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## Acknowledgement & Thanks

Simon Fraser University's three campuses occupy the unceded traditional territories of the x<sup>w</sup>məθk<sup>w</sup>əy̓əm (Musqueam), Sḵw̓xwú7mesh Úxwumixw (Squamish), səlilwətaʔl (Tsleil-Waututh), q̓ícəy̓ (Katzie), k<sup>w</sup>ik<sup>w</sup>əłəm (Kwkwetlem), Qayqayt, Kwantlen, Semiahmoo and Tsawwassen peoples. We recognize and support the return of territorial sovereignty to the Indigenous peoples of these lands.

This volume is dedicated to every single person involved in its creation. The *Gadfly* team acknowledges and praises each and every hard-working author featured within this issue, as your work is unquestionable in its rigour. We appreciate your perseverance throughout the editing process, and we thoroughly enjoyed watching your submission evolve into what is reflected in this issue. We want to also recognize your willingness to revise, rethink, and push your arguments further. Your commitment is ultimately what gives this issue its depth and robustness as an undergraduate journal.

To our editing team, the journal would have never seen another volume come to light without your excellence. The feedback and dedication each editor gave to each author strengthened not only the individual pieces, but the intellectual integrity of this entire volume. All editors involved with the editing process truly exemplify the collaborative nature of student scholarship, and the *Gadfly* executive team can not thank each and every one of you enough for your tenacity.

Finally, to you, the reader of this issue, thank you for engaging with the arguments held within these pages. We truly hope that you are left with a sense of curiosity and inspiration for the questions that matter most, and are most importantly continuing to critically think as participants in our shared political life.

*The views and ideas from papers within this issue reflect only those of the contributing authors, not Gadfly, Gadfly staff, or the Department of Political Science at Simon Fraser University.*

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## Letter from the Team

For the final issue of Volume 3, our executive team finds ourselves reflecting on the remarkable community that has grown around this journal. From editors to authors, this volume has been shaped by the curiosity and courage of those who have chosen to engage with it. This collection holds tremendous significance for the *Gadfly* team, marking not only an era of revival, but a renewed commitment to rigorous academic inquiry.

As we wrap up 2025-2026's submission cycle, we look back on our process as a lesson in both our successes and our shortcomings. We recognize the imperfections that surfaced throughout the editorial journey, including the need for numerous extensions and the challenges created by our unconventional timelines. Despite these complications, our team remained committed to cultivating a space where emerging scholars could generate new conversations and participate in academic thought. This commitment continues to drive the heart of what *Gadfly* stands for, and will push our team forward as we enter a new cycle for the journal. Ultimately, we aim to carry forward our ambitions while refining the procedural foundations that support it.

As we look ahead, we encourage you to remain connected with *Gadfly*. A new submission pool for manuscripts is slated to open up in the early months of 2026, accompanied by opportunities to join our editorial team. The *Gadfly* executive team also intends to introduce several new initiatives in 2026 that will strengthen a community of scholars within the study of political science. We hope you will consider contributing to our journal, whether that be in modest or substantial ways. *Gadfly* thrives because of those who share our same ambitions, and we look forward to welcoming the next cohort of voices who will shape Volume 4 and beyond.

The Gadfly Executive Team,

**Lisa Kim and Artin Safaei**

*Editors-in-Chief*

**Alexander Hodaly, Sarah Higgins**

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*Contemporary Canadian Politics*

# | The Evolution of Right-Wing Immigration Stances in BC From 1991-2024: Analyzing the Party Platforms of the BC Liberals, BC United, and BC Conservatives

*Jayson Biana*

**Keywords:** *Immigration, migration, BC politics, right-wing politics, electoral platform analysis*

Increasing polarization and politicization of immigration and integration policies have challenged the narrative of ‘Canadian exceptionalism’ and mirrored the rise of anti-immigrant sentiment evident in other Western countries. Provinces have also had increasing influence on immigration policy through the Provincial Nominee Program, making immigration increasingly salient in provincial politics. This project seeks to contextualize the fraying consensus in British Columbia (BC) by analyzing the immigration policies of ten party platforms from the BC Liberals, BC United, and BC Conservatives from 1991–2024.

I coded each platform to identify variations in tone, underlying ideology, policy focus, immigrant type, and role of governments. This paper addresses two gaps in the literature: the lack of focus on immigration politics in BC and the absence of analysis on right-wing provincial parties. As such, this provides a much-needed study of immigration in provincial party platforms, allowing us to better understand regional nuance and underlying narratives present in the new chapter of Canadian immigration politics and BC right-wing politics.

## *1. Introduction*

This descriptive paper explores the evolution of immigration stances among British Columbia's (BC) right-wing political parties, using electoral platforms from 1991 to 2024 as the primary data source. The BC Liberals will be the primary data source as they were the dominant right-wing party from 1991–2020. The party would rename themselves as the ‘BC United’ afterwards. In 2024, the rebranded BC United and the Conservative Party of BC would emerge as new players in the landscape of BC politics. The research fills two significant gaps in the literature: the lack of study on immigration politics in British Columbia and the absence of analysis specifically targeting right-wing provincial parties. I use a qualitative content analysis framework to examine how these platforms have framed immigration over time, analyzing variations in tone, ideology, policy focus, immigrant type, and the role of governments.

The paper is organized into five sections. Section 2 contextualizes the federalization of immigration policy in the 1990s, the rise of provincial powers through the Provincial Nominee Program, and the increasing salience of immigration in provincial politics. It also highlights relevant studies that employ content analysis of party platforms. Section 3 explains the research design, data set, and coding framework, consisting of ten electoral platforms from major BC right-wing parties. Finally, section 4 identifies four key eras in BC's right-wing immigration stance, illustrating a gradual shift from pro-immigration sentiments to anti-immigration rhetoric. Overall, I will argue that the immigration stances of BC right-wing parties from 1991–2004 have gone through four distinct eras: the entrance of immigration into the provincial agenda, immigration as an economic driver, the ‘neoliberalization’ of immigration, and immigration as a destabilizing force.

## *2. Literature Review*

### *2.1 The Federalization of Immigration*

The literature on immigration at the subnational level has expanded in recent decades due to the significant increase of provincial power in immigration policy. Immigration as a policy area has long been dominated by the federal government, but this would change in the 1990s with what scholars call the federalization of the immigration. This term refers to the increasing influence that the provinces have on immigration, largely due to the Provincial Nominee Programs, henceforth referred to as PNPs. This can be traced to two main events: (1) the demands of Quebec for increased jurisdiction on immigration into their province motivated by cultural and linguistic preservation; and (2) the demands of Manitoba for increased immigration selection due to overconcentration of immigration to urban areas and partly in response to Quebec new powers (Baglay & Nakache, 2014; Gagnon & Larios, 2021; Paquet, 2014; Xhardez & Paquet, 2021). Power over immigration has been devolved through the Provincial Nominee Program (PNP) implemented in 1998, which gives provinces excluding Quebec the ability to nominate immigrants coming to their provinces (Baglay & Nakache, 2021).

In other words, the role provinces play in immigration has grown significantly in the past three decades, making it a rich unit of analysis. As such, immigration has become increasingly salient in provincial politics, evidenced partially by the increase in immigration coverage on provincial party platforms across Canada, and more significantly by the rhetoric of politicians in speeches and press releases (Gagnon & Larios, 2021; Paquet, 2014). This is followed by the trend of increasing salience and polarization—and arguably

xenophobia—surrounding immigration policy at the federal level (Abu-Laban, 2014; Abu-Laban et. al., 2023). As argued by Xhardez and Tanguay (2024), the increasing power of provinces through PNP calls for a disaggregated analysis of migration to Canada.

## *2.2 Canadian Platform Analysis*

The literature on content analysis of party platforms, both federal and provincial, is broad. As argued by Flynn (2011), “parties were relatively unconstrained in advancing detailed election platforms...and that they were able to fulfill, or partially fulfil, those commitments at fairly significant levels (pp. 235)”, making party platforms a reliable unit of analysis. Wesley (2011) uses this method to study rhetorical and ideational patterns in Manitoba, concluding that progressive but centrist platforms succeed the most. He states that this is required to capture the ethnic and immigrant vote while still appealing to the rest of the province. Through this method, scholars have identified important shifts in party stances, including on immigration, both federally and provincially. Ultimately, the literature begs the same question: how have political parties, through their party platforms, shifted their stances on immigration?

Firtova (2019) uses content analysis of the federal Conservative Party’s party platforms and other discourse to identify how the Conservative government framed immigration. She identifies a shift in the discourse from one of integration, reflecting the Canadian value of multiculturalism, to one of patriotism, which focuses on economic growth and careful selection of immigrants. Xhardez and Paquet (2021) used content analysis of party manifestos to explore the evolution of immigration politicization in Quebec. They find that Quebec tends to lean towards a ‘liberal’ stance on immigration, specifically regarding volume, origins, and type of immigrants. Gagnon and Larios (2021) used content analysis of party platforms, speeches, and

other discourse mediums to compare politicization of immigration in Ontario and Quebec. Their analysis finds that while both provinces are generally pro-immigration, both have experienced moments of politicization triggered by the 9/11 incident and Hérouxville event, respectively. Following these events, new frames of immigration as a security and cultural threat would challenge the traditional frames of immigration as an economic and social driver.

### *2.3 Canadian Right-wing Parties*

The behaviour of Canadian right-wing parties as it pertains to immigration is less studied.

However, the literature points to right-wing parties as a rich unit of analysis. Peker and Winter (2024) studies right-wing parties' response to the immigration policy of the Liberal Party of Canada by analyzing the platforms of right-wing parties at the federal level and in provinces like Alberta and Quebec. They identify a newfound vitality in right-wing movements following the COVID-19 pandemic which has created a need to return to the study of Canadian exceptionalism in immigration. They identify a tripling of support for the staunchly anti-immigration in People's Party of Canada (PPC) from 2019 to 2021, as well as a record electoral performance by the Parti conservateur du Quebec who framed immigration as an issue of 'civilizational compatibility' (Peker & Winter 2024). Budd (2021) analyzes the evolution of right-wing populism at the federal level—particularly the Reform Party, the Conservative Party, and the PPC—concluding that right-wing populism has been moderated to appeal to neoliberalism rather than blatant xenophobia or anti-immigration sentiments.

This contrasts with the wealth of scholarship on right-wing parties and immigration in the United States of America (USA) and Western Europe. Such analysis in Canada is needed in

the face of a newfound ‘fraying’ of Canadian exceptionalism and consensus on immigration. This paper will analyze the right-wing party platforms in the new era of British Columbia politics following the transformative triumph of Gordon Wilson’s Liberals. It will explore the findings of other papers—particularly the federalization of immigration and a shift of the immigration consensus—and see how it applies to the context of British Columbia. This addresses two aforementioned gaps in the literature: first, it will tackle the lack of disaggregated study of immigration in Canada, especially at the provincial level; second, it will delve into the fertile ground of right-wing politics as it pertains to immigration.

### ***3. Research Methods***

#### ***3.1 Research Design***

The paper uses a qualitative content analysis method to examine the electoral platforms of right-wing parties in BC from 1991 to 2024. Electoral platforms are chosen as the unit of analysis as they provide a party’s official stance on a range of policy issues, which Canadian parties tend to accurately pursue when elected into government or as opposition parties (Flynn, 2011). The primary objective will be to determine changes in party views towards immigration policy over time. It will use content analysis to identify variations or patterns in five categories discussed in section 3.3.

#### ***3.2 Data Set***

The data consists of ten electoral platforms from 1991–2024: eight from the BC Liberals, one from BC United, and one from the BC Conservatives, all of which were acquired from public online databases and official party websites. These parties have been chosen based

on their competitiveness and relevance in the modern BC political scene; only right-wing parties which formed government or the official opposition are included (see table 1). The defunct BC Social Credit Party—and its successor, BC Reform—is not analyzed due to its decline in the 1990s, during which it lost relevance in BC electoral politics. 1991 was selected as the starting year as it aligns with the rise of provincial power in immigration which started in the 1990s and expanded significantly in the 2000s, and marks the BC Liberals dramatic electoral victory under Gordon Wilson, after which the party became the main right-wing actor in BC (Paquet 2014). It is also the first platform which explicitly addresses immigration policy.

