli women. Outsiders often view Israeli women as liberated and equal with men due to "universal military service, the prime ministership of Golda Meir, the Declaration of Independence, and the 'plough women' of the pre-state period…" (Jacoby, 1999, p. 383). However, Israeli women have long struggled to obtain equal status and rights with their male counterparts within the confines of the country's national project (Jacoby, 1999). According to Gila Golan (1997), societies that experience chronic conflict, such as Israel, automatically value men over women because the former are essential for combat. Israel is exceptional in conscripting both men and women for military service, but women have not been able to achieve the same status as men within the Israeli Defense Force (IDF). When soldiers finish their mandatory service, women's lower status in the armed forces transfers over to civilian life (Levin, 2011). In general, the militarized femininity of Israeli women perpetuates regressive gender norms in both the armed forces and society.

Demographics

Women in Israel are not a homogenous group and are divided by ethnicity, religion, social class and a variety of other factors. Jews in Israel can be divided into several different ethnic groups; the Ashkenazim from Europe, the Sephardim who originate from the Iberian Peninsula and the Mizrahim, who come from majority-Muslim countries in West Asia and North Africa. The Sephardim and Mizrahim often overlap because many Sephardim sought refuge in Muslim-majority countries after Iberian rulers expelled them in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Ashkenazim

were the main pioneers in establishing the Israeli state and enjoy privileged positions in the country, dominating the upper echelons of society. In contrast, most Mizrahim arrived in Israel because their native countries persecuted and/or expelled them in reaction to the Arab-Israeli conflict. At their arrival, the Mizrahim suffered discrimination from the Ashkenazi-dominated Israeli state and today occupy lower social positions. Mizrahi Jews earn less than their Ashkenazi counterparts, are more likely to end up in prison, occupy fewer positions in academia and have never seen one of their own become Prime minister (Goldenberg, 2018). Israel also has an important Arab minority, who are divided between Muslims, Christians, Druze, and Bedouins. There are also hundreds of thousands of Jewish settlers in the West Bank. This paper will mainly focus on Jewish Israeli women, though a lot of the issues they face are similar to those experienced by Palestinian women.

Militarized Femininity, Masculinity and Society

The concept of militarized femininity describes how armies depend on women to enact particular roles in order to support military activities, which may or may not involve combat (Brown, 2019). The following roles have been common for women in armies throughout history: camp followers (doing menial tasks to support the army, such as food preparation and laundry), wives, prostitutes, nurses and combat soldiers (Brown, 2019). In general, women's roles are often secondary and meant to support predominantly male soldiers (Brown, 2019). The militarized femininity of Israeli women largely follows this model of assigning women to secondary roles in the IDF that support male soldiers (Jacoby, 1998).

Armies depend on militarized femininity in order to construct militarized masculinity. Militarized masculinity links different constructions of masculinity to military service, though the traits that armies emphasize may differ from country to country (Brown, 2019). In Israel, the IDF is characterized by a hegemonic masculinity that emphasizes "emotional and physical self-control and thrill " for male soldiers (Brown 2019, p. 385). Israeli militarized masculinity is also largely a reaction to the persecution and suffering Jewish people experienced throughout their history – it aims to create strong men (Sharoni, 1998).

Militaries are often associated with masculinity (Brown, 2019) and many female soldiers in the IDF experience it as a deeply masculine space (Levin, 2011). Militaries rely on constructions of masculinity to recruit, conscript, train and motivate men to fight (Brown, 2019). Most Israeli soldiers are conscripted straight out of high school and "young men in particular will train themselves sick in the months before they are called to duty, in order to be placed in the most competitive and prestigious units, which are often also the most dangerous" (Levin, 2011, p. 7).

Militarized femininity in Israel is shaped by the militarized nature of its state and society. From its founding in 1948 to the present period, Israel has experienced armed conflict with its neighbors, terror attacks, armed incursions, uprisings and rocket attacks at both high and low levels of intensity; it now enforces a military occupation of the Palestinian territories. Due to this context and history, the army plays a disproportionate role in the country's affairs (Golan, 1997). According to the 2017 Global Militarization Index, which measures the importance of a country's military structure in relation to its society, Israel ranks first as the most militarized society in the world with a score of 911.0. For reference, its regional rival, Iran, ranks 22nd and has a score of

763.7, its American allies takes 34th place with a score of 733.01, and Canada ranks 92nd with a score of 630.49 .

Other global measurements reflect the state of insecurity in Israel and the Palestinian territories. The 2018 Global Terrorism Index, which reports key trends and patterns in terrorism, ranks Israel 41st country most affected by terrorism with a score of 4.758, and Palestine 31st with a score of 5.330. For reference, Iraq is ranked 1st as the country most affected by terrorism with a score of 9.746 and Canada took 57th place with a score of 3.527. The Global Peace Index, which measures the peacefulness of states in 163 states, ranks Israel as the 146th most peaceful state in the world with a score of 2.764 and Palestine as 141st with a score of 2.621. For reference, Canada ranks as the 6th most peaceful country in the world with a score of 1.372 and Iraq ranks 160 with a score of 3.425 .

Due to its history of conflict, Israel has developed a (often vague) national security doctrine that prioritizes security concerns over civilian issues (Herzog, 1998). This security doctrine persists despite Israel's military dominance over Palestinians, its economic power,and the acknowledgment of its rights to exist from its Arab citizens (Herzog, 1998). This doctrine ties Israelis to the IDF, which plays a substantial role in Israeli society (Hauser, 2011). Conscription is mandatory in Israel for Jews of both genders and military service signifies true citizenship for Jewish Israelis (Arab Israelis are exempt from conscription) (Hauser 2011). Most female recruits serve a two-year service versus a three-year service for men (Hauser 2011).

The military, and by extension militarized femininity, is deeply tied to the nation and nationalism in Israel. According to Nila Yuval-Davis (1998), "women play crucial roles in biological, cultural and political reproductions of national and other

collectivities" (p. 28). For this reason, gender relations play a fundamental role in nationalist projects and national collectivities (Yuval-Davis, 1998). In Israel, there is a very gendered social order that serves to sustain Israeli society and its occupation of the Palestinian territories. The conflict subordinates Israeli women to the Zionist project, which has particularly traditional notions of femininity and masculinity (Sharoni, 1998). According to Simona Sharoni (1998), "while men are expected to be liberators and protectors of the Jewish people, women - cast as symbols of the nation, vulnerable and in need of protection - are assigned primary responsibility for the reproduction of the nation and for the transmission of its culture" (p. 25).

History of the Women's Movement in Israel

To understand the militarized femininity of Israeli women, it is important to look at the history of women's movements in the country. Women played an important role in the early Zionist movement and the women's movement was originally deeply intertwined with the national project (Jacoby, 1999). The 1917 Balfour Declaration promised to create a Jewish homeland in the recently settled territory of Palestine. This declaration allowed the Zionist movement to proceed with their goal of having an *ingathering of the exiles* in the Holy Land and creating a new egalitarian society based on social justice, creating a collective, and gender equality (Jacoby, 1999). In reality, female Jewish pioneers had difficulty obtaining complete equality with their male counterparts (Jacoby, 1999). This is notably demonstrated in the gendered roles that Jewish women took in the development of labour, agricultural, and paramilitary movements during the Mandate of Palestine (Jacoby, 1999).

It was mostly men who dealt with plowing and tilling the soil for food crops while women were relegated to work in the domestic sphere (Jacoby, 1999). Jewish men were largely inhospitable to the idea of Jewish women's independent labour, but that did not stop Jewish women from creating their own labour movements (Jacoby, 1999). These female labour movements worked to promote women's work in agriculture, aiming to put female pioneers on equal footing with their male counterparts and help them obtain an equality of duties with them (Jacoby, 1999). During this period, women's labour movements largely aligned themselves with Zionism, but they mostly failed to achieve gender equality (Jacoby, 1999).

The Jewish population progressively increased during the pre-state years, often facing backlash from the native Arab Palestinians, who were increasingly worried about dispossession from their land. Tensions increased between both groups, leading to intercommunal riots and massacres. In reaction to this conflict, Jewish settlers started to organize themselves into paramilitary groups, such as the *Haganah*. The *Haganah* had both male and female members, but women were largely consigned to communications, first aid, and medical assistance until the Arab Revolt of 1936, when they were given the right to guard communes (Jacoby, 1999). Jewish women were also able to later serve in the *Palmach*, the elite fighting force of the *Haganah* (Jacoby, 1999).