Year	Government	Official Opposition	Third Party	Total Seats
1991	BC NDP (51)	BC Liberals (17)	BC Social Credit (7)	75
1996	BC NDP (39)	BC Liberals (33)	BC Reform (2)	75
2001	BC Liberals (77)	BC NDP (2)	-	79
2005	BC Liberals (46)	BC NDP (33)	-	79
2009	BC Liberals (49)	BC NDP (35)	-	85
2013	BC Liberals (49)	BC NDP (34)	BC Greens (1)	85
2017a <sup>1</sup>	BC Liberals (43)	BC NDP (41)	BC Greens (3)	87
2017b	BC NDP (41)	BC Liberals (43)	BC Greens (3)	87
2020	BC NDP (57)	BC Liberals/United <sup>2</sup> (28)	BC Greens (2)	87
2024	BC NDP (47)	BC Conservatives (44)	BC Greens (2)	93

*Table 1. BC Election Results from 1991–2024.*

### 3.3 Coding Framework

<sup>1</sup> The BC Liberals were elected with a minority government (2017a) but were replaced by the BC NDP forming a confidence and supply agreement with the BC Greens (2017b).

<sup>2</sup> The BC Liberals changed their name to BC United in 2022.

This study will use content analysis to identify patterns in the party platforms, defined by Johnson, Reynolds, and Mycoff (2015) as the, “use of the written record via systematic coding and classification of its contents (pp. 270)”. I use the ‘checklist approach’, which codes texts in their entirety rather than by sentence or paragraph, as it is an, “efficient and valid method to code large numbers of manifestos in a relatively short time” especially on “complex policy domains not necessarily overlapping with the left-right divide (Ruedin & Morales, 2019, Conclusion)”. It will assess the following categories: (1) tone, (2) underlying ideology, (3) policy focus, (4) immigrant type, and (5) role in the federation. While this paper uses this checklist-style approach, section 4 will use specific quotes from the platforms to illustrate and discuss the findings.

### 3.3.1 *Tone*

A platform will be considered *pro-immigration* if immigration is discussed in a positive manner, either by wanting to attract immigrants or retain immigrants in BC. A platform will be considered *anti-immigration* if it discusses immigration as a cause or stressor of negative outcomes (e.g. crime, housing crisis) and thus wishes to scrutinize immigration. Both pro- and anti-immigration sentiments can be present in one platform.

### 3.3.2 *Ideology*

The Canadian right wing typically encompasses the following ideologies: classical liberalism, neoliberalism, and classical conservatism. This study will be guided by the following simplified definitions. *Classical liberalism* is defined by a small government which minimally intervenes in an individual’s life. Often credited as the archetypal classical liberal,

Hayek (1960) states emphatically that an unlimited government is the ‘chief evil’, stressing the importance of individual liberty. In the context of immigration, *classical liberalism* would be skeptical of restrictive immigration policy and opposed to nationalism and xenophobia. *Neoliberalism* is characterized by an emphasis on the economy and free markets, often at the expense of social services (Harvey, 2007). In the context of immigration, this would see immigration viewed solely as a source of cheap and highly-demanded labour in sectors such as agriculture, care work, and construction (Harvey, 2007). Finally, *Classical conservatism* is characterized by an opposition to change and a desire to protect the cultural and moral integrity of a nation (Grant, 1965; Hayek, 1960). Classical conservatives could be concerned about immigration affecting the essence of Canadian identity or view it as a threat to the nation. This will be useful in gauging the fundamental ideological change of right-wing parties over time.

### 3.3.3 Policy Focus

I found three underlying motives for the policies listed in these platforms. First, a platform may want to attract immigrants into the province. This policy focus often has economic motives and is also associated with immigration federalization (Baglay & Nakache, 2014; Gagnon & Larios, 2021; Paquet, 2014; Xhardez & Paquet, 2021). Second, it wants to integrate immigrants by providing services to immigrants that ease their transition into the province and, more importantly, the workforce. Finally, a platform may express a desire to scrutinize immigration by monitoring how many, and which, immigrants come into the province, often to protect the local population from a perceived harm or threat. These second and third categories are described in detail by Xhardez and Paquet (2021), who observe a shift in focus from the former to the latter in the Quebec context.

### 3.3.4 Immigrant Type

This category identifies the type of immigrants the platform focuses on. Baglay and Nakache (2014) conclude that provinces generally only focus on economic immigrants, which can be divided into two categories: *skilled workers*, who are valued for the unique skills they bring, *business immigrants*, valued for the business and investment they bring, and *live-in caregivers*, valued for the care they provide vulnerable Canadians. Live-in caregivers are not included as they are not mentioned in any of the provincial platforms and because the live-in caregiver program was closed in 2014. ‘PNP nominees’ is additionally listed as a separate category, which I have instead chosen to address in the fifth category. As such, the two types of immigrants discussed in this paper are *skilled workers* and *business immigrants*.

### 3.3.5 Role in Immigration Policy

As described in the literature review, the role of provinces in immigration policy has significantly expanded in the past three decades due to provincial demands (Paquet, 2014). This category will determine if the platform advocates for an *increased role* in immigration policy, especially through increased leverage of PNP, or a *collaborative role*, in which they do not challenge the status quo of federal-provincial collaboration on immigration policy.

## 4. Findings and Discussion

Year/Platform	Tone	Motive/Ideology	Policy Focus	Immigrant type	Role in Immigration
1991 BC Liberal	Pro-immigration	Classical liberalism	Integrate immigrants	–	Increased role
1996 BC Liberal	–	–	–	–	–
2001 BC Liberal	Pro-immigration	Neoliberal	Attract immigrants	Skilled workers	Increased role
2005 BC Liberal	Very pro-immigration	Neoliberal	Attract immigrants Integrate immigrants	Skilled workers Business immigrants	Increased role
2009 BC Liberal	Very pro-immigration	Neoliberal	Attract immigrants Integrate immigrants	Skilled workers Business immigrants	Increased role
2013 BC Liberal	Pro-immigration	Neoliberal	Attract immigrants	Business immigrants Skilled workers	Increased role
2017 BC Liberal	Very pro-immigration	Neoliberal	Attract immigrants	Business immigrants Skilled workers	Collaborative role
2020 BC Liberal	Pro-immigration	Neoliberal	Attract immigrants	Skilled workers	–
2024 BC United	Pro-immigration Anti-immigration	Neoliberal Classical conservative	Attract immigrants Scrutinize immigration	Skilled workers	–
2024 BC Conservatives	Pro-immigration Anti-immigration	Neoliberal Classical conservative	Attract immigrants Scrutinize immigration	Skilled workers	Increased role

*Table 2. Immigration Stance of Major Right-Wing Political Parties in BC from 1991–2024.*

Table 2 shows how each of the platforms have been coded. I use this data to make conclusions

about the evolution of right-wing stances on immigration in BC, separating it into four distinct eras: the emergence of immigration on the provincial agenda; the framing of immigration as an economic driver; the neoliberalization of immigration; and the framing of immigration as a destabilizing force.

#### *4.1 Immigration Enters the Provincial Agenda: The 1991 Platform*

The 1991 BC Liberal Platform marks an important change in Canadian immigration policy, as it is the first provincial platform in BC which explicitly mentions immigration. Interestingly, it is also the only platform with a section solely dedicated to immigration instead of being put under other sections, such as healthcare or jobs. This signifies that immigration is an important policy area for provinces, and not simply to how it pertains to other areas under provincial jurisdiction. This aligns with the start of immigration federalization in the 1990s during which provinces became a significant actor in Canadian immigration policy (Paquet, 2014). The 1991 platform shows the emergence of immigration on the provincial agenda and a new desire for an increased role in immigration policy with the help of the federal government.

They advocate for, “greater input into the criteria for entry to Canada...[and] involvement in the screening, selection and settlement processes of immigration”, and promise binding negotiations with the federal government (BC Liberal Party [BCLP], 1991, pp. 28). This desire for increased jurisdiction is the defining stance of the 1991 BC Liberals. They do not explicitly want to attract immigration, and instead pragmatically want increased integration services for existing immigrants in BC, which they hope to achieve with increased federal funding. They specifically ask for federal support in, “language training for immigrant people not functional in English” and “medical, dental, and social support services for immigrants”

(BCLP, 1991, pp. 28). This emphasis on strong integration and settlement services for immigrants is unique to the 1991 platform.

Indeed, these desires would be fulfilled as BC signed an agreement with the federal government in 1998 giving them access to the PNP and increased funding for settlement services. The integrative stance would shift with the start of the ‘new’ BC Liberal era under Gordon Campbell.

#### *4.2 Immigration as an Economic Driver: 2001-2009 Platforms*

The desire for an increased role in immigration policy would remain consistent in this new era. The 2001 platform criticizes the BC NDP under Ujjal Dosanjh for failing to sufficiently, “use the federal-provincial immigration program [he] signed” (BCLP, 2001, pp. 24) referring to the PNP, and repeated promises in consequent platforms for a higher use of PNP and an expansion of the program (BCLP, 2005, 2009). The shift in the BC Liberals stance is their decision to frame immigration as an economic driver for the province, away from the more integrative and social service-oriented approach of their 1991 platform. As such, *attracting immigrants* becomes a priority over *integrating immigrants*. While the 2001 platform makes one promise to attract more foreign healthcare workers, which will also remain a recurring promise, this shift is most evident in the 2005 platform. The BC Liberals promise to implement a BC Skills Connect for Immigrants program to bridge immigrants into the workforce and “aggressively recruit” skilled workers through the PNP (BCLP 2005, pp. 12).

This platform also focuses on attracting *business immigrants* who can bring investment and enterprise into the province. The BC Liberals make a new promise to, “open up [the] province to new trade, investment, [and] visitors and cultures” (BCLP, 2005, pp. 34), and the

subsequent platforms similarly have sections dedicated to attracting Asian business immigrants (BCLP 2009, 2013, 2017). Immigration as an economic driver would become the defining stance of the BC Liberals from 2001–2009.

### *4.3 The Neoliberalization of Immigration: 2013-2020 Platforms*

The BC Liberals in 2013, now led by Christy Clark, would take a larger step towards this direction. Attracting *business immigrants*, especially “entrepreneurs and investors from Asian nations” (BCLP 2013, pp. 5) would become a priority over *skilled workers* in the 2013 and 2017 platforms, evidenced by the visibly increased attention given to them within the platforms. These platforms would substantially build on Gordon Campbell’s proposed “Pacific Gateway” in the 2009 platform (BCLP, 2009, pp. 43), which seemed to focus more on shared culture and ethnic diversity than Clark’s business-oriented framing. Additionally, post-2009 platforms would solely prioritize *attracting immigrants* for the purpose of provincial economic growth, now making no policy commitments to *integrating immigrants* as the other platforms had.

This suggests a stark shift towards neoliberal policies which value free markets and liberalization—indeed, the marketization of immigrants—to spur economic growth at the cost of settlement services for immigrants. Despite this, the 2017 platform features a noticeably larger section on multiculturalism than other platforms. I conjecture that this decision intended to legitimize the immigrant service cuts by offering compensation in the form of multicultural and diversity investments, though this argument would require further study. The 2020 platform under the leadership of Andrew Wilkinson would discuss immigration significantly less apart from one commitment to recruiting more international health professionals, likely due to the

priority given to healthcare and the COVID-19 pandemic response (BCLP, 2020). This would also mark the end of the BC Liberals' domination of BC right-wing politics, replaced by the new BC United party and BC Conservative party who espouse a markedly different framing of immigration.

#### *4.4 Immigration as a Destabilizing Force: 2024 Platforms*

The 2024 platforms of the BC United, though uncompleted, and the BC Conservatives interestingly display novel anti-immigration sentiments. These are based on the claims that uncontrolled immigration under the BC NDP, often in association with the Trudeau Liberals, has led to destabilizing effects on housing, organized crime, and healthcare in BC. BC United boldly claims that they will, “end the international student scam” which has exacerbated the housing crisis by, “flooding the system with thousands of international students” (BC United, 2024). This platform is also the first to suggest that illegal cross-border immigration is contributing to the illicit drug supply and organized drugs trade. The platform quotes a BC United Candidate who states that, “our borders, both provincially and federally, must be better secured to stop dangerous drugs from coming into BC” (BC United, 2024).

This shows a very significant change, perhaps a concerning one, in the immigration stance of the right wing in BC, which has exclusively expressed pro-immigration sentiment up until this point. The BC Conservatives shared similar notions in their 2024 platform, though arguably with less urgency than BC United. They promise to *scrutinize immigration* by ensuring there is, “precise data on both the volume and composition of new immigrants coming to the province” to ensure that the healthcare system is not overburdened (Conservative Party of BC [CPBC], 2024, pp. 59). Their platform also commits to, “improv[ing] border integrity in both

land and maritime environments” (CPBC, 2024, pp. 83) similar to the BC United platform. Overall, this shows that a *classical conservative* element has entered the BC right wing’s stance towards immigration as it suggests an opposition to increased immigration and expansion of immigration programs in BC. This mirrors Abu-Laban et al.’s (2024) observation of increasing anti-immigration and xenophobic sentiment in federal politics, perhaps suggesting a wider cultural shift in attitude towards immigration and arguably signaling a new politicization of immigration.

## 5. Conclusion

This study has addressed two gaps in Canadian immigration literature: first, the study of immigration politics in BC, and second, the specific study of right-wing provincial parties. First, I have given context to the federalization of immigration policy which began in the 1990s. Largely due to the demands of Quebec and Manitoba, provinces gained significantly increased power in the selection of economic immigrants into their provinces through the Provincial Nominee Program and increased federal funding for provincial immigration settlement services. I use content analysis to study variations in the following categories in BC right wing party platforms from 1991–2024: tone, ideology, policy focus, immigrant type, and role in immigration. From this, I have identified four key eras which show the evolution of the immigration stance of BC right wing parties since the federalization of immigration. Immigration first entered the provincial agenda in 1991, in which the BC Liberals strongly advocated for an increased role in immigration policy and an expansion of services for existing immigrants. The BC Liberals under Gordon Campbell begin framing immigration as an economic driver for the province. This is taken further by the BC Liberals under Christy Clark,

shifting towards a business-oriented and pronouncedly neoliberal stance. Finally, the 2024 platforms of the BC United and BC Conservatives suggest anti-immigration sentiment has now permeated the BC right wing.

Future scholarship should build on my work by studying non-platform discourse, particularly speeches, to develop a more nuanced understanding of this evolution. Furthermore, the study of provincial election platforms should be expanded to other provinces in Canada. Alberta is another major recipient of immigrants while the Maritime provinces have routinely proposed immigration as a solution to their population decline and subsequent economic stagnation. Including the unique contexts of other Canadian provinces will facilitate a comprehensive picture of immigration in Canada, similar to the many studies done in Europe. This understanding will help us make sense of the ever-evolving landscape of modern Canadian politics and where exactly immigration fits within it.

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# | Western Alienation in Canada: A Policy Analysis

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Regionalism is a defining characteristic of Canadian domestic politics. Since the Western provinces have joined the confederation, with a particular focus on the Prairie region of Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba, there has been consistent tension with West and Ottawa. In this paper I provide historical analysis of Western alienation, providing critical context for the current political climate in the region.

I then explore the similar case of regional isolation with regards to the Appalachian region of the south-eastern region of the United States and their successful integration of an Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) as a potential solution to address growing sentiments of political dissolution in the Canadian Prairie region. I propose a provincial-federal partnership between Ottawa and the Prairie provincial governments as a practical and innovative means to address this phenomenon, as well as providing insight as to how such a model may operate in practice, allowing for provincial and federal cooperation under the context of growing threats of American annexation.

Canada must pursue an option that seeks to remedy longstanding regional division, with a focus on increased political participation and careful consideration to cultural gripes. The electorate in the Prairies must be given further opportunities for political mobilization to foster a stronger national bond, allowing for further country-wide collaboration and a stronger Canada, capable of addressing the complexities of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

## *Historical Review: Western Alienation Throughout Canadian*

### *History*

The Western region of Canada is characterized by the mighty plains, the rugged Rocky Mountains, and the vastness of the beautiful, yet brutal wilderness. Informally considered to encompass Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia, these provinces have played a critical role in the development of the Canadian state, offering plentiful resources such as timber, minerals, oil and fertile agricultural land suitable for large-scale industrial farming. Canada, being the world's second biggest country in terms of geographical land size, has had the advantages that come along with mass territorial acquisition, including resource extraction and plentiful room for agricultural activities. Paradoxically, this has also served to create a stark division between East and West, with many Westerners feeling as though their needs are not being considered by the far away Eastern elites in Ottawa. As stated by former Canadian Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King in 1936: "If some countries have too much history, we have too much geography."

Residents from Canada's Western regions have long cited dissatisfaction with the current federal system, demonstrating sentiments of political dissolution and frustration with leaders who seem to dismiss their concerns time and time again. A rise in right-wing populist attitudes during the 2010s and into the 2020s has further ignited these concerns, creating a hostile dichotomy between the working-class people of Canada's Western region and the perceived political elites in Ottawa (Budd, 2021). Western Canadians often perceive themselves as consistently battling Ottawa's unfair demands, exploiting their people and resources for the benefit of politicians thousands of kilometres away. This has led to a culture of Western alienation wherein residents feel as their cultural, political, and economic concerns are continuously dismissed and largely

ignored. Nevertheless, this sentiment is not exclusive to Canada. The phenomenon of regional exploitation done by the nation's capital is an unfortunately all too common story in modern geopolitics. Populism has further exacerbated this occurrence, creating a strong sentiment of regionalism in states where this has occurred.

Canada has always been a country with diverse political beliefs. While the current political institutions tend to favour either centre-right or centre-left parties, a range of political identities have always characterized Canada's liberal democracy. Despite this, there has been a significant rise in political division and polarization observed in Canada's democracy throughout the last decade. Canadians are more politically divided than ever before (Public Policy Form & Ling, 2023). The divide between rightists and leftist camps throughout the world has never been so apparent, with Canada being no exception to this current trend. Wealth disparity has led to further widespread political polarization throughout the globe (Micu, 2021). This division is only exacerbated by regional separation, with a staunch divide between rural and urban communities, fueled in part by a history of Western alienation, isolation, and geographical separation.

Indigenous government structures further characterize the country's unique case of regionalism. Alberta is home to 43 unique First Nation communities as well as 8 Metis communities (Indigenous Services Canada, 2022). Saskatchewan has 70 distinct First Nation communities, with 130 different Metis communities (Indigenous Services Canada, 2021; University of Saskatchewan & Préfontaine, 2018). Manitoba has 63 First Nation communities, with no specific Metis communities, although they make up a significant part of the province's population, with the capital of Winnipeg being located on the traditional homeland of the Metis people, the Red River Settlement (Indigenous Services Canada, 2021). Overall, the Prairies is home to hundreds of thousands of Indigenous peoples, forming a significant population that must

be considered when analyzing the politics of the region. Indigenous voices seeking to participate in the Canadian political system have faced unique discrimination, making it critical that any serious solution consider their political agency alongside the rest of the non-Indigenous population.

The 21<sup>st</sup> century has paved the way for an increasingly complicated geopolitical climate, introducing new ways to conceptualize and make sense of global phenomena. While regionalism was certainly an issue prior to the start of the new millennium, a new increasingly globalized world with emerging non-state actors has further complicated this issue. Regionalism in the 20<sup>th</sup> century involved regional actors and institutions having, or attempting to gain, influence and power in their specific area as an alternative to a system of centralized control. However, as the trend of new regionalism is beginning to emerge, alternative means and strategies are now being commonly pursued in the political arena. New regionalism is multidimensional, with non-state actors collaborating with their state counterparts, creating a new rich tapestry of political mobilization amongst the electorate (Soderbaum & Shaw, 2003).

Thanks to the current political climate, the Canadian federal government is facing a significant issue of institutional discontent, frustration, and even anger coming from its Western electorate. Now more than ever, Western Canadians feel ignored and rejected by their federal leadership. This trend is particularly concerning as Canada faces external threats of annexation and unfair tariff implementation by our American neighbours led by the Trump administration. At a time when Canada needs to stand united and strong against foreign powers to assert our sovereignty, Canada remains divided and fragmented with respect to the Western provinces and their dysfunctional relationship with Ottawa, continuing an unfortunate tradition of regional division within the Canadian state, creating a culture of dysfunction and tepid compromises.

## *Review of Policy Options and Considerations*

In a longstanding tradition of Western provincial governments attempting to stand up against the federal government, Albertan premier Danielle Smith championed the *Alberta Sovereignty within a United Canada Act*. Created to protect Albertan interests from a seemingly increasingly hostile federal government, the *Alberta Sovereignty within a United Canada Act's* (2022) primary purpose is to protect the province from federal legislation or policy that is interpreted as unconstitutional or harmful to the province. Once the act is invoked, it would give authority to the Albertan provincial cabinet, allowing for provincial actors and institutions to not enforce a specific federal law or policy with provincial resources (*Alberta Sovereignty Within a United Canada Act, 2022*). Theoretically, this piece of legislation would allow for the provincial government to effectively veto pieces of federal legislation that is deemed to be anti-Alberta. Despite achieving royal assent in December of 2022, it has yet to be invoked, making it challenging to comprehend how effective it may be in a real life scenario, as well as the potential consequences that may arise from its usage.

While the passing of the *Alberta Sovereignty within a United Canada Act* may have been a symbolic victory in defending Western interests against the unfair federal government, many have criticized the act for being superficial. Nigel Bankes, an Emeritus Professor of Law from the University of Calgary criticized the act as being “performative,” further stating that he does not expect to see its usage soon (2024). It is probable that this act would only be utilized following federal action that was explicitly anti-Alberta, of which has yet to occur. An invocation of the act would surely be perceived as hostile by Ottawa, likely leading to increased tensions in an already strained and historically difficult relationship. The act remains as a symbolic rejection of federal elitism, with little efficacy in terms of addressing the issue of Western alienation in a

satisfactory manner, leaving room for further populist sentiment, discontent, and disenfranchisement of the federal system to continue unchecked.

The Canadian federal government itself has tried to meditate on this issue through the establishment of the Western Economic and Diversification, or WED, Canada. Created in 1987 by the Mulroney government as a response to years of frustration surrounding Western inclusion in Canada, it has worked for the last nearly 40 years to diversify the West's economy while improving the standard of living for its residents (The Government of Canada, 2022). In 2021, the decision was made to split Western Economic Diversification Canada into two distinct departments, Pacific Economic Development Canada or PacifiCan in British Columbia and Prairie Economic Development Canada or PrairiesCan for the provinces of Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba.

Despite the well-meaning intentions on behalf of the federal government, there are glaringly apparent issues that plague the former Western Diversification Canada, now Prairies Economic Development Canada in attempting to rectify longstanding grievances. A significant problem is that Prairies Canada only addresses economic concerns and projects. While the economy plays a large part in the Prairie identity and does seek to address many issues tangentially related to Western alienation, it does not strike at the heart of the issue, that being the socio-political angle. Prairie Canada's sole concern are economic issues in the region, leaving political, social, and cultural issues ignored and unaddressed. This makes the institution's scope quite shallow when considered in the broader context of West alienation. Western alienation is largely a political issue, and Prairie Canada is symptomatic of that very same concern. The issue of federal overreach cannot be corrected through a federal department; these two represent contradictory goals. Prairie Canada's very existence as a federal department is grounds for many

Prairie residents to view it as yet another attempt of federal overreach with no genuine respect for provincial autonomy. This makes it very easy for Prairie Canada to be scrutinized by skeptics, viewing it as just another institution of the white-collar elites that do not meaningfully care about the average Prairie resident. An effective solution must be one that addresses political, economic, and cultural concerns harmoniously.