In 1948, Israel declared independence, fought its first war against its Arab neighbours and dispossessed hundreds of thousands of Palestinians. A large proportion of Jewish women, from both secular and religious backgrounds, fought in the war, more so out of patriotism than for ensuring gender equality (Rosenberg-Friedman, 2003). In September 1949, Israel passed the Defence Service Law, establishing mandatory

military service for women. However, Israeli women occupied an ambiguous position in the army because "no system was ever worked out to clearly define their rights and duties" (Jacoby 1999, p. 389-390). Israeli women largely took on traditional domestic duties in order to support male leadership and early state development (Jacoby, 1999).

Some Israeli Jewish women managed to achieve power, such as Golda Meir, who had been minister of various departments starting in 1949 and was Israel's Prime Minister from 1969 to 1974. However, the ideal model of Israeli femininity during the early statehood years was the 'heroine mother' who was able to produce an abundance of offspring in order to contribute to the national cause (Jacoby, 1999). David Ben-Gurion, Israel's first Prime Minister, often encouraged women to have as many children as possible (Jacoby, 1999).

In 1967, Israel defeated Jordan, Egypt and Syria in the Six-Day War, allowing it to occupy the Palestinian territories, the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula.In 1973, Egypt and Syria launched the Yom Kippur War, invading the Sinai and the Golan Heights respectively, killing roughly 2,600 Israeli soldiers and wounding around 9,000, which were heavy losses for Israel's then population of 3 million people. Israel drove back these forces, but the war still shocked, angered, and demoralized many Israelis, forcing then Prime Minister Golda Meir to resign.

It was only in the 1970s and the 1980s that the women's movement in Israel started to divorce itself from the national cause. The disastrous results of the 1973 Yom Kippur War created an atmosphere of dissent in Israel that opened up space for public debate on gender issues (Jacoby, 1999). The Israeli state encouraged women to take on greater responsibility in the army and the labour market (Jacoby, 1999). Israel also liberalized abortion laws during the 1970s after a large and sustained protest movement

(Jacoby, 1999). Women also lobbied for the criminalization of domestic abuse, which threatened many traditionalists (Jacoby, 1999). Israeli women's groups started to increasingly divorce themselves from Israeli nationalism and militarism and to associate themselves with the peace movement (Jacoby, 1999).

The 1982 War in Lebanon lead to mass protests from different women's groups against Israeli participation, notably from *Women Against the Invasion of Lebanon* and *Parents Against Silence* (Sharoni, 1998). To give context, Israel invaded Lebanon to fight the Palestine Liberation Organization, but Israeli and international public opinion turned against the war after the Sabra and Shatila massacres, when Israeli soldiers allowed Christian militias to massacre Palestinian and Lebanese civilians.

Women Against the Invasion of Lebanon received a lot of backlash because it was an explicitly feminist movement that condemned militarism and sexism (Sharoni, 1998). *Parents Against Silence*, which was later dubbed *Mothers Against Silence*, received much more public support because it more closely conformed to a socially acceptable embrace of motherhood, care, and protection (Sharoni, 1998). Even then, political figures reproached these mothers for their protests, telling them instead to spend their energy supporting their children in the IDF (Herzog, 1998). The First Intifada (1987-1993) lead to greater collaboration between Israeli feminists and their Palestinian counterparts and greater recognition of the link between militarism and sexism in Israel (Jacoby, 1999). The 1993 Oslo Peace Accords further reinforced collaboration and anti-militarism amongst Israeli feminist movements (Sharoni, 1998). However, feminists who try to fight for peace and the rights of Palestinians still face enormous backlash (Natanel, 2012).

Women in the Army

In order to understand the role of Israeli women in the armed forces, it is necessary to look at some important dates. During Israel's early years, the military barred women from many positions, though it opened them up over time (Jacoby, 1999). In 1978, women were allowed to become tank instructors (Jacoby, 1999). However, in 1981, the Israeli military institutionalized a gendered division of labour by ruling that activities such as coffee making and floor washing were legitimate duties of military secretaries, the majority of whom happen to be women (Sharoni, 1995). In 1995, the Supreme Court of Israel ruled that women could become pilots, one of the most prestigious roles in the army, but only after Alice Miller, an aeronautical engineer, brought her case to court (Golan, 1997). Beginning in 1996, the Israeli Border Guard started to recruit women into its forces, however, it was considered less prestigious because it was a police unit and not associated with the IDF (Golan, 1997).

It is also important to look at some statistics regarding women in the armed forces. Only 65% of Jewish women serve in the IDF, while the rest are exempt due to a variety of reasons (Sharoni, 1995). Around 25% of women (often ultra-Orthodox and Haredi) are exempt from conscription due to religious grounds (Sharoni, 1995). The rest are exempt due to marriage, pregnancy, motherhood or unsuitability for the job, which could mean an insufficient knowledge of Hebrew, level of education and/or physical fitness (Sharoni, 1995). Most of these exemptions are granted for Mizrahi women, who come predominantly from disadvantaged backgrounds (Sharoni, 1995). There's also a fairly important contingent of female conscientious objectors who refuse military service, though the exact proportion is unknown (Natanel 2012).

Women only make up approximately 35% of the regular IDF and a large percentage of them are in clerical or service positions under the authority of higher-ranking male officers (Jacoby 1999). These positions include clerks, typists, kitchen workers, entertainers, etc. (Sharoni, 1995). In addition, many female IDF members are loaned out to other government institutions in order to fill shortages of teachers, policewomen, nurse aides, and other positions (Sharoni, 1995). Many of these women serve in bases and areas where there are very few women, or where they may be the only woman (Hauser, 2011). Today, around 92% of positions in the IDF are open to women, though the 8% that they cannot access are largely the ones that allow soldiers to achieve higher ranks in the army (Gross, 2016). Only 2.5% of female soldiers have combat positions in the IDF versus 20% of men (Hauser, 2011).

The IDF is a deeply masculine institution that pushes women to take traditionally feminine roles in the army (Hauser, 2011). Some female soldiers report benefitting from playing these feminine roles, receiving special attention, privileges and treatment due to their gender (Hauser, 2011). These women often strive to be a "civilizing force" and "bring a touch of home" to their bases, providing emotional support for male soldiers (Hauser, 2011). Women in the IDF often act as camp followers, taking care of male soldiers' physical and emotional needs (Hauser, 2011). Those women do so by baking cakes, doing social work, and providing comfort and a substitute family model for male soldiers (Hauser, 2011).

According to Orlee Hauser (2011), many of these women find performing feminine roles empowering on an individual level, but on a collective level, it weakens their positions as soldiers in the IDF. Many female IDF members also feel that they have to conform to feminine roles in order to contribute to the army (Levin, 2011). When

women in the IDF reject feminine roles and try to move up to traditionally male combat positions, they are characterized as 'dykes' (Levin, 2011). Due to the culture perpetrated within the IDF, women face limited prospects to pursue roles of combat or gain promotion within their line of work.

Another major issue that women face in the IDF is sexual harassment and sexualisation. Although a large proportion of women face sexual harassment, the issue is often trivialized by both men and women (Levin, 2011). Some women do not see sexual harassment as such and see it instead as a form of flattery (Hauser, 2011). When women date in the IDF, others judge them based on the status of their partner, with some members joking about women joining prestigious units to find high-status husbands (Levin, 2011). Sometimes, female soldiers date their superiors (Levin, 2011). Heteronormativity dominates the dating scene, so gay and lesbian IDF members are often assumed to be heterosexual (Levin, 2011). These views and actions blur professional and private boundaries for women in the armed forces.

Women in combat roles are often seen as less desirable dating partners because of their 'dykish' image (Levin, 2011). In addition, Israeli public relations campaigns employ sexualized images of female IDF members to promote the IDF (Sharoni, 1995). An internet search of women in the IDF brings up many sexualized images of female soldiers. *Maxim*, a men's magazine, has had many articles on female IDF members with photos of them in skimpy clothing and provocative poses. In general, the IDF "seems to create an environment in which many women, intentionally or unintentionally, are seen primarily as feminized or sexual objects in either the presence or absence of their attractiveness to men." (Levin, 2011, p. 23).