On the other side of the North American continent exists a similarly isolated region with a history and culture distinct from the country it is in, the Appalachia. Located in the Eastern United States, Appalachia exists in the central and southern sides of the Appalachian Mountain range, encompassing the entirety of or parts of the thirteen states of Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia. In order to address similar problems concerning years of rural isolation, frustration with their federal government, and a prevailing sentiment that they have been rejected by the elites in Washington, the Appalachian states took it upon themselves to establish the Appalachian Regional Commission, or ARC, in 1965 following President Johnson's signature. After years of lobbying the federal government for relief, the Appalachian region was set to take troubling matters into its own hands. In the decades since its founding, the ARC has worked to improve the socioeconomic conditions of the region to level the playing field and put Appalachia on par with the rest of the United States. The commission has and continues to invest in economic growth through the approval of large-scale infrastructure projects, the creation of new jobs, and improved access to vital amenities such as health care (2020).

The Appalachian Regional Commission has been largely accepted as successful in improving the socioeconomic conditions of Appalachians. Projects that they have undertaken are

directly responsible for improving the everyday lives of its residents. For example, in 1998, the ARC established the Appalachian Higher Education, or AHE, Network with the goal of encouraging more of its high school graduates to attend postsecondary and further their education. The commission chose to create a program that would result in a more educated working population, inspired by the successful predecessor of the Ohio Appalachian Center for Higher Education (OACHE). The success of the original Ohio centre was quickly replicated as network centres opened in Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia, all in an effort to increase postsecondary enrollment (2004). By the mid 2000s, these centres were proving to be shockingly effective, with post-secondary enrollment increasing by an average of 25-30 percentage points in a few short years (Schwartz, 2004).

Other projects that the commission has successfully undertaken include their flagship Appalachian Development Highway System, or ADHS, have also been widely regarded as positive, with the project ultimately serving to connect one of the country's most isolated regions with the rest of the nation, consequently rewarding both native Appalachians and residents from around the continental United States with new market access. Jaworski and Kitchens (2019) have calculated that the removal of the highway system would result in devastating income losses of \$53.7 billion, suggesting that the region would have been vastly worse off without the completion of such a significant piece of infrastructure, of which may have not been created without the necessary push from the ARC. Overall, the ARC has been mostly regarded by bureaucrats and academics as largely positive, ushering in policies and projects that have greatly improved the lives of Appalachians, thus lessening regional friction and feelings of abandonment in its electorate. The committee continues to advocate and work for Appalachian residents to ensure that their voices are heard and that their needs are met.

Much like the Canadian Prairies, Appalachia is also home to a diverse group of Indigenous peoples who have called the region home for generations. This includes but is not limited to the Cherokee, the Lenape, the Shawnee, and the Iroquois peoples who have stewarded Appalachia for thousands of years. Eurocentric colonial government structures have excluded Indigenous peoples from self-determination and self-government, leading to further complexities that must be addressed in the creation of new, experimental governance structures. The ARC acknowledges and partners with the region's Indigenous peoples to promote reconciliation and the creation of a new positive relationship between the state and the region's original peoples. A Canadian version would benefit from following this established approach.

Nevertheless, there are some unfortunate realities that the ARC was unable to address. As other parts of the country offered opportunities not found in Appalachia, many young graduates chose to take their talents elsewhere. Thus, a significant portion of Appalachian-born individuals fled their hometowns in pursuit of better economic opportunities in other parts of the country. Appalachian natives are consistently offered better jobs with higher paying salaries outside of the region (Vazzana & Rudi-Polloska, 2019). This phenomenon is better known as brain drain. It has consistently ensured that Appalachian talent for the most part does not stay in Appalachia, consequently creating a lower-skilled workforce. Appalachia simply does not have the same industries, job opportunities, and economic attractors that larger cities like New York, Chicago, or Los Angeles do. Paradoxically, this has meant that Appalachian industries have not had the resources and people they need to flourish, keeping the region economically weak, with poverty remaining a pressing concern for residents. As of 2022, Appalachia remains one of the poorest regions in the United States, with the average median household income only reaching 82% of the national average (Appalachia Regional Commission, 2024). While poverty rates have been

declining since the 2010s, poor economic opportunities still characterize the region, making it a serious concern for the region. The ARC is likely to continue to try to mitigate this issue, but as of 2025, it remains a principal concern for Appalachians.

It is important to note that both the Prairies and Appalachia are both regions home to significant diversity. The experiences of individuals living in rich cities such as Calgary and Edmonton will likely be vastly different from those living in more remote, rural areas. While individuals living in richer, more populated cities in the Prairies may have different experiences compared to those in isolated regions, the grievance of Western alienation remains a significant part of the political culture. Ashley and Alm (2016) have suggested that this experience of Western alienation is not exclusive to rural regions, rather the attitude they have towards the phenomenon, as well as related topics such as individualism, anti-tax attitudes, and natural resource economies differs between the rural and urban divide, suggesting that location plays a significant role in determining these frustrations. Residents in rich urban areas were more likely to be less concerned of Western alienation when compared to their rural counterparts. The case for Appalachia is very similar. Those living in more geographically isolated areas such as eastern Kentucky and the Virginias, areas that have historically depended on unskilled labour in the form of coal extraction and the industry's decreasing importance are more likely to feel isolated and ignored by their federal government (Bowen et al., 2018). This suggests that in both regions, rural populations tend to have the most grievances concerning isolation and alienation.

In consideration of adapting similar policies from the ARC to a Canadian context, it is critical that mitigating the issue of Western alienation in Canada must be done through a lens of provincial autonomy. Western sovereignty will be central in establishing a solution that pleases all parties involved, of which will be especially important for the provinces who continue to

reject federal domineering. Provincial sovereignty must be recognized and upheld. The chosen solution will have to balance the tricky dichotomy of both appeasing the Prairies and highlighting their sovereignty, while also ensuring a degree of federal control. The Prairie provinces must work together as partners with their federal counterparts, not as inferiors that are ultimately powerless to the demands of Ottawa.

Additionally, a chosen solution must also be sure that it can garner a significant degree of public support. Prairie residents must be excited and willing to share their often-silenced voices in creating meaningful, long-lasting change. Grassroots involvement is critical, the importance of involving the people of the Prairies in addressing Western alienation cannot be understated. A solution will be one that empowers those who have been long shunned by federal policy. It is likely that if the chosen policy does not explicitly seek to empower the average Prairie resident, it will be rejected by its people and ultimately prove to be shallow and ineffective. It is important to take populist sentiments into account when drafting a solution, residents will not accept or participate in a project that is too centered on the objectives and goals of the perceived elites. The Appalachian Regional Commission has seen such a high level of success due to its holistic approach, addressing political, economic, and social issues concurrently. The average person must feel as though their voice is valued and listened to in conversation for them to experience the transition from political dissolution to political empowerment.

This is a problem that the Canadian federal government must address, especially in the context of heightened global tensions and repeated threats to Canadian sovereignty. Through providing a comprehensive analysis of different policy decisions in similarly regionally divided states, I recommend that the federal government pursue the establishment of federal-provincial partnership and creation of a new Prairie-focused commission. While the work done by Prairie

Economic Development Canada has been useful in providing more autonomy to the provinces of Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba, it fails to address historical cultural grievances, choosing to focus its scope on solely economic concerns, leaving a large component of the phenomenon unaddressed and allowed to fester. Additionally, as a federal department, it is impossible to achieve separation or a distinct barrier from Ottawa, stressing the importance of establishing a new commission that is by Prairie residents and for Prairie residents, addressing the economic, political, and social divisions that have long characterized the region. Such an approach could help bridge the historical provincial-federal gap.

## *Policy Options and Evaluation*

There are two primary options that the federal government should consider in attempting to navigate Western alienation. The first option is perhaps the easiest in theory, continuing to stick with the status quo and not alter the government's ongoing strategy to mitigate this issue. The federal government already has some initiatives, most notably the work being done by Prairies Canada that has proven to be at least marginally successful. Since the department's break into two distinct new departments, it has given Prairies Canada more opportunity to address regional specific concerns, allocating resources and funds only to the Prairie region where the heart of the issue lies. This is proven through the department's commitment to funding local entrepreneurs, supporting small businesses, manufacturing, and agricultural activities (The Government of Canada, 2021). Additionally, the department has done an admirable job of attempting to diversify the economies of the Prairie provinces away from oil in an era where fossil fuels and non-renewable energy sources are being slowly phased out by the Global North.

The primary advantage of this option is that it would cost no added expenses to continue what is currently being done to address the issue. The creation and adaptation of new policy recommendations would surely impact federal budgeting, even if funds currently allocated to Prairies Canada go to the creation of a new Western commission. Additionally, there would likely be a significant period of transition in the creation of a new federal-provincial commission, with previous Prairie Canada employees adapting to their new positions. Upholding the current status quo would also allow for valuable federal resources to be allocated to different departments that could potentially serve all of Canada, not just the Prairie region. This is likely to be more popular with much of the Canadian population located in metropolis hubs such as Vancouver, Toronto, and Montreal. This population is likely to be skeptical of initiatives solely targeted in three of the ten provinces.

Nevertheless, it is apparent that the status quo is not enough. Western alienation continues to be a significant socio-political-economic concern, with no apparent end in sight. Arguably, Western alienation has existed as an issue in Canada since the establishment of the Prairie provinces. In 1878, Canada's first Prime Minister John A. Macdonald made the controversial decision to enact his National Policy to protect the established industries in Central Canada, primarily Ontario and Quebec. This act imposed harsh tariffs on American equipment, forcing Westerns to purchase farming equipment and other machinery from the comparatively more expensive Central Canadian market. Despite this, Canadian grain was still exported at the competitive global price, making Western farmers pay more for lower returns. This piece of policy would mark a tradition of Western frustration, further influencing later movements like the establishment of the Progressive Party in 1920 (Russell, 2015). Later, this would evolve into other movements such as the United Farmers movement into the 1920s and the establishment of

the right-wing populist Reform Party in 1987, with its catchy slogan “the West Wants In” (Macpherson, 2013; Harrison, 2006). It is apparent that the theme of Western alienation is repeatedly raised in Canadian politics, making it unlikely to go away without new, meaningful initiatives and policy changes.

The establishment of a new Western commission could usher in a new chapter of cooperation and partnership with the Prairie provinces and the Canadian federal government. In the context of an increasingly unstable geopolitical environment, ensuring that the country is strongly united should certainly be of concern for the federal government. Following a procedural policy design, policy actors could create a significant cultural shift, influencing larger public sentiment (Howlett & Mukherjee, 2018). Creating a commission inspired by the partnership and work accomplished by the ARC could have the potential to mend a historically fraught relationship between the Prairies and Ottawa. This commission would be a federal-provincial collaboration, allowing for the federal government to still have some say in its activities, without becoming domineering and potentially reigniting political frustrations. Prairie Economic Development Canada would be dismantled, with its budget and resources going towards this new commission. As inspired by the ARC, the federal government could elect a federal representative, granting the ability for the federal government to voice their concerns. Ottawa would still provide funding alongside the Prairie provinces, allowing for a larger pool of funds to accomplish projects for the region. The Canadian government would be able to participate and contribute to the commission, while still recognizing the autonomy of the provinces involved. This arrangement would likely be quite popular with Prairie residents, as it allows for them to take a leadership position, with the federal government taking a back seat,

secondary role. Following the example created by the ARC, this proposed solution could radically alter the West's dysfunctional relationship with the Federal government.

The disadvantage of this option is that it would likely be challenging to transition from Prairies Economic Development Canada to a new regional commission. Those currently working for Prairies Canada would have to decide if they would like to join the new federal-provincial commission or continue as a federal public servant in a different federal department. The creation of an entire commission would certainly come with some hiccups as the commission attempts to establish itself, with the first few years of its operation likely being disorderly until it finds its footing. Prairie residents may also be hesitant to support a project that diverts provincial funding to a new commission. Additionally, in an era where austerity politics is ever-frequent, taxpayers may be less eager to support a new, and surely expensive provincial project.