Women in a Militarized Society

Transitioning to Civilian Life

IDF service is an important stage in young Israelis' transition to adulthood and it often socializes female soldiers into traditional roles (Levin, 2011). Contrary to the popular belief that female conscription eliminates gender inequality, military service actually reinforces a gendered division of power and labour, which transfers to structural inequalities between men and women in Israeli society (Sharoni, 1995). Thus, women's secondary roles in the army leads to them accepting unequal roles in Israeli culture, society, and politics (Hauser, 2011). Since combat experience is linked with prestige that is transferable to civilian life, predominantly, male ex-army officials are able to translate their military accomplishments into material and political benefits after their military service (Jacoby, 1999).

For example, businesses headhunt high-ranking members of the IDF for managerial positions and political parties have recruited generals into important political positions (Herzog, 1998). These men bring their military ways of thinking to their leadership positions, perpetuating the gendered military order and sexist stereotypes (Herzog, 1998). Since there is a blurred line between the military, politics and civilian life in Israel, ex-army officials have been recruited for positions where military experience is unnecessary or even inappropriate, such as managing municipal governments and administering schools (Herzog, 1998). Since women are not part of these "old boys'" networks in the military, they often are not able to access high positions and are thus predisposed to accepting men's superior status (Herzog, 1998)

The Homefront, Family and Motherhood

Women's principal role in Israeli society is to guard the homefront, the family sphere, and support their men in the battlefront (Herzog, 1998). Women play a special role as "beautiful souls," symbols of the nation and objects of protection for Israeli men (Jacoby, 1999). Nations are often symbolized as women, who act as markers of their continuity, traditions and authenticity (Jacoby, 1999). Following this logic, Israeli women are meant to support and nurture Jewish families under a patriarchal system (Herzog, 1998). The birth rate in Israel is 3.1 children per woman versus 1.7 children for the rest of the developed world (Kraft, 2018). Many Israeli couples have numerous children due to a desire to replace the 6 million Jews who perished during the Holocaust (Kraft, 2018). This birth rate is also in large part due to fears that Palestinians will outnumber Jewish Israelis and to the need to provide future soldiers for the state (Kraft, 2018). According to journalist Dina Kraft (2018), many Israelis negatively judge couples who have two or fewer children due to the above-mentioned reasons.

In a way, the wombs of Israeli women have been weaponized in order to fight against the Palestinians. The Israeli government provides many economic incentives for large families, often bankrolling fertility treatments (Kraft, 2018). Having a large number of children increases women's dependence on men, creates excessive childrearing burdens for women and reinforces the preservation of the traditional patriarchal family (Herzog, 1998). This pro-natality stance has resulted in some benefits for Israeli women, such as generous maternity leave (Herzog, 1998). However, there has been increasing backlash against social pressures to have many children (Kraft, 2018). In general, this pro-natality stance often makes women's reproduction into a matter of national importance instead of an individual matter .

Being a Jewish state, religion plays a large role in Israel, and each religion has its own court system that determines personal status laws. Orthodox Judaism prevails as the dominant state-supported interpretation of religious law in the country. Orthodox Judaism affects personal status for Jewish Israelis in regard to "political representation, marriage, sexuality, issues of domestic litigation such as divorce, inheritance, and child custody, and other social mores bound to the familial unit" (Jacoby, 1999, p. 392). According to Orthodox Jewish law, Judaism is transferred through the mother, making Israeli women the biological, legal and ideological reproducers of the Jewish nation (Jacoby, 1999).

For this reason, Israeli Jewish women are expected to marry other Jews in order to perpetuate the nation. In cases where Israeli women decide to have in vitro fertilization, they make sure to use sperm from other Jews (Bokek-Cohen, 2017). Also, these women will often try to obtain sperm from elite combat soldiers who served in important military campaigns (Bokek-Cohen, 2017). Because many Israelis feel such a need to produce more Jews, intermarriage with non-Jews, especially with Palestinians, is heavily stigmatized. Extremist groups, such as *Lehava*, hold marches and engage in violent protests against intermarriage between Jewish women and Palestinian men (Cook, 2016). One notable example of Lehava protesting intermarriage is their attempt in 2014 to disrupt a wedding between Morel Malka, a Jewish woman, and Mahmoud Mansour, an Arab Israeli (Arad, 2014).

In general, motherhood and family are an overarching theme in the lives of Israeli women, much more so than most Western countries. Geula Cohen, the founder of the extremist right-wing *Tehiya* Party, asserted that "the Israeli woman is a wife and a mother in Israel, and therefore it is her nature to be a soldier, a wife of a soldier, a sister

of a soldier. This is her reserve duty. She is continually in military service" (Sharoni 1995, p. 126). As mothers, Israeli women are expected to support their children during their military service (Jacoby, 1999). In essence, the Israeli state and army have transferred many of the burdens of military service to families and thus to mothers (Jacoby, 1999). Mothers often take time off to visit their children in far-off bases, clean and iron their clothes and provide psychological and economic support (Jacoby, 1999).

They also use their status as a way to gain moral legitimacy and lobby for political causes, whether they be expanding settlements or protesting against military service in the occupied territories (Herzog, 1998). However, this reliance on motherhood for legitimacy is problematic and reduces Israeli women to a limited space for mobilization (Jacoby, 1999). Though the symbol of motherhood is powerful, it does not always transfer into effective political influence (Jacoby, 1999).

Marginalization of Women's issues

Women's issues and social issues, such as health, education and welfare, are often marginalized in Israel due to the dominance of security concerns (Herzog, 1998). This marginalization is reflected in the Knesset, where committees dealing with social issues, which are considered traditionally within the feminine domain, enjoy less prestige and are disproportionately represented by women (Herzog, 1998). The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is often used to justify the neglect of gender equality and women's rights, which are seen as luxuries that Israel cannot afford, even as detriments to its security interests (Herzog, 1998). Even prominent female scholars in Israel, such as the political scientist Yael Yishai, claim that nationalist and feminist causes are incompatible with each other (Herzog, 1998).

A good example of this is women's lack of upward mobility in Israel due to their inability to fill combat roles. Israel has also enacted neoliberal policies that further diminishes women's socio-economic status (Sachs et al, 2007). The events of the Second Intifada in particular highlight the difficulties of Israeli women, who faced a deteriorating economic situation, health and emotional state and lower well-being (Sachs et al, 2007). Single mothers and women from marginalized groups, notably Israeli Arabs and Mizrahim , faced particularly strenuous circumstances (Sachs et al, 2007). Due to military, police or criminal activities, the possession of firearms is widespread amongst the civilian Israeli male population (Sachs et al, 2007). During the Second Intifada, dozens of Israeli women were killed by male relatives or boyfriends who possessed these very firearms (Sachs et al, 2007).

Conclusions

In conclusion, Israeli militarized femininity serves to perpetuate a gendered social order that severely limits the rights, freedoms, privileges and opportunities of Israeli women. Due to the militarization of Israeli society, Israeli women are socialized to fulfill traditional roles and to support men. In the armed forces, Israeli women suffer from gender discrimination and a lack of mobility. These impediments influence their transition to civilian life, because they have difficulty obtaining the same high-level positions as men. When they start families, they face pressure to marry fellow Jews, have many children, and raise future soldiers. Though some Israeli women have managed to enter positions of power, they are often relegated to less important roles. Some Israeli women have used their motherhood to lobby for certain changes, but it is often their main or only source of legitimacy in the public sphere. Many Israeli women

have become more active in the peace movement, but they often face backlash from a militarized society. Overall, Israeli society has reacted to the conflict by converging "around a patriarchal model of national identity, where women are marginalized to the ends of political power (Jacoby 1999, p. 387). This state of affairs will likely continue for as long as the conflict lasts.

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The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: What Has This Meant for Africa?

Marina Gathright

Despite the adoption of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) in 2007, which sets various standards for the recognition and protection of indigenous peoples across the globe, the need for a human rights instrument specifically developed for indigenous peoples remains a central and highly controversial issue within the international community. The central debate on this issues in international discourse is characterized by a division between those who believe it is essential to address the centuries of discrimination and harm inflicted on indigenous peoples under colonialism, and more recently within economic globalization (Crawhall, 2011, p.11); against those who argue that this specific categorization undermines the universality of human rights (Hays, 2011, p.4). These tensions are especially apparent within the African region, which played a key role in the final stages of the UNDRIP negotiations and processes (Barume, n.d, p. 1).