Furthermore, there is always the risk that Prairie residents will see this as yet another attempt of federal domineering, leading to further, not reduced, sentiments of Western alienation amongst the population. While this is an important concern that should be seriously considered in the adoption of a joint federal-provincial commission, I believe that it is unlikely to be realized. The commission, while being a federal-provincial partnership, will be primarily focused on provincial control. This will be done through the election of provincial leadership roles, with the federal government taking a backseat, supervisory role. Although Ottawa will still have a degree of participation in the activities of the commission, they will not have the final say in decision-making that they currently do at Prairies Canada, ensuring that the provinces take a leadership role in decisions that directly impact them. This approach of decentralized control will allow for the Prairies to be actively involved in regional affairs while also ensuring that the federal government will be there for support and funding, empowering the traditionally

disenfranchised voices of the average Prairie resident. A new commission must be by Prairie residents, for Prairie residents. Thus, it is likely that Prairie residents will recognize the autonomy of the commission as an organization focused on economic development, mending political wounds, and addressing historical injustices for a more united and stronger Canada.

I believe that the risk of the project turning into another source of Western grievances is unlikely if it is operated in a manner like the ARC. The ARC has largely been received kindly amongst its residents, with governors from its 13 states quoting its success in transitioning the region from a troubled area to an up-and-coming new economy within the broader context of the United States (Appalachian Regional Commission, 2021). Appalachia would be far worse off without the creation of the ARC, suggesting that such a model may have similarly positive effects for the Canadian Prairies. If the new Prairie commission is able to harness the public support received by the ARC, it will aid in combatting] Western alienation, not contribute to it. While the new commission is likely to experience a period of unitability in its infancy, this will almost certainly be remedied within a few years of operation once the commission has well established its identity and role within the provinces it operates in.

## *Final Policy Recommendation*

After considering the potential risks and rewards that each solution offers, I recommend that the federal government ought to pursue the establishment of a new federal-provincial Prairie commission. This commission will empower Prairie residents to have a say in the development of their provinces, while still allowing for collaboration with Ottawa. Prairie residents are tired of being ignored, dismissed, and perceived as lesser than more populated provinces such as Ontario and Quebec. A new federal-provincial commission would allow for dialogue, collaboration, and

partnership, fostering a better and stronger relationship between the federal and provincial government of the Prairie region. Such a project will likely attract great public support if it is executed in a manner that is inclusive of the goals and initiatives put forth by the Prairie provinces.

The establishment of this new commission matters to Prairie residents, but it will also empower all of Canada. While Western alienation is an issue that existed throughout the Canadian experiment, now more than ever under the context of American threats of annexation, Canada needs to reinforce and restate its sovereignty as an autonomous, strong nation united under a common state. Nationalism must be harnessed as a tool to achieve amalgamation in a country where division has unfortunately contributed too much to its history. A united country benefits all of Canada and Canadians alike, not just the Prairie regions where this new commission would be operating, highlighting significant national appeal. A Prairie-federal commission has the potential to reshape regionalism in Canada as it currently exists, settling longstanding historical discontent and consequently creating a united, stronger Canada.

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*Contemporary Canadian Politics*

# | A Critique of Canada's National Women's Health Strategy

*Baldeep Gill*

**Keywords:** *Gender, women's health, national women's health strategy, gender-based analysis, government*

In 1996, Canada recognized the need for addressing the inequalities and barriers women experience when accessing healthcare. Thus, they created the National Women's Health Strategy (NWHS) to address the inequities that disproportionately burden women, whether that resulted in unequal access to services or disparities in medical research.

In this paper, I critique the NWHS to see whether it has made substantial progress since its implementation. The evaluation indicates that the policy has strong goals but lacks clear metrics to assess its progress and shortcomings. Overall, highlighting the government's lack of focus on intervening to effectively address the needs of women underscores the need to bring systemic changes to see the strategy working.

## *Introduction*

Historically, around the world women's health needs have been excluded from medical research and practices, as their health needs are seen as secondary to men's health by medical researchers (McKinsey Health Institute, 2024). Women's health has been simplified to the point in which it only includes sexual and reproductive health (McKinsey Health Institute, 2024). This can be seen through the exclusion of women from clinical trials for several years (Balch, 2024). Not only did this exclusion hinder the development of effective treatments for conditions that disproportionately affect women, it also led to women experiencing several more harmful effects from 'approved' medication (Balch, 2024; McKinsey Health Institute, 2024). In the US, this can be seen in the year 2000 when women reported experiencing adverse events 52 percent more often than men who only reported 36 percent (McKinsey Health Institute, 2024). These statistics reiterate that women are disproportionately burdened by the effects from health care practices that cater towards men's health.

In this paper, I assert the need for equality in national healthcare. By analysing policy frameworks like *The National Women's Health Strategy* (NWHS), we see how a mere creation is not enough to resolve the inequalities impacting women's health. Therefore, to what degree has the NWHS succeeded in meeting its goals to enhance women's health in Canada since its introduction? This paper begins by providing background on how women are disproportionately impacted, and then looks at the socio-economic, cultural and political factors impacting the progress of the policy, followed by a policy analysis of the NWHS to identify its strengths and weaknesses, ending the analysis with the impact it has on gender equality. Finally, ending the discussion with recommendations for women's health policies to be able to truly accommodate

the needs of women. Ultimately, despite its progressive intentions, the NWHS has struggled to achieve meaningful change due to entrenched structural, regional, and political resistance to gender-sensitive health reform.

## *Literature/Conceptual Framework*

In Canada, healthcare responsibilities are primarily allocated to either the provincial or territorial governments. The federal government sets national standards through the *Canada Health Act* (CHA) and provides funding through the *Canada Health Transfer* (CHT) (Canadian Medical Association, 2023). The two governments also collectively work together to ensure quality of care standards are met (Tikkanen et al., 2020). However, Canada recognizes that its system has not adequately understood the factors that continue “influencing the health status of women nor has it addressed women’s issues concerning research, education, leadership and health interventions (Health Canada, 2010).” This quote highlights the nation's failure to accommodate the needs of women as an overlooked group in society; however in the NWHS they do recognize that women's health goes beyond physical well-being and expands to their emotional and social well-being as well (Health Canada, 2010). This reasserts that women's health outcomes are determined by the social, political and economic contexts of their lives (Health Canada, 2010).

Women play a crucial role in society; they bear the double burden of economically contributing to society and caregiving within the home. Safaei (2009) highlights that culturally traditional gender roles and societal expectations influence women's health behaviours, access to healthcare and their experiences with healthcare providers. These inequitable experiences are shaped by race, ethnicity, immigration status, and sexual orientation (Safaei, 2009). This

highlights the theory of intersectionality, emphasizing that women's experiences aren't simply shaped by their individual identities, rather these intersecting factors reinforce one another creating unique forms of privilege and marginalization.

Differences in socioeconomic positions also shape the health outcomes by influencing the conditions in which individuals grow, live, work and age in (Government of Canada, 2018). Material circumstances that influence these socio-economic conditions consist of housing standards, workplace conditions, neighborhood safety and amenities (Government of Canada, 2018). These factors are crucial circumstantial aspects that can either enhance or limit socio-economic growth and overall health outcomes. Some psycho-social factors include job strain, social isolation or connectedness, and access to social support (Government of Canada, 2018). These factors can significantly impact mental and physical health outcomes for women (Srivastava, 2012). Carrying the burden of adequately providing for the family affects a woman's ability to remain psycho-socially secure; generally meaning that it affects her ability to feel safe and supported in the social and psychological environment around her (Merriam-Webster, 2018; Della Corte et al., 2020) . The above factors also influence a women's health behaviours, by influencing their diet, physical activity and harmful substance consumption like tobacco or alcohol abuse (Government of Canada, 2018). The interactions between these diverse factors are the pathways in which inequitable social processes translate into inequities in health outcomes (Government of Canada, 2018).

A state's political condition is another major contributor to women's health. Political factors can significantly impact women's health by influencing their access to resources, healthcare and social protections. These issues can broadly consist of governance issues, legislation, and societal norms that directly impact women's rights, autonomy, and access to

care. For instance, women's reproductive health and autonomy is a globally contested topic. Political decisions globally have created barriers to women's access to maternal care, safe abortion, and access to contraception, severely impacting their reproductive health and overall well-being. Specifically in Canada women's access to abortion is not criminalized but is limited due to variations in funding, availability of services, and geographical barriers (Government of Canada, 2024). Limited federal funding, and provincial/territorial restrictions are political contributors to such barriers. The CHA and CHT set the standard that medically necessary services must be fully accessible, however abortion services are not fully funded if not medically necessary or if they do not meet standards defined in the CHA (Action Canada, 2022). The abortion policy issue in Canada is just one instance of political contributors to women's health outcomes. Like the disparities in policies governing abortion, women's general health is often overlooked as it becomes a less socially visible issue.

## *Policy Background*

Health Canada's National Women's Health Strategy (NWHS) aims to improve women's health in Canada by making the system more responsive to women and women's health (Health Canada, 2010). Health Canada (2010) lists the policy objectives as:

1. "To ensure that Health Canada's policies and programs are responsive to sex and gender differences and to women's health needs"
2. "To increase knowledge and understanding of women's health and women's health needs"
3. "To support the provision of effective health services to women"

4. “To promote good health through preventive measures and the reduction of risk factors that most imperil the health of women”

Together, these objectives provide a clear reasoning as to why it is needed and sets out its aim to rectify health disparities, inequities and barriers women experience. The strategy provides a clear illustration of the government's commitment to improve women's health by working on social factors like education, race and status. It emphasises how gender will be incorporated into policies and research frameworks to increase knowledge on women's needs. This showcased the government's vision to make progress in women's health nationally. However, since 1999, the strategy has lacked a clear structure that could allow for the monitoring of the progress of The Women's Health Strategy.

## *Policy Critique*

The policy takes a holistic and gender sensitive approach that focuses on both biological differences and gender roles ensuring that women's health needs are considered from various perspectives. This reflects an intersectional lens that considers women and overlapping identities such as how race, socio-economic status and other factors influence health outcomes. By focusing on preventive measures and health promotion, these policies can help reduce long term disparities. For instance, programs that target specific health risk factors and diseases that disproportionately affect women like breast cancer, reproductive health, and mental health are vital (Health Canada, 2010). The gendered approach to increasing research funding also helps to ensure that women's health remains a priority in medical and health related studies ultimately contributing to more comprehensive options for women. The emphasis on increasing knowledge about women's health challenges and promoting research into sex and gender differences are

crucial (Health Canada, 2010). Since women's health issues have been historically under-researched, addressing the differences is an important step in filling those gaps.

This also supports the policy's goal to support effective health services for women. Supporting effective health services entails that health care providers are aware of and responsive to women's health needs. The implementation of services like preventative screening (mammograms, pap-smears etc.) and specialized care sectors like obstetrics and gynecology specifically address health service disparities (Health Canada, 2010). The emphasis on the need for proactive health initiatives and preventative measures through the promotion of healthy lifestyles, awareness campaigns and reduction strategies are an important step in mitigating health disparities (Health Canada, 2010). Public health initiatives like breast cancer awareness, or other initiatives like cervical cancer screening which disproportionately affect women are crucial in advancing women's health (Health Canada, 2010). By targeting areas where women face unique health challenges the objectives aim to enhance gender equality in healthcare and empower women to take control of their health. These initiatives may work to strengthen the policy to show its progress, however they still fail to deliver outcomes.

While the policy aims to improve health services for women, there are gaps in the actual delivery. For instance, rural and remote communities lack access to adequate women-specific healthcare services, such as obstetrics or gynecological care. Also funding inconsistencies can result in sparse implementation of services across provinces and territories. For example, some regions may receive more robust funding for women's health programs while others fall behind. This institutional issue arises due to the fact that provinces and territories are responsible for the administration and funding of healthcare services (Government of Canada, 2018a).

While the objectives are comprehensive, they lack measurable outcomes and data

collection, therefore it does not allow us to evaluate the long term impacts of these policies on women's health. Without a clear mechanism for feedback and strategic adjustments the policy may not be fully responsive to the evolving health needs of women and may neglect the needs of minority groups. The objectives assert the need for Gender Based Analysis (GBA). GBA is an evidence-based process that examines existing programs and policies to assess their impact on gendered individuals (Health Canada, 2010). Hankivsky (2006), highlights a critique, that the government failed to incorporate GBA to further the understanding of health disparities. Asserting that there is more gender blindness, as it overlooks “the fact that women are the majority of patients, paid and unpaid caregivers in Canada (Hankivsky, 2006).” Hankivsky (2006) also notes how federal, provincial and territorial initiatives also fail to recognize significant gender variations and their impacts highlighting the absence of gender and the isolated nature of women's health policy within the government. GBA is a valuable tool for promoting equity, and improving health outcomes for women. However, the government needs to work to fully integrate it into all its policies and programs, improve its monitoring and reporting to address the identified barriers to guarantee successful implementation of GBA-approved initiatives.

Overall, the weaknesses in the implementation of the women's health policies stem from a combination of resource limitations, regional disparities and an insufficient focus on the intersectionality of gender and social factors. While the policy is ambitious, addressing the implementation gaps is crucial to improving the overall health and wellbeing of women in Canada. Strengthening monitoring and evaluation, and targeting underserved populations are key areas for improvement.

## *Case Examples*

*The Women's Health Strategy* has significantly impacted women's health outcomes by fostering research into women's unique health needs and promoting gender equality in healthcare. To overcome the inequities in Canada's health research and health care system, the National Women's Health Research Initiative (NWHRI) launched in 2021 (Canadian Institutes of Health, 2022). The goal of this research initiative is to ensure “everyone has access to evidence-based, gender-sensitive, culturally safe, high quality care and services across their lifespan (Canadian Institutes of Health, 2022).” The initiative allows the Canadian healthcare system to recognize the gaps in women’s health research and improve the quality of care.

For instance, in British Columbia, research at the University of British Columbia led to a better understanding of women's reproductive and sexual health, and has influenced policies to include free contraception (Chow, 2023). The initiative to provide free contraceptives allows women to prevent unintended pregnancy, as it allows them to be able to have economic stability in their lives and for their families; therefore ensuring that children and families are more likely to have adequate shelter and food security (Chow, 2023). This mitigation ensures the long term avoidance of negative health outcomes for women and children. According to Bernstein and Jones (2019), “access to reliable contraception will undoubtedly have significant implications for women. Allowing women to use the contraceptive method of their choice and more effectively plan pregnancies could improve their educational and career outcomes and increase their economic security.” This is reflected in B.C. through its raw data on how almost 860,000 women of reproductive age struggled to access effective birth control methods before the cost barrier was removed (Rolfsen, 2025). The 49% jump in women being able to access long-acting

reversible contraception (LARC) holds the power to shift national pharmacare policies (Rolfson, 2025).

The impact of increased research funding is evident above, however affordability is only a single part of addressing the barriers to access. Here we see again how regional disparities come into play. Free contraceptives are only available in BC and Manitoba, therefore, in the rest of Canada affordability still remains a barrier to access. Along with affordability and regional policy disparities, geographical barriers hinder the true impact of the policy. For instance those in rural and remote areas, tend to lack timely access to specialized care like reproductive, maternal and mental health. In provinces like Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Ontario, abortion providers are accessible only in urban areas, despite 35-40% of the population residing in rural communities (Action Canada, 2019). This reflects how access has not significantly reflected the success of the strategy's objective of providing “support for the provision of effective health services to women (Health Canada, 2010).” Though there has been improvement in the past couple years, Health Canada can make significant improvements in order to see better results from its strategy.

## *Recommendations*

To ensure the success of the NWHS, it's important to prioritize a coordinated approach that addresses women's health inequities, invests in research and supports healthcare delivery and policy reforms. This means ensuring that policies and programs are responsive to sex and gender differences, increasing knowledge about women's health and supporting effective health services.

Looking forward, it's important that the NWHS is integrated into all levels of

government, through joint planning and prioritisation, equal distribution of services can prosper across Canada (Atkinson et al., 2025). It is important that all levels of government collaborate to address the barriers that hinder women's health outcomes, whether societal, cultural or political. This could address the systemic issues and encourage legal reforms like provincial autonomy in prioritisation of funding, policy changes, and community level interventions (Atkinson et al., 2025). Regional government collaboration would allow for equitable health care service access around Canada.

Ultimately, to begin to see progress, further investment in research and healthcare practices catered to women are important as well (Chyzy et al., 2024). This involves expanding GBA to include basic and complex women's health needs. GBA focused research can push for more research on areas like autoimmune diseases, hormonal health, maternal health, and chronic reproductive conditions that disproportionately affect women (Weise & Gross, 2024). An increased focus on women's health in understudied areas can promote investigation in research to focus on the overlapping identities that suffer to receive adequate healthcare, ultimately leading to more effective healthcare strategies for diverse populations (Chyzy et al., 2024). To truly achieve full gender equality in healthcare, it needs to address these challenges more vigorously, with targeted interventions, greater integration of services and a continued focus on addressing structural inequalities.

## *Conclusion*

The NWHS is a comprehensive Canadian policy that was implemented nearly 26 years ago, and has made limited progress in addressing the sex and gender differences in health care practices. Reflecting the point made by McKinsey Health Institute (2024), the progress the

policy has been able to make has only focused on sexual health, this does not illustrate evolution. The analysis highlights how it lacks measurable goals preventing the average person from seeing progress. Without clear metrics, it's impossible for Canada to see its advancements or shortcomings (Atkinson et al., 2025). Despite that, it's important to note that gender inequality is prevalent widely across Canada, which is why it is important that it is addressed in the healthcare sector effectively through mechanisms that ensure stability and sustainability.

Implementing recommendations like an expansion of GBA and government collaboration are vital for ensuring that healthcare policies and programs are inclusive and equitable for all Canadian women. The strategy has made little progress since its launch in 1999 due to the lack of focus on the importance of GBA and the government's commitment to intervening and protecting vulnerable groups. Like any sector, gender inequality in healthcare has broader implications that go beyond only affecting women. They lead to disparities in access to care, poorer health outcomes while perpetuating social inequities. Ultimately, these inequalities impact communities and the overall effectiveness of the healthcare system as well, therefore it is important to bring systemic changes to enhance the effectiveness of *The Women's Health Strategy*.

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*Contemporary Canadian Politics*

# | Partisan Gaze: Examining the Impact of Political Party Preferences on Exposure to News Content (An Eye-Tracking Study)

*Mary Toma*

**Keywords:** *Selective exposure, selective avoidance, eye-tracking, partisanship, disconfirmation bias, horizontal attention bias*

This research aims to investigate how people perceive political information being presented to them, particularly when the content conflicts with their political beliefs. This study theorizes that those with specific political party affiliations have a greater tendency to avoid gazing at political content that differs from their beliefs.

An eye-tracking experiment was conducted at SFU Burnaby with a sample size of 17 participants who were randomly assigned to one of two treatment conditions. They were tasked with completing a pre-experiment questionnaire, followed by the treatment phase, before concluding with a post-experiment questionnaire. Participants were presented with a news article from the 2024 BC Elections period, containing drug policy initiatives of BC's three main political parties - NDP, Conservative, and Green. Eye-tracking data and survey data were cross-tabulated in linear regressions and t-tests to statistically analyse where participant gazes were most drawn and fixated on for the longest duration to identify what they avoided as a result.

Findings show the significant presence of the inverse effect where those who identified with a specific political party tended to expose themselves more to opposing party content, encouraging further exploration into disconfirmation bias.

## *Introduction*

In a politically polarized world, people are not passive recipients of information but rather selectively choose, whether consciously or unconsciously, what it is that they would like to be exposed to. This is known as selective exposure theory (also referred to as confirmation bias), a concept first introduced by Lazarsfeld et al. (1948 as cited in Knobloch-Westerwick, 2015, p. 5). Selective exposure occurs when individuals hold attitude-driven biases and will only interact with political information that reaffirms their beliefs (Garrett, 2009, p. 678; Schmuck et al., 2019, p. 158; Sülflow et al., 2019, p. 169). In having access to such a vast amount of information yet only choosing to encounter reaffirming content, this leaves us wondering whether people are actively avoiding looking at opposing information.

Selective avoidance occurs when there is “a tendency to avoid opinion challenging information systematically” (Jang, 2014, p. 668), and is a separate phenomenon that arises regardless of whether reaffirming information is present or not (Schmuck et al., 2019, p. 160). My research aims to refine selective exposure theory to account for how people with established political identities may avoid viewing content that contradicts their beliefs, contributing to broader discourse on selective avoidance theory.

I conducted an eye-tracking experiment where participants were presented with political news content on drug policy. The use of eye-tracking technology to measure the visual attention of participants provided empirical evidence for examination while deepening understanding of public perceptions towards political news content and the role that biases may play in our subconscious interactions. Visual attention in this case, refers to “what the eyes are looking at” (Segijn & Vraga, 2024, p. 115), and was assessed to determine where participant gazes were most drawn and fixated to deduce what they avoided as a result.

The reason for selecting drug policy as the content shown to participants is due to Canada declaring the opioid crisis a national emergency back in 2016, with British Columbia (BC) alone having the highest rate of illicit drug use and overdose deaths (Belzak & Halverson, 2018, p. 226). In 2024, BC Emergency Health Services (BCEHS) reportedly responded to 40,543 calls for overdoses and poisonings, averaging to about 111 calls per day (BCEHS, 2025). As citizens of a democratic institution, it is our responsibility to seek the implementation of adequate drug policies that work to resolve such a widespread issue.

Ensuring that individuals are knowledgeable about the proposed drug policy initiatives from the respective political parties is a step in the right direction. However, factors such as partisanship which is “an individual’s adherence to a particular party or platform” (Klar, 2014, p. 687), present a challenge to the way people choose to perceive political information. This is where cross-cutting exposure theory comes into play.

Mutz (2002) defines cross-cutting theory as exposure to “dissimilar political views” (p. 111). It is largely believed that exposing individuals to diverse content including both reaffirming and opposing information, increases political tolerance (Matthes & Marquart, 2015, pp. 134-135; Peterson & Kagalwala, 2021, p. 585; Sülflow et al., 2019, p. 169). My study employs this theory by visually exposing participants to political information from BC’s three main political parties to evaluate how they view the material being shown.

At a societal level, understanding whether partisanship impacts visual attention (by causing people to deliberately avoid certain information) will provide valuable insight to both politicians and news reporters seeking to keep the public politically informed. Ultimately, this research seeks to answer: *To what extent do people's political beliefs affect the visual attention of participants when presented with reaffirming and opposing information on drug policy*

*initiatives?* It is important to note that this study will not go in depth about the specific policies that should be established to mitigate the crisis, but rather the way in which people visually expose themselves to political information on such drastic issues.

Before discussing the findings of my study, I begin by reviewing existing literature on partisanship and various exposure theories. I am particularly interested in uncovering a phenomenon known as selective avoidance and seek to identify the extent to which it exists based on the strength of people's partisanship by performing eye-tracking analysis. Then, I describe the details concerning the collection of my primary data. Before interpreting the results by combining pre-experiment survey data with eye-tracking data. Finally, I conclude by explaining what my findings mean and offer suggestions for future research to potentially investigate.