Throughout Africa, the negotiation and application of this declaration have been especially complex and divisive. This is in large part due to the concept of indigeneity itself and the many barriers this document has faced in terms of adoption on the continent. This is, however, not to say that this specific issue of indigenous rights and the principles of this document are not recognized and promoted by regional bodies throughout the continent. Rather, the fundamental principles and its basis on collective human rights have been central to the regional human rights body, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR), since before the adoption of the UNDRIP (Hays, 2011, p.3; Crawhall, 2011, p.28). In this context, the ACHPR has played

a prominent role in advocating for the adoption of the UNDRIP and in ensuring its application throughout the continent.

Yet, despite these international and regional efforts to ensure the protection of indigenous peoples' rights there have been mixed results. These unequal results reflect a fundamental division between various stakeholders within Africa, including states, regional bodies, transnational networks, local indigenous groups and NGOs. On one side are primarily states who consider this 'special' categorization of indigenous peoples as having the potential of being misappropriated or misused, posing a threat to territorial integrity and sovereignty, and promoting or facilitating ethnic conflict through isolating, disadvantaging or essentializing different groups (Hays, 2011, p.3). On the other side are states, regional bodies, and various NGOs, who recognize the need for specific human rights instruments at various levels to protect the rights of indigenous groups who are systematically marginalized under national governments (Crawhall, 2011, p.17).

What is the UNDRIP?

The UNDRIP is an international policy instrument that sets various standards for the recognition and protection of indigenous peoples across the globe as an extension to the universal United Nations Declaration on Human Rights (UN, n.d). The document itself encompasses an instrument of global governance, namely "… policymaking activities that produce a coordinated action in the absence of world government" (Avant, 2010, p.14). It is an especially important instrument of governance in the issue arena of indigenous peoples rights, largely due to the United Nations (UN) body's prominent role

as a global governor in various policy arenas reflected in its ability to exercise authority through various normative, regulative and organizational functions across international borders; thus, reflecting Avant's (2010) definition of a global governor as "…those who exercise authority across borders for the purpose of affecting policy" (p.2).

However, within the context of the UNDRIP, the UN and the states of which it is comprised, are not the only prominent actors. In fact, this declaration marks a turning point in the UN system as it is the first UN document to include non-state actors who are personally impacted by the policy instrument itself, namely representatives from indigenous groups, to directly participate in the drafting of the declaration (Crawhall, 2011, p.11).Thus, the declaration recognizes the especially vulnerable position of indigenous groups internationally and adopts a holistic approach towards addressing indigenous rights (Tamuno, 2017, p.317); encompassing their right to self-determination and autonomy, while also guaranteeing "…indigenous peoples' collective rights to a healthy environment, and to own and control their lands and resources" (Tamuno, 2017, p.317).

The International Processes of the UNDRIP:

The indigenous right movement can be traced back to the 1960s, with the rise of non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) advocating for the respect of indigenous peoples as distinct societies at the international level (Tamuno, 2017, p.308). Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s this movement gained traction within the UN, the major global governance body, mobilizing indigenous peoples to appear before UN human rights bodies and setting in motion the creation of various committees,

conferences, and forums that recognized indigenous peoples as a distinct group (Tamuno, 2017, p.308). This eventually led to the establishment of the 1982 United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations (UNWGIP) in response to the widespread occurrence of discrimination against indigenous peoples worldwide (UN, n.d). The group's central mission was to develop a set of minimum standards to protect indigenous peoples and, thus, were tasked with drafting a document which would later become the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) (Tamuno, 2017, p.309). However, the creation and adoption of this document was not a simple process. From the first draft to its final adoption, this document faced many challenges in terms of political, economic, legal, social and cultural differences and barriers (Hays, 2011, p.1) and took 26 years to become ratified in international law (Crawhall, 2011, p.20).

The first concrete proposal for international standards on indigenous rights under the international human rights regime emerged in 1981 with the World Council on Indigenous Peoples (WCIP), which itself led to the creation of the UNWGIP the following year (Crawhall, 2011, p.20). Under the UNWGIP, the process of drafting the UNDRIP began almost immediately at their first meeting in 1982 (Crawhall, 2011, p.20). To start, this draft was submitted to the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities and was reviewed by the UN Commission on Human Rights, leading to its approval in 1994 (UN, n.d). This led to the creation of an open-ended inter-sessional working group in 1995, who were tasked with considering and devising this draft in the hopes that it would be adopted by the General Assembly (UN, n.d).

After nearly a decade, the working group was finally successful in convincing the UN Human Rights Council to adopt the declaration (UN, n.d). However, this was followed by an initiative to defer consideration and action, led by Namibia and other African states, as well as additional amendments to the declaration (UN, n.d). In September 2007 the UNDRIP finally passed with a majority of 144 states voting in favor, with 11 abstentions and 4 major votes against, including the United States (US), Canada, New Zealand, and Australia. However, since its adoption each of these states have revised their response and endorsed the document (UN, n.d). One of the most surprising outcomes of this final vote is the sudden shift in position within African states. Despite pressure from the US and Canada to oppose the document and the initial resistance of many states, a total of fifty out of fifty-three member states voted in favour of adoption (Crawhall, 2011, p.12).

Africa's Staring Role in the UNDRIP Processes:

Within Africa the indigenous rights movement was first recognized in Moringe Parkipuny's 1989 address to the UNWGIP session in Geneva (Tamuno, 2017, p.310). Parkipuny was the founder of the first Maasai NGO to frame Eastern Africa's land struggles as an indigenous rights issue and was a pioneer in his attempt to link the marginalization of African peoples with the already existent transnational community of indigenous peoples (Makumbe, 2018, p.149). In his address, Parkipuny affirmed the need to protect peoples with distinct cultures, especially pastoralists and hunter and gathering peoples, from nationalization processes that threatened their cultures with extinction and which promoted blatant intolerance, domination of and violation of their fundamental rights (Tamuno, 2017, p.310). Parkipuny's address set in motion the

creation of African networks of indigenous peoples that facilitated their own participation in both the regional and international spheres (Makumbe, 2018, p.150).

Regionally, this initial motion culminated in the first indigenous conference on the African continent in 1999, which took place in Tanzania and included participants from Eastern, Western and Central Africa (Tamuno, 2017, p.311). The result of this conference was the adoption of the Arusha Resolution which called on African governments to establish legal protections specifically for indigenous peoples (Tamuno, 2017, p.311). At the international level, this initial address and the subsequent regional action mark the beginning of the African region's meaningful participation in the UNDRIP process. Within the Africa bloc there was much confusion and division on how to achieve their goal of strengthening their position relative to Western industrialized states (Crawhall, 2011, p.22). This played out during negotiations for the UNDRIP with many states either not attending negotiations or abstaining from votes for much of the process (Crawhall, 2011, p.22). However, by the late 1990s many African states had achieved a prominent role in determining the direction of the document (Crawhall, 2011, p.22). South Africa, once becoming a democratic state, was the first of these nations to meaningfully and directly engage with the UNWGIP and the creation of the UNDRIP (Crawhall, 2011, p.20), illustrating the strategic and contradictory interests of various other member states within the region.

The South- African state initially promoted a united African approach to human rights and democracy, despite their conservative reputation for their domestic approach to indigenous rights. Yet, while negotiating the rights of its own indigenous population

following the dissolution of the Apartheid regime, South Africa was moving forward slowly and in an unclear direction (Crawhall, 2011, p.20). Despite their own challenges, South African diplomats were persistent in promoting indigenous rights for African peoples within international discourse (Crawhall, 2011, p.20). This reflected the president's strategic efforts to secure a seat on the UN Security Council, which is highlighted by the sudden shift towards a more conservative approach to human rights issues once this position was secured (Crawhall, 2011, p.21). This shift is most notably seen in their complete reversal of support for the UNDRIP in their vote to block the declaration at the General Assembly meeting in November of 2006, a contradiction to their vote in favour just 4 months earlier (Crawhall, 2011, p.21). This reversal, however, is not unique to South Africa, but instead mirrors the sudden change of position by the Africa group as a whole.