## *Partisanship*

There is extensive literature exploring how an individual's political beliefs shape their attitudes, ultimately influencing their levels of political participation. Greene (2002) writes that "partisanship clearly fits the psychological definition of an attitude" (p. 172) and goes on to state that it is representative of "the social-psychological concept of group identification" (p. 172). Building on this conceptualization, this paper examines how partisanship as an independent variable leads to selective avoidance, since individuals are believed to seek information that reinforces their political identity while avoiding content that challenges it (Sude & Knobloch-Westerwick, 2022, p. 88). Lelkes and Westwood (2017) find that as partisanship levels increase, avoidance of individuals with opposing viewpoints also increases (p. 486). While this confirms the existence of selective avoidance as a phenomenon among partisans, Lelkes and

Westwood's (2017) research reveals that it occurs based on physical interactions whereas I am assessing visual selective avoidance to political information.

The major ongoing debate amongst researchers concerns partisanship and selective exposure. By analysing existing literature, we can determine that much of the research wants to understand why strong political beliefs have such a prominent impact on political participation. Stroud (2007) mentions that partisan selective exposure may even be a false belief because individuals often seek to expose themselves to unfamiliar views to be more informed (p. 343). However, she goes on to write that if partisan selective exposure did not exist, then people would not be motivated to be active political participants (p. 343). An example showcasing how partisanship impacts selective exposure is offered by Areal (2024) who writes about the rise in negative partisanship where individuals do not identify strongly with a preferred party but are instead "motivated by their dislike towards a particular party or ideological group" (p. 1). It is evident that when there is a higher avoidance of content that discusses any differing viewpoints, the greater the negative attitude towards opposing political parties and their policies (Peterson and Kagalwala, 2021, p. 586). When combined with selective exposure, this idea of negative partisanship raises concerns about how people seek information, often reflecting a concept known as disconfirmation bias defined later in this research.

### *Horizontal Attention Bias*

An important consideration on the topic of selective exposure as it relates to this study, exists in the fact that native English speakers are programmed to read content from left to right. Dickinson and Intraub (2009) identified an asymmetry in visual attention, reporting that individuals are more likely to initially direct their gaze towards the left side of the screen rather than the right (p.

1257). Churches et al. (2017) aimed to discover whether such asymmetries exist across horizontal and vertical spatial dimensions through experimentation. Their study finds evidence of an imbalance of horizontal visual attention directed towards the left of a stimuli due to space-based mechanisms (p. 457). Space-based mechanisms describe how attention is directed towards locations in a visual field, which differ from object-based mechanisms that describe attention towards objects (Churches et al., 2017, pp. 456-457). Based on this research and an understanding of potential bias arising in my own research, the first hypothesis reads as follows:

*H1: Irrespective of partisanship, individuals are expected to allocate greater visual attention to content presented on the left of the screen when compared to the right.*

## ***Selective Exposure and Selective Avoidance***

The prevailing view is one that has been identified as selective exposure theory. Hart et al. (2009) state that “Selective exposure enables people to defend their attitudes, beliefs and behaviours by avoiding information likely to challenge them and seeking information likely to support them” (p. 2). Peterson and Kagalwala find that selective exposure to content in online environments, leads individuals to hold negative views of those with opposing beliefs - mainly in relation to news media (2021, p. 586). In comparison with selective exposure occurring as an individual’s information-seeking process, Ohme (2021) finds that the use of algorithms in social media settings simulates an accelerated ability to encounter information that reinforces one’s beliefs (p. 37). This is further supported by Schmuck et al. when it is stated that, “In the age of ad blockers, filter algorithms, and TV streaming services, it has never been easier to avoid political advertising with relatively low effort” (2019, p. 158). While my study does not look at the effect of algorithms and how they may play a role in exposure to political news content, it is beneficial

to consider these findings and how they reinforce the idea of selective exposure in a political context. The more people are exposed to selective content that fortifies one's existing beliefs, the greater the divide grows between individuals within society.

While selective exposure involves actively seeking out information that aligns with one's existing beliefs, it can also pave the way for selective avoidance, where individuals deliberately steer clear of information that challenges their perspectives. Assessing selective avoidance among partisans has been explored by previous studies and has yielded mixed results. Garrett (2009) finds high evidence of partisans seeking to reaffirm themselves through self-reports of selective exposure, however this did not entail an avoidance of opposing information (pp. 693-695). Likewise, Jang (2014) who relies on self-reported data after presenting participants with reaffirming, neutral, and opposing information, concludes that there is "compelling evidence for selective seeking but little evidence for selective avoidance" (p. 679). Oppositely, Bode et al. (2017) employ the use of eye-tracking technology alongside survey data to find evidence of selective avoidance and determine that when political cues are present on a social media post, people will spend less time looking at the post (p. 2). This suggests that selective avoidance is apparent, however Bode et al. did not account for partisanship which they recommend future researchers to consider (p. 5). Schmuck et al. also use eye-tracking and survey data to measure whether participants avoid looking at certain political poster ads and find "initial evidence for selective avoidance of political ads that are inconsistent with one's partisan ideology" (2019, p. 161). This means that testing for the presence of selective avoidance is more precise and accurate when eye-tracking technology is incorporated conjunctively with survey data.

To test for the occurrence of selective avoidance, I chose to replicate the design used by Schmuck et al. (2019) while substituting for elements that were relevant to my research. For instance, their method consists of showing participants 12 political poster ads from Austrian parties, where Liberal and Conservative party ads were shown situated next to neutral party ads (p. 160). The researchers chose to have the ads appear on screen for 6 seconds and tracked the eye-movement of participants before making them complete a post-experiment survey (p. 160). I share similar techniques which are described in detail under the method section.

The second hypothesis was established to detect the presence of selective avoidance among partisans when presented with political content using cross-cutting methods. Thus, the second hypothesis reads as follows:

*H2: If an individual self-identifies with a particular partisanship, then they will avoid gazing at opposing political content.*

Along this reasoning a sub-hypothesis was also developed to account for those who had weaker political party affiliations and reads:

*H2a: If an individual self-identifies as having weaker ties with their chosen political party, then they will show a balanced gaze towards reaffirming and opposing content.*

## ***Cross-Cutting Exposure***

Another prominent theory in the literature is known as cross-cutting exposure theory. Matthes et al. (2019) explain cross-cutting exposure to be “the disagreement in viewpoints encountered by individuals in their communication environments” (p. 523). Basically, this entails being exposed to a variety of political beliefs that may differ from one’s own. Mutz (2002) assumes that cross-cutting theory has negative consequences for political participation amongst

those exposed to beliefs different from their own and offers two alternate theories for why this is true (pp. 840-841). The first being an *ambivalence* explanation which occurs when differing views result in increased tolerance, hindering political engagement out of hesitation from one's own beliefs (Mutz, 2002, p. 840). The second, a *social accountability* explanation arises when people would rather sacrifice their political participation than to act in a way that impacts their social relationships with others (Mutz, 2002, pp. 840-841). Ultimately, there are claims that cross-cutting exposure causes partisans to engage in more hesitant political behaviour, however other research finds that it fosters tolerance to opposing viewpoints and creates effective deliberation in political settings (Garrett, 2009, p. 694; Matthes & Marquart, 2015, p. 135; Peterson & Kagalwala, p. 588).

Matthes and Marquart (2015) write that being exposed to political beliefs that differ from one's own, are essential to the existence of a sound society because it helps to create "political tolerance, increase the awareness of oppositional opinions, and encourage political engagement" (p. 135). Sülflow et al. (2019) agree that being exposed to cross-cutting viewpoints is beneficial because it leads to "effective deliberation and significantly influences the ability to seek political solutions in the case of disagreement" (p. 169). This study uses cross-cutting practices to expose participants to reaffirming opposing information, aiming not only to test for selective avoidance but also to assess for balanced engagement towards opposing viewpoints.

## *Disconfirmation Bias*

Disconfirmation bias occurs when individuals who hold preconceived beliefs are exposed to communication on a topic and tend to "assimilate congruent evidence uncritically but vigorously counterargue incongruent evidence" (Taber & Lodge, 2006, p. 756). This line of

reasoning is consistent with the social-psychological work of Ditto et al. (1998) who write that “preference-inconsistent information is seen as less valid than preference-consistent information because individuals faced with information they prefer not to believe recruit memories with the goal of undermining the validity of that information” (p. 54). Therefore, it is important to consider that a potential reason for higher exposure to opposing information corresponds to cognitive processes where the individual argues against the information they are perceiving. The presence of disconfirmation bias is further discussed in the results section of this research.

## *Method*

The overall design of my study was a laboratory experiment where participants were tasked with looking at information on BC drug policy initiatives on a computer screen while having their eyes tracked. My study took inspiration from Schmuck et al. who recruited 76 total subjects in their study (2019, p. 160), however I recruited only 17 participants making it a smaller sample size. Individuals were recruited at Simon Fraser University (SFU) Burnaby using various approaches such as distributing flyers, a departmental email sent to all political science students, and through word of mouth across different areas of campus. These strategies were pursued to create a more diverse pool of participants while limiting potential bias. Participants were incentivized to join the study through the offer of a \$30 Amazon gift card. Participation in the experiment was entirely voluntary, and participants were allowed to withdraw at any point in the study so long as it occurred prior to the submission of this paper, with the information collected remaining completely confidential and being destroyed wholly afterwards.

Participants were first presented with a pre-experiment questionnaire on SurveyMonkey that collected information relating to demographics such as: gender, age, city, and education.

Participants were also asked questions relating to politics such as: their level of partisanship, electoral participation, ranking political issues, and how they stayed informed about political news. Non-responses were also recorded since the questionnaires generated the selection of ‘Don’t know’ answers. (Refer to Appendix 1 to view a sample of the pre-experiment survey). The post-experiment questionnaire contained more open-ended questions and was used to gather the thoughts of participants after reading the different party positions on drug policy initiatives. These results and their implications are discussed in greater detail in the conclusion.

In terms of the type of information presented to participants, they were shown a document containing NDP, Conservative and Green political party content. The implementation of the BC Green party was meant to introduce a neutral party stance amid more left-leaning (NDP) and right-leaning (Conservative) content. My study uses political content from news articles which is an essential feature of my research compared to the political poster ads used by Schmuck et al. (2019, p. 160). I chose to use online news articles as a mode of delivering information because it is one of the main sources of information that is widely available and accessible by the general population (Xenos et al., 2018, p. 719). Overall, the replication of a previous study boosted external validity and the generalizability of the research since I aimed to confirm previous findings under different conditions.

In my study, I used a CBC news article that described the various party positions from the 2024 BC Elections. I extracted snippets from the section titled “Mental health and addiction” (Dickson et al., 2024), where each party went over their proposed plan to mitigate the ongoing opioid crisis. The snippets were pasted onto a document where the article title appeared at the top of the page followed by the title of the section where each party position is listed. Below that, the platforms of BC’s NDP, Green, and Conservative party were pasted and the order in which they

appeared differed across two different documents depending on which treatment condition participants were assigned to. The Green party position remained fixed in the centre, to maintain neutrality, whereas the NDP and Conservative platforms were swapped. The treatment group had the NDP appear on the left, with Conservatives appearing on the right. The control group had Conservatives on the left, with NDP on the right. These documents were randomly assigned to participants as a control measure to account for the fact that participants might have been inclined to read whichever party platform appeared first. (Refer to Appendix 2 to view a sample of these documents).

To test for the hypotheses, eye-tracking was used to measure visual attention because it allowed for a closer inspection of what people focused on in milliseconds when they physically gazed at something. This was done by assessing elements of visual attention such as area of interest (AOI) and the duration of fixations within those areas (Segijn & Vraga, 2024, p.113). In the Tobii software, three areas of interest were established on the two treatment documents where each party's position appeared, and fixations were mapped by following the gazes of participants from their recorded sessions. The independent variable was established as being the political party affiliation (partisanship) of participants. The strength of partisanship was of particular interest when testing for the sub-hypothesis. There were two dependent variables examined, the first consisted of the time (milliseconds) spent gazing at NDP content, and the second being the time (milliseconds) spent gazing at Conservative content. The data from the eye-tracking recordings was then used in conjunction with data from the pre-experiment survey for cross-tabulation. All data was coded using JASP software and used to perform statistical analyses.