The primary display of resistance from within the African bloc against the UNDRIP culminated in the 2006 Draft Aide Memoire, which was circulated within the Africa Group by Namibia and was the central reason for the deferral of the UNDRIP's adoption in 2006 (Makumbe, 2018, p.156). The document made public seven major concerns with the UNDRIP. The most prominent of these includes their concern for the ambiguous, or lack of, definition of indigenous peoples, which they believed could exacerbate inter-ethnic tensions and their objection to the right of self-determination, believing that this could enhance political instability, secessions and threats to territorial integrity of African states (Makumbe, 2018, p.157). In addition to various inconsistencies and misinterpretations of the UNDRIP, many of the document's criticisms were suspiciously similar to submissions by the US, Australia and New

Zealand, which many believe reflects efforts by the West, and the USin particular, to influence the region's stance (Crawhall, 2011, p.28).

The Draft Aide deepened tensions within the African bloc, with states such as Algeria and Cameroon in support of the UNDRIP, while Namibia, Botswana and Kenya were vehemently opposed. This document also created tensions between the African bloc and Latin American states, which was detrimental for south-south solidarity with other southern bloc members of the G77 (Crawhall, 2011, p. 22). These events in turn led to a stark division between two opposing statements regarding the international declaration. On one side, the Aide Memoire represented the defense of power politics, sovereignty and African political reality. The opposition, on the other hand, included the ACHPR, who called on African states to re-affirm their support and commitment to the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights and the international norms and standards of universal human rights with the UNDRIP (Crawhall, 2011, p.23). In the end, these power dynamics were overcome with almost unanimous support for the adoption of the UNDRIP (Crawhall, 2011, p.23). However, this support has still not led to a widespread adoption across the continent of the principles and standards encompassed within the UNDRIP.

Who is Indigenous under the UNDRIP?

Under this international declaration the concept of who is indigenous is left open to interpretation, as no real definition outlined within the document (UN, 2009, p. 4). This largely reflects a push from indigenous representatives within UNWGIP to not include a precise definition of indigenousness in order to facilitate flexibility in the

application of this instrument in light of the vast diversity of indigenous groups internationally (Tamuno, 2017, p. 316-317). While states did resist this argument, inciting concerns over the flood of claims they predicted would ensue under a highly subjective and generous conception of indigenous peoples, ultimately the former won (Tamuno, 2017, p. 316-317). As it stands today, instead of offering a definition of indigenous groups, the UNDRIP underlines the importance of self-determination (UN, 2009, p.5). Under this provision indigenous peoples have the right to determine their own identity or group membership in accordance with their customs and traditions and to determine the structures and select the membership of their institutions in accordance with their own procedures. All of this should not preclude them from the right to citizenship within their state (UN, 2009, p.5). In theory, this vagueness in terms of who can claim indigenous right allows for the application of indigenous rights to affected groups globally, however, in practice this has not been the case.

The most common conception of indigenous peoples in the international arena follows the definition of Martinez Cobo, the Special Rapporteur for the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples in the 1970s (Tamuno, 2017, p.313). Cobo defines indigenous peoples as "…those [who], having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing on those territories, or parts of them" (UN, 2009, p.4). He goes on to describe these groups as non-dominant and outlines their intentions to "preserve, develop and transmit" their territories and ethnic identity to future generations (UN, 2009, p.4-5). However, it has been widely recognized that this

conception reflects the development of indigenous rights from colonial and post-colonial experiences, mainly in the Americas and Australasia, with an emphasis on primitivism and nativism and based on American essentialist ideologies of culture and identity (Makumbe, 2018, p.153). As such, the discussion of indigenous peoples within international discourse is often considered to have failed its aim to construct an instrument that applies to international indigenous groups and it easily invalidates the experiences of indigenous peoples in non-western societies.

How does indigeneity differ in Africa?

Based on this Eurocentric understanding of indigenous peoples, there has been much resistance to the application of indigeneity within Africa. This resistance draws on various discontinuities between this conceptualization and the situation within most African national contexts. In examining Cobo's definition, this can be identified in the four central elements of indigenousness, namely, historical continuity with pre-colonial society, cultural distinctiveness, non-dominance, and ancestral territory and cultural identity as the basis of their existence (Tamuno, 2017, p.313-315). The first, and arguably the most fundamental issue, concerns the concept of historical continuity as a differentiating factor (Crawhall, 2011, p.17). This concept refers to the recurring cycle of historical events that are interconnected with peoples who were living on their territory before the arrival of colonizers and the creation of the state as it is recognized today (Tamuno, 2017, p.305); consisting of the occupation of ancestral lands, common ancestry with the original occupants of the land, distinctive cultural forms, language and residence in a certain region (UN, 2009, p.4). The issue here, is that this concept cannot be identified as a distinguishing characteristic among indigenous groups as nearly all

ethnic groups throughout the continent were already settled on their lands prior to colonization and, thus, would apply to all African peoples (Makumbe, 2018, p.154).

The second disconnect from this concept is the issue of groups as culturally distinct from other sectors of society, suggesting a dichotomy between the culture adopted by most citizens and the traditional culture of indigenous peoples (Tamuno, 2017, p.314). This criterion does not apply to most African societies, as marginalization in these contexts is often carried out by indigenous peoples who were granted an advantaged position through colonization (Tamuno, 2017, p.315). The third, and likely most applicable element of the definition, is the position of indigenous groups as occupying non-dominant sectors of society (Tamuno, 2017, p.315). In the African context this does in fact apply to indigenous groups, as they experience the same economic and political marginalization of groups from around the world, evident in the seizing of their lands, distortion of their culture and ascription of inferior status by their governing state bodies, regardless of the fact that this dominant group is in fact indigenous (Tamuno, 2017, p.315).

While this position as a non-dominant sector of society does arguably apply to the region, it becomes especially complex and difficult to maneuver within the pluralistic setting of most African states, whose citizenry is composed of multiple ethnic groups, including multiple minority and dominant groups, often living in situations of economic instability (Makumbe, 2018, p.154). The fourth factor of concern, the basis of their identity as their relation to ancestral territory and cultural identity, highlights this challenge (Tamuno, 2017, p.315). This aspect implies a connection between culture,

religion and economic survival of indigenous people and their land or territory, which has proven controversial in the context of Africa due to the widespread dependence of nearly all African peoples on their land for survival (Tamuno, 2017, p.315). While there is tangible evidence of the inapplicability of this restrictive conception of indigeneity within Africa, resistance to the application of indigenous rights is often attributed to political motivations; primarily consisting of concerns that the recognition of indigenous peoples's right to self determination could pose a threat to territorial integrity or lead to the disintegration of the nation state (Makumbe, 2018, p.156).

What Measures has Africa Taken to Address This Discontinuity?

Recognizing this discontinuity, the African Commission took measures to establish the African Commission's Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations (ACWG), tasked with examining the concept of indigenous peoples and studying the implications of the African Charter on human rights and well-being of indigenous communities (Makumbe, 2019, p.151). The ACWG developed a report which was adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights in 2005 as the "…official conceptualization of, and framework for the issue of the human rights of indigenous populations…" (Makumbe, 2019, p.151). In their report the ACWG created their own definition, to include "… groups who have been left to the margins of development and who are perceived negatively by dominating mainstream development paradigms, whose cultures and ways of life are subject to discrimination and contempt and whose very existence is under threat of extinction" (African Commission, 2005, Article 87).

Within their definition they outline five key characteristics of indigenous peoples (Tamuno, 2017, p.320).The first of these characteristics refers to a fundamental distinction between an indigenous group's culture and that of the dominant group, as well as the dominant group's threat to the continuation of indigenous cultures, potentially to the extent of extinction (Tamuno, 2017, p.323). The second is the survival of the group's way of life as dependent on access to their traditional land and natural resources (Tamuno, 2017, p.323). The third is the discrimination against such a group in relation to their perception as less developed and less advanced than dominant sectors of society (Tamuno, 2017, p.323). The fourth has to do with the domination and exploitation of the group within national political and economic structures designed to accommodate the interests and activities of the national majority (Tamuno, 2017, p.323). And finally, the fifth characteristic reflects the concept of self-determination found within the UNDRIP (Tamuno, 2017, p.323). As such, these five characteristics allow for a more applicable conception of indigenousness within the African context that has the potential to increase the recognition of indigenous peoples. However, the process of determining indigenous status within this regional context is highly complex and site specific, requiring extensive technical lenses that not only consider whether groups are vulnerable and marginalized but also determine the extent of these factors (Makumbe, 2019, p.154). In consideration of this, it is unclear whether this definition of indigenous peoples is flexible and specific enough with regards to the vast diversity of indigenous peoples on the continent while simultaneously preventing governments from using ambiguity to justify their denials of these rights. In light of this dilemma, the tangible results in regard to indigenous rights within national policy throughout the continent is telling.

What has been the effect of the UNDRIP in Africa?

Considering the clear disconnect between the international conception of indigenous peoples and the reality of African nation states, it is no surprise that the specific adoption by nation states of the standards and principles of the UNDRIP has not been particularly promising. Despite a general recognition of ethnic diversity within various national constitutions, there have been very few measures to specifically recognize indigenous rights within national law (Makumbe, 2019, p.167-168). Even most official records, such as the national consensus, do not recognize indigenous peoples in their country or their language (UN, 2017, p.15).

In contrast, while many states have not specifically recognized the rights of indigenous peoples in their constitutions, there have been some promising forms of action towards recognizing and protecting these groups in certain nations (UN, 2017, p.17). One example is the actions of Burundi, who have made efforts to encourage the political integration of the Batwa, a local indigenous group, through explicit provisions in the national constitution and the electoral code that calls for the protection and inclusion of this group in national politics and specifically allocates them three seats in the National Assembly and the Senate (International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 2016; quoted in UN, 2017, p.18). This progress is also present at the regional level, with the most prominent example of the ACHPR's decision in the case of the Endorois peoples in Kenya (Laher, 2014, p.xi). The Endorois peoples are pastoralists living around lake Bogoria, a major tourist attraction, who were forcefully dispossessed of their ancestral lands by the Kenyan government (Barume, n.d, p.3). The Endorois brought their case to the African Union in 2010, which both recognized the Endrois

people as an indigenous group and cited the UNDRIP specifically as grounds for ruling against the Kenyan government for their violation of the group's right to lands, natural resources, and cultural identity (Tamuno, 2017, p.325). Yet, seven years later, the Kenyan government still had not relinquished their land, nor compensated the Endrois people for the violation of their rights as a recognized indigenous group (Mavenjina, 2017).

Conclusion

While the practical adoption of this instrument has not been evenly implemented within the African region, the UNDRIP has generally been considered to have benefited the region in locating Africa within the global indigenous rights framework (Tamuno, 2017), strengthening African civil society, and opening up a long-needed dialogue on the "… legacies, cultural diversity and inclusion of indigenous peoples in the socio-political-economic life of African countries" (Crawhall, 2011, p.32). This being said, throughout the literature it becomes evident that this progress is not enough, as indigenous peoples are rarely even recognized as a distinct group in most of the region and, as the Endorois case shows, even when they are, states are often reluctant to accept these as fundamental rights. As such, there is a clear need for action within the region, and potentially at the global level, to ensure the recognition of indigenous peoples throughout the African continent in order for the UNDRIP to make a fundamental and long-lasting impact on policy outcomes.

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Obstacles to Political Democratization for the Chinese Middle Class

Genver Quirino

Introduction

Following three decades of swift economic growth (from 1978 to the present day), China has undergone a profound social transformation which has brought higher levels of income, education, and professional employment to a new group of Chinese people: the Chinese middle class. The emergence and rapid expansion of China's middle class caught the attention of contemporary China scholars, who have sought to study and understand the sociopolitical role this new group occupies. Since then, numerous debates have been sparked on what potential consequences this new middle class may have on China's current authoritarian political regime. At its core, these discussions are conducted around two opposing arguments: one which argues that the Chinese middle class *can* be a significant destabilizing agent for political democratization in China; while the other argues that the middle class *cannot* facilitate political democratization, as it is a politically stabilizing group in support of the current political order (Li, 2013, p. 12; Ying, 2010, p. 50).

These debates have been driven by wide-held expectations and assumptions projected by the media, analysts, and intellectuals alike, that the Chinese middle class would follow the same political trajectories of the middle class in other parts of the world. In particular, these assumptions draw upon earlier observations of the Western middle classes in 19th century Europe (Chen & Goodman, 2013, p. 5), and more recently the "third wave of democratization" in the Global South, as theorized by scholars like Samuel Huntington and Ronald Glassman (Rocca, 2017, p. 13 cited Glassman, 1997; Huntington, 1991). While the role of the middle class in these examples have been

questioned (Rocca, 2013, p. 112-114; Chen & Lu, 2011, p. 711 cited Bell, 1998 & Jones, 1998), scholars who are optimistic of the Chinese middle class as a democratizing force refer to the growing number of middle-class protests and online expressions of grievances as promising signs of the middle class' willingness to act towards political change (Weber, 2011; Li, 2010). However, many contemporary China scholars seem hesitant to draw these conclusions prematurely, suggesting that China's middle class may be more reluctant to upset the political status quo than expected.

This literature review aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the current scholarly debates surrounding the Chinese middle class, and whether it can become a force for democratization. In doing so, this review hopes to provide more clarity on a key academic puzzle regarding Chinese middle-class democratization, as posited by Andrew Nathan (2016): How can China's middle class support democratic values and sporadically demand democratizing change, yet still largely remain politically inactive and supportive of China's authoritarian regime? Furthermore, my review of the literature aims to provide some answers as to why the Chinese middle class acts this way, and what obstacles may currently exist to limit middle class actions towards democratization. This literature review is structured into four main parts. The first section of the paper introduces the two key axes of the debate on the democratizing role of the middle class, as well as further elaboration on the academic 'puzzle' within the study of China's middle class democratization. The following two sections will grapple with two broader categorizations of the obstacles for Chinese middle class democratization (including two sub-categories within each) – the 'cultural' and the

'structural' obstacles to political democratization. The final section will conclude with some further reflections on the future of Chinese middle class democratization.

"The Puzzle of the Chinese Middle Class": Unilinear and Contingent Theories of Democratization

Scholars seeking to understand the Chinese middle class have had to grapple between two distinct schools of thought regarding the sociopolitical role of the middle class: the 'unilinear' and the 'contingent' theories of political democratization (Chen & Lu, 2011, p. 706; Nathan, 2016, p. 7). The unilinear theory emerges from the broader assumptions of Tocquevillian modernization theory, and sees a unilinear relationship between economic modernization and political democratization (Chen & Lu, 2011, p. 706). Key proponents of the 'unilinear' theory – scholars like Lipset, Glassman, and Huntington – argue that economic modernization's increased levels of income, education, and social mobility inevitably creates a middle class with robust democratic leanings and attitudes (Chen & Lu, 2011, p. 706 cited Glassman 1997; Nathan 2016, cited Lipset 1959; Li 2013, p. 13 cited Lipset 1960). From new material interests and changing cultural values, stemming from higher levels of education and occupation, unilinear theorists see these attributes of the middle class as driving the "main thrust of the democratization movement" (Chen & Lu, 2011, p. 706 cited Hattori et. al 2013; Nathan 2016, p. 7).

Not exclusive to Western academic discourse, Chinese scholars have also made unilinear arguments for the democratizing role of China's middle class. Picking up the threads from early radical Chinese scholarship in the 1980's, more recent studies on

political attitudes and behavior boldly claim that China's middle class could potentially move on to destabilize the current political order (Li 2013, p. 13 cited Liu 1988 & Zhang 2009). Chinese scholars – like Li Peilin, Zhang Yi, Yuan Yue and Li Lulu – paint a picture of a more cynical, critical, and demanding middle class (Li 2010, p. 73-39 cited Yi 2008, Yue 2008, Lulu 2008). Notably, these scholars argue that China's middle class has shown an increased willingness to publicly protest and express their grievances, directly aiming these grievances at the Chinese central government (ibid.). Scholars like Yi have also suggested that a continued rise of government-caused dissatisfaction could herald a significant political 'destabilization' – such as the middle class demanding direct competitive elections (ibid.).

Despite these recent shifts, the majority of academic literature on China's middle class and democratization has since the 1990's belonged under a second school of thought: the 'contingent' theory of political democratization (Li 2013, p. 13; Ying 2016, p. 50). Contrary to the former, the contingent approach questions the implied teleological inevitability of political modernization in the unilinear argument. Instead, contingent theory argues that the transition towards democratization is contingent upon the existence of various sociopolitical and socioeconomic conditions (Chen & Lu, 2011, p. 706; Nathan 2016, p. 7). These conditions differ by country and are context-specific,[1] and may vary from the country's political culture and norms to the structural relationships between the socioeconomic classes and the state (ibid.). Much of the scholarship on the Chinese middle class and democratization has focused on identifying these socioeconomic and political factors. Scholars within this school of thought largely suggest that China's middle class is a 'stabilizing' force and is ultimately unlikely to lead

a democratization of the current authoritarian political order (Chen & Lu, 2011; Weber, 2011; Nathan, 2016; Chen & Goodman, 2013; Ying, 2016; Tsang, 2014; Rocca, 2017).

It is with these opposing schools of thought in mind that Andrew Nathan (2016) posits "the puzzle of the Chinese middle class". On the one hand, there is 'unilinear' evidence that the new Chinese middle class supports democratic ideals, and that it has acted in multiple instances to promote democratic changes (Chen & Lu, 2011; Weber, 2011; Li, 2010; Nathan, 2016). On the other hand, numerous academics are skeptical to these signs of democratization, as academic studies and surveys still observe high levels of approval for the current political regime, and low desires to act towards challenging it (Nathan, 2016; Ying, 2016; Chen & Lu, 2011). Many scholars of the Chinese middle class have sought to tackle this central puzzle: What factors could explain the paradox of the Chinese middle class, in having pro-democratic *beliefs*, but simultaneously exhibiting passive political *behavior* (Ying, 2016; Nathan, 2016)?

By uncovering the socioeconomic and political conditions which limit the Chinese middle class from taking democracy-oriented political action, the body of academic literature under the 'contingent' theory has identified many of the key obstacles to middle-class democratization in China. In the following review of the literature, I have further categorized these arguments into two broader categories: the 'cultural' and the 'structural' obstacles to democratization. In structuring the reading of the literature around these categories, I aim to more clearly distinguish and isolate the central issues and commonalities between the texts.

Understanding the Cultural Obstacles to Middle Class Democratization

The study of sociocultural factors in the literature on Chinese middle class democratization has led scholars to address some important defining questions: how does the Chinese middle class understand 'democracy' and 'democratization'? Interrelated with this: how does the Chinese middle class perceive its role in society? To answer these questions, the academic literature has explored the political culture of the Chinese middle class – the political norms, attitudes, and values that have shaped the Chinese middle class's actions, conceptualizations of democratic principles, and perceptions of itself as 'the middle class'.

Chinese Political Culture and 'Democratization'

Many empirical studies and surveys on Chinese middle class attitudes towards democratic principles have primarily focused on identifying the middle class's opinions on 'Western' conceptions of democratic norms, such as individual political liberties and popular democratic participation (Chen & Lu, 2011, p. 707; Ying, 2016, p. 57). These studies have illustrated what some pro-democratization scholars – like Li Lulu – argue is a gradual transition of Chinese attitudes towards Western transnational political values (Li 2010, p. 76 cited Lulu 2008). However, more critical China scholars have stressed the importance of studying the 'Chinese' cultural conceptions of democratic norms, as potential obstacles to democratization (Chen & Lu, 2011; Nathan, 2016; Weber, 2011; Ying, 2012). This section of the academic literature would argue that Chinese political culture, as a product of historical events and Confucian traditional values, conceptualizes democracy and democratic principles differently to its Western

counterparts (ibid.). In Chinese political culture's conceptions of social order and democracy, maintaining collective interests and harmonizing individuals with the social order is prioritized over pursuing principles of individual rights and liberties (Chen & Lu, 2011, p. 708 cited Nathan 1997; Weber 2011, p. 30 cited Brooks 1997; Nathan, 2016, p. 16). To scholars studying China's cultural obstacles to democratization, the Confucian political values of interdependence and vertical obligations to the state under a social hierarchy may factor into the more gradual development of individual rights consciousness in China (Weber 2011, p. 30 cited Wakemann 1993; Ying. 2016, p. 75).

Aside from Confucian influences on political culture, scholars like Timothy Brook suggest that the Chinese state has actively partaken in shaping China's political culture, to the point where any conception of democracy and public action has been appropriated or delegitimized by Chinese state ideology (Weber, 2001, p. 30 cited Brook 1997). This would in part explain Miao Ying's (2016) more nuanced take on political culture and the Chinese middle-class 'puzzle'. She describes a Chinese middle class that is aware and supportive of Western democratizing values, but is also deeply realistic of the difficulties of achieving reform without state support. This, she argues, has created a pragmatic political culture which largely supports and expects political change to be government-led (Ying 2016). Consequently, Ying draws a conclusion which is neither overtly optimistic or skeptical of the Chinese middle class as a democratizing force: instead, Yi sees the Chinese middle class as 'passive observers', who see China's current political culture "as it is" and attempt to maneuver politically within it (Ibid.). Ying's theory both reconciles Nathan's 'puzzle' – of democratic attitudes with concurrent support for Chinese state authoritarianism – and serves as a nuanced example of how

political culture may affect the *political imagination* of what is possible for China's middle-class and democratization.

Broadly speaking, the academic literature on Chinese conceptions of political culture and 'democracy' can be divided among the main axes of unilinear and contingent theory. On one side, 'unilinear' scholars see signs of Chinese cultural convergence with Western conceptions of 'democracy' (Li, 2010). On the other side, more critical scholarship under the 'contingent' approach has uncovered a series of context-specific 'patrimonial' (Weber, 2011) and 'paternalistic' (Ying, 2016, p. 73) cultural conceptions of Chinese social order, social obligations, and expectations of the state. Notably, scholars like Weber (2011) and Brook (1997) argue that these political cultures are important 'ideological blinds', which serve to limit the ability of China's middle class to recognize, imagine, and pursue emerging political opportunities (Weber, 2011, cited Brook 1997). This insight is important to keep in mind, with regards to the following section on Chinese political culture and their conceptions of the middle class.

Chinese Political Culture and 'The Middle Class'

In recent scholarship, theories on the political culture of China's middle class paint a negative picture in terms of their potential to realize and facilitate regime-altering democratization (Nathan, 2016; Ying, 2016; Tsang, 2014; Rocca, 2017). This pessimistic conclusion is drawn from two major obstacles identified by the academic literature. First, is the struggle of China's middle class to establish and perceive itself as a 'class-conscious' entity – one that is capable of mobilizing social capital through its members' shared interests and experiences (Tsang, 2014; Rocca, 2017; Nathan, 2016;

Weber, 2011). Second, there is a reluctance from the Chinese middle class to take upon itself the role of initiating political action towards democratization (Tsang, 2014; Rocca, 2016; Nathan, 2016; Ying, 2016).

The literature on the challenges of Chinese middle class formation broadly describes a "politically anesthetized" middle class (Nathan, 2016, p.14), which so far has failed to incorporate political involvement as a key element of its class identity (Nathan, 2016; Ying, 2016; Tsang, 2014; Rocca 2017). Eileen Tsang's (2014) studies on the Chinese middle class, particularly on class formation and political development, serves as a comprehensive review of the sociocultural factors that may affect the formation of China's middle class. Her final verdict on China's middle class formation is strict: she claims that the middle class has failed to form a political culture, has a weak degree of class awareness, and shows little evidence of class-based socialization – all important elements to constructing a middle-class consciousness of shared experiences (Tsang, 2014, p. 156; Rocca 2017). Tsang most pertinently illustrates the lack of middle-class identity formation by finding that a majority of her study's interviewees failed to even recognize themselves as middle class (Tsang, 2014, p. 153).

Most of the scholars critical of the Chinese middle class' political culture have also reached a similar conclusion: the Chinese middle class *do not* perceive themselves as vanguards of democracy or political change (Tsang, 2014; Chen & Lu, 2011; Nathan, 2016; Ying, 2016; Rocca, 2017). Furthermore, Ying's (2016) study on middle class attitudes to sociopolitical affairs found that many middle class respondents distanced themselves from people who take political action – who they characterized as rash, emotional, and easily manipulated – and generally identified themselves as 'stabilizers'

in Chinese society (Ying, 2016, p. 68-74). Jean-Louis Rocca (2017) has similarly characterized the Chinese middle class as a comparatively stabilizing force in society.

Two important questions have so far remained unanswered: *why* did middle class formation and political culture fail to emerge in China, and *how* does the Chinese middle class currently conceptualize its middle class identity? Notably, a subset of the academic literature converges around one sociocultural argument to answer both questions: a political and class-conscious middle class identity failed to materialize, in part because of an atomizing political culture which set material and economic indicators as the main characteristics of Chinese middle class identity (Tsang, 2014; Nathan, 2016; Rocca, 2016). Tsang (2016) explicitly indicts the Chinese middle class' hyper-consumption oriented culture for leaving no space to develop a middle class identity as a political group, and further traces this culture's origins to consumption as a 'life-style indicator' for the newly emerged middle class, which distinguishes its status from the rest of the population. Making similar arguments, Nathan (2016) characterizes the 'anesthetized' middle class as a result of a culture which produced a class identity where politics were under-prioritized in favor of career advancement and 'middle class consumption'. He further suggests that the relative newness of the Chinese middle class means they are still in the midst of forging a class identity, and may currently be doing so through emulating Western consumption habits.

Ultimately, Rocca (2017), in spirit with Tsang (2016) and Nathan (2016), argue that the emergence of China's middle-class consumer culture was part of a process to construct a 'civilized' cultural narrative of the new middle-class, which linked Chinese conceptions of *quality* ("*suzhi*") with consumption and improved lifestyles. Similar

arguments of a 'civilizing' narrative have also been used by Luigi Tomba (Nathan 2016, p. 12 cited Tomba) to describe the role of middle class neighborhood committees. One could speculate whether this 'civilized' cultural narrative of the middle class could explain their restraint and reluctance to take political action – especially in consideration of how Ying's (2016) middle class respondents found political actors 'emotional' and 'manipulated'. Rocca himself suggests that this cultural 'civility' narrative may explain the middle class's broad acceptance of "the rules of the game", in their preference for finding ways to maintain their prosperity and rights without changing the political regime (Rocca, 2017, p. 201).

Understanding the Structural Obstacles to Middle Class Democratization

Institutionalized State Dependence as an Obstacle for Middle Class Democratization

The broader category of *structural* obstacles to democratization addresses a particularly compelling area in which the academic literature converges – in the argument that the socioeconomic position of the middle class as the class *in the middle*, and its subsequent structural relationships with the other classes and the party-state, may itself be an obstacle to middle-class democratization (Chen & Lu, 2011; Ying, 2016; Nathan, 2016; Rocca, 2017).The broad categorization of 'structural' also applies to the institutional and dependent relationships which the middle-class has with the Chinese state. This state-constructed dependence has important effects on the prospects for Chinese middle class democratization and bears a review.

An often remarked institutional obstacle for middle class democratization in China has been the lack of legitimate avenues for middle-class associational life (Nathan, 2016, p. 11; Tsang, 2014, p. 154-156). Nathan (2016) reflects on the heavy hand of the Chinese state in their various strategies of coopting, suppressing, and delegitimizing new avenues of associational life in China – raising examples of the Chinese government crowding the public field with its many top-down mass organizations (Nathan, 2016, p. 11-12). Interestingly, both Nathan (2016) and Rocca (2013) see the most active middle class associational life occurring in homeowners' associations to contest construction and real-estate management companies. However, both scholars draw different conclusions on their potential for facilitating middle-class led democratization – whilst Nathan (2016) remains skeptical of the ability for homeowner's activism to scale at a class level against the political regime, Rocca (2013) emphasizes the importance of the long-term incremental political change that these micro-associations bring forth.

Another oft-cited institutional obstacle for the Chinese middle class arises from the middle class' clear and deep-rooted dependence on the Chinese party-state (Goodman & Chen, 2013; Chen & Lu, 2011; Nathan, 2016). This section of the academic literature broadly argues that the Chinese party state has been instrumental, in creating, employing, and materially supporting the majority of China's current middle class (Ibid.). Goodman & Chen (2013) uses this relationship to suggest a key difference between 19th Century Western entrepreneurial middle class democratization and the potential for Chinese entrepreneurial middle class democratization in the future. In contrast to the current Chinese middle class, 19th Century European entrepreneurs were

largely excluded from political power and participation, which propelled their organization and action towards democratization – this is significantly different from the case of China's new middle-class entrepreneurs, who rarely emerged outside of the state (Goodman & Chen, 2013, p. 5). Tomba's (Nathan 2016, p. 10 cited Tomba) studies on the active role of the Chinese government in creating a propertied and government-employed managerial middle class remain some of the clearest examples of Chinese middle class dependence on the Chinese party state. With these issues in mind, it should come as no surprise that recent academic scholarship on democratic attitudes find that entrepreneurs and the managerial middle class are likely to personally value individual political liberties, but are even more likely to favor Chinese state-party authoritarianism (Li, 2013; Chen & Lu, 2011).

Socioeconomic and Structural Relations as an Obstacle for Middle-Class Democratization

One particularly novel argument made in recent academic literature has been the suggestion that the *position* of the Chinese middle class in the 'middle', and its impact on the middle class's socioeconomic relations with China's upper, lower, and ruling classes, in itself is an obstacle for middle-class democratization (Chen & Lu, 2011; Ying, 2016; Nathan, 2016; Rocca, 2017). This argument within the literature explores the uncertainties, anxieties, and alienations of the Chinese middle class.

To start, studies on middle class attitudes towards democratic principles and sociopolitical affairs converge on an important finding: that the middle class judges democratization by evaluating its potential to upset the middle class' current wealth

privilege and beneficiary position in 'the middle' (Chen & Lu, 2011; Ying, 2016). This partially explains the middle class 'puzzle' – in their support of individual liberties, but unwillingness to 'reshuffle' the current social order (Ibid.). Nathan's (2016) observations further put this issue into perspective, as he points towards the Chinese middle class being comparatively *small* in size, in comparison to the mass group of lower class citizens. Both Nathan (2016) and Rocca (2017) argue that this social structure inherently serves as an obstacle for the middle class to be interested in democratization. Any political modernization in China, like the introduction of a representative democratic system of popular participation, would inherently benefit the majority lower class (Nathan, 2016; Rocca, 2017, p.211). As part of this argument, Rocca (2017) also argues that the 'civil' cultural narrative of the middle class inherently makes them skeptical of the lower class 'mob'. The structural and cultural obstacles to civilization converge at this point, and further supports one of our opening arguments: that the middle class *cannot* facilitate democratization and is a stabilizing group in support of China's current political order (Li, 2013, p. 12; Ying, 2010, p. 50).

Discussion: The 'Anxious' Middle Class and the Pursuit of Gradual Political Change

Nathan's (2016) reflections – on the turbulent history of the Chinese middle class since the crises of inflation and corruption culminated in the 1989 Tiananmen protests – paints a picture of an *anxious* political group: a middle class stuck between a secretive upper and ruling class and an overwhelming majority of lower-class, where the social ladder and positioning of any member of the middle class could shift quickly and

unpredictably. It is in a political system like this that the Chinese middle class' seemingly paradoxical and puzzling views on democratic belief and authoritarian support may reasonably coexist. Rocca (2016) finds that in these structural conditions, the long-term struggle over laws and regulations become the best way for the middle class to guarantee fair competition with the upper and ruling class (Rocca, 2016, p.206) without upsetting and risking the current political order. This insight further puts into perspective the importance and effectiveness of gradual political change for the middle class – examples ranging from legal changes pushed forth by homeowners' associations (Rocca, 2013), to localized middle-class NIMBY protests (Weber 2011) to informal private sector maneuvers influencing larger institutional reforms (Tsai 2007). These incremental, gradual, and context-specific fixes may be easily missed by analysts expecting large-scale, regime-changing democratic action (Rocca, 2013, p. 133; Weber, 2011, p. 31), but the cumulative impacts of these actions contribute to the long-term political change ultimately sought and preferred by the Chinese middle class (ibid.).

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