The combination of eye-tracking data with pre- and post-experiment survey data aided in the credibility and validity of my findings by allowing me to build a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon under investigation. I also performed linear regressions, like Schmuck et al. (2019) to analyse the data collected from the eye-tracking experiment and cross-referenced this with the survey data to identify whether partisanship had a causal effect in the selective avoidance of opposing content.

A limitation present when conducting an eye-tracking study is how time-consuming it is. From setup to the interpretation of the results, the use of this device proved to be more time intensive than initially thought. Another limitation of following this research design involved the recruitment of such a small sample size. This was anticipated as leading to difficulties in finding evidence of a causal relationship between partisanship and selective avoidance of opposing political information. This was mitigated through the experimental approach of data collection by manipulating the treatment so that conclusions can be drawn more precisely. Also, a potential source of bias in my data source arises due to the lack of variation in the participants' political beliefs since they share similar demographics. I aimed to resolve this issue by recruiting individuals from different areas of campus to develop a diverse pool of subjects. Frequency tables indicating the program of study of participants showed a diverse array of results with two students in business, three from criminology, and a majority of five from political science – mainly due to recruitment efforts occurring through a departmental email for those students (see Appendix 3 for more info). Ethical issues when performing an experimental design were also taken into consideration and ethics approval was obtained.

Ultimately, this study worked towards determining whether people truly avoided looking at opposing political information, especially as it related to urgent societal matters. If selective

avoidance appeared to be of major issue, this would hold greater implications when establishing public policies, delivering political content, and fostering political engagement.


## *Results*

Two main hypotheses and one sub-hypothesis were generated to determine the extent to which people viewed political content on drug policies. The first hypothesis states that:

*H1: Irrespective of partisanship, individuals are expected to allocate greater visual attention to content presented on the left of the screen when compared to the right.*


This hypothesis was important for reducing potential bias in the results, as English speakers naturally read from left to right. By including two different treatment conditions, the study was able to test whether this tendency existed and ensured that any observed effects were due to the experimental conditions themselves - not just the layout of the content, which boosted internal validity.

For the first hypothesis, a t-test was conducted to determine how long participants gazed at NDP content when it appeared on the left or the right of the document, and the same was done for Conservative content. Figure 1.1 below shows that the average duration spent gazing at NDP content in the control group when it appeared on the right, was 23,602 milliseconds. Whereas the average duration spent gazing at NDP content in the treatment group when it appeared on the left, was 30,743 milliseconds. (See Appendix 4 for more info). This means that when NDP content appeared on the left side of the screen, participants gazed at it for approximately 7,141 milliseconds more than if it appeared on the right. The p-value must be less than 0.10 to be statistically significant for such a small sample size. Since the p-value is 0.14 for this test, this means that it is not statistically significant.



*Figure 1.1: Average duration (milliseconds) spent gazing at NDP content*

The next test for the first hypothesis was done to assess the duration of time spent observing Conservative content in both the treatment and control groups. Figure 1.2 below shows that 23,101 milliseconds were spent viewing Conservative content in the control group when it appeared on the left. Whereas an average duration of 25,531 milliseconds was spent on Conservative content in the treatment group when it appeared on the right. (See Appendix 5 for more info). Therefore, participants spent approximately 2,430 milliseconds more looking at Conservative content on the right side of the document meaning we can reject the first hypothesis. The p-value for this test is 0.61 which exceeds the threshold for statistical significance. In sum, I found no evidence to suggest that individuals have a tendency to gaze at content on the left of the screen to a greater extent.




*Figure 1.2: Average duration (milliseconds) spent gazing at Conservative content.*

The second hypothesis states that:


*H2: If an individual self-identifies with a particular partisanship, then they will avoid gazing at opposing political content.*

To determine the accuracy of this prediction, a paired samples t-test was conducted to assess the difference in duration between Conservative participants and NDP participants. The first test examined all participants who self-identified with Conservative partisanship. With a total of 5 out of 17 participants self-identifying with Conservative partisanship, the average duration of visual engagement towards either NDP or Conservative content is added across both treatment and control groups. Figure 2.1 shows the average duration of time that only Conservative participants gazed at NDP content was 28,334 milliseconds. The average time spent gazing at Conservative content was 20,145 milliseconds. (See Appendix 6 for more info). Meaning, the Conservative participants in this study spent 8,189 seconds more looking at NDP content. The p-value for this is 0.02 making it highly statistically significant for a small exploratory sample.



*Figure 2.1: Average duration (milliseconds) that Conservative only participants spent gazing at NDP and Conservative content.*

The second test examined all participants who self-identified with NDP partisanship. With a total of 9 out of 17 participants self-identifying with NDP partisanship, the average length of visual exposure to either NDP or Conservative content across both treatment groups did not differ greatly. Figure 2.2 shows that an average of 27,913 milliseconds was spent gazing at NDP content. While 27,163 milliseconds were spent focusing on Conservative content. (See Appendix 7 for more info). The p-value for this test is 0.66 meaning the data did not support the belief that this led to selective avoidance. Therefore, evidence shows that NDP only participants did not have a tendency to avoid gazing at opposing party content.



*Figure 2.2: Average duration (milliseconds) that NDP only participants spent gazing at NDP and Conservative content.*

Overall, findings for the second hypothesis show that the inverse effect is present, where those who identified with a particular political party spent more time visually directed at opposing party content. This was only true for those who self-identified with Conservative partisanship seeing as NDP participants did not show evidence of this effect. The eye-tracking data showed no statistically significant evidence for the prediction that partisanship leads to the selective avoidance of opposing party information. However, seeing as there is high statistical significance of Conservative partisans selectively exposing themselves to opposing content to a greater extent, it would be beneficial to explore further research on the topic of disconfirmation bias.

The presence of disconfirmation bias among participants in this study means we can reject the second hypothesis. Sude and Knobloch-Westerwick (2022) supply that individuals seek exposure to opposing information when they believe it to be “easy to refute” (p. 91). This claim is supported by the work of Ditto et al. (1998) as well as Taber and Lodge (2006). In participants who chose to visually expose themselves to opposing information to a greater extent, it is believed to be motivated by a cognitive desire to argue against the information as it is being processed. In addition, the findings of my study differed from those of Schmuck et al. who find that Conservative participants did in fact avoid gazing at attitude-discrepant political content (2019, p. 161). Whereas my research establishes the inverse effect for Conservative participants. This may be attributed to the smaller sample size as well as the use of more politically salient content. Overall, there is more to be learned about these effects and the motivations behind them.


The sub-hypothesis to the second hypothesis allows us to look at the effect of cross-cutting exposure on participants who self-identified with having somewhat weaker political party affiliations. It reads as follows:

*H2a: If an individual self-identifies as having weaker ties with their chosen political party, then they will show a balanced gaze towards reaffirming and opposing content.*

To assess this claim, a linear regression was performed to analyse whether participants who identified weakly with their preferred party tended to gaze evenly at the content shown. The extent of gaze duration towards NDP and Conservative content is compared to determine whether there is evidence of this hypothesis.

Figure 2.3 is a model of the span of time focusing on NDP content based on partisanship strength. In summary, 9 total participants identified as NDP, 5 total participants were Conservative, 1 identified as Green, and 2 specified that they did not know. Out of the total NDP


participants, 2 stated having weaker party affiliations. Similarly, Conservative participants also had 2 who stated weaker party ties. (Refer to Appendix 8 for more info). Figure 2.3 shows that those who identified as weak NDP spent 22,294 milliseconds gazing at NDP content with a p-value of 0.96. Whereas those who identified as weak Conservatives spent 21,520 milliseconds gazing at NDP content with a p-value of 0.90. (Refer to Appendix 9 for more info). While this shows that a relatively close duration of time is spent on NDP content by both weak NDP and weak Conservative participants, it is not statistically significant under conventional standards.



*Figure 2.3: Average duration (milliseconds) that participants spent gazing at NDP content.*

Figure 2.4 shows the duration of time that participants spent observing conservative content based on the strength of their partisanship. Those who identified as weak NDP spent 24,094 milliseconds gazing at Conservative content with a p-value of 0.97. While participants who identified as weak Conservatives spent an average duration of 15,756 milliseconds gazing at Conservative content with a p-value of 0.45. (Refer to Appendix 10 for more info). It appears

that weaker NDP participants spent a total of 1,800 milliseconds less engaging with NDP content when compared to Conservative content. Results also show that weaker Conservative participants spent a total of 5,764 milliseconds less time gazing at Conservative content when compared to NDP content. The outcome of these tests is not statistically significant; therefore, conclusions cannot be drawn to confirm whether there is evidence of the sub-hypothesis. Heat map visualizations found in Appendix 11 are supplicated to show that there are also no visually significant effects of cross-cutting exposure in creating a more balanced gaze towards reaffirming and opposing viewpoints among weaker partisans.



*Figure 2.4: Average duration (milliseconds) that participants spent gazing at Conservative content.*

Finally, balance tests were carried out to confirm that there were no statistically significant differences between participants in the treatment and control groups. The results of these tests found no apparent differences among participants in terms of age, political interest, left-right orientation, program, and partisanship. However, there was a slight difference among the gender of participants, with significantly more women in the treatment group than the control group. (For a more detailed overview, refer to Appendix 12).

## *Conclusion*

Ultimately, this research aimed to investigate whether there is a causal relationship between partisanship and the tendency to avoid looking at content from the opposing political party, a pattern that has been suggested in previous studies. It determined that people are not naturally inclined to read politically polarized content with a leftward bias in their visual attention. This study also established that, depending on partisanship, some people are significantly inclined to direct their focus on opposing political information as a form of disconfirmation bias. Finally, no significant effects were found to show that those with weaker ties to their preferred party had a balanced gaze across all political content through cross-cutting exposure.

There are some limitations to consider in this research. The first limitation is that only areas of interest were analysed, so I did not examine the specific words on the documents shown that may have contributed to the observed confirmation bias. This may be of interest to future researchers looking to examine the type of political speech that leads to visual avoidance or adherence to certain party content. Another limitation is that this study did not present additional content to participants other than drug policy initiatives from BC's three main political parties. Perhaps results would have differed by showing that visual avoidance is evident in partisans when presented with reaffirming and opposing political content on alternative issues.

Furthermore, recruitment efforts were centralized at SFU Burnaby where the experiment took place which could indicate a limitation. However, although participants were not sourced from external locations, their demographics showed that they lived in various cities across BC's Lower Mainland. A final limitation considered is that participant ages remained close in range with the average age being 19.82 (See Appendix 3 for more info). Since the sample is primarily

composed of individuals from a similar age group - university students - the results may not accurately reflect the behaviours or attitudes of older or more diverse populations. Greater variety in the age distribution of participants could offer a broader perspective on the studied phenomenon.

Additionally, the post-experiment questionnaire results showed that when asked about which party policy they most approved of, approximately 48% of all participants favoured the Green party policy. Conversely, when asked about which policy they least approved of, 40% of total participants did not favour the Conservative party's drug policy initiatives. (See Appendix 13). These results reflect a clear divergence in policy approval, highlighting how exposure to differing viewpoints improves understanding and knowledge towards such a widespread issue.

The findings of this research therefore emphasize the influence of partisan bias and suggest that targeted interventions be implemented by policymakers to encourage more balanced engagement with political information. Such efforts could ease polarization, creating a more informed society, thus strengthening democratic engagement and support for more effective solutions to complex societal issues such as the opioid crisis.

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## APPENDIX 1

The following images contain screenshots of the Pre-Experiment questionnaire presented to participants:

1.

\* 1. Principal Investigator: Dr. Eline de Rooij (eline\_de\_rooij@sfu.ca)  
Student Lead: Mary Toma (mta156@sfu.ca)  
Department of Political Science, Simon Fraser University

**WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY?**  
The purpose of this study is to gather your opinion on BC politics in general and on BC's drug policy in particular. This study is being conducted to look at how you process information and proposed policies.

**WHY ARE YOU BEING ASKED TO PARTICIPATE?**  
This is a study of BC politics and we are interested in the thoughts of people like you.

**VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION**  
Your participation in this study is voluntary. You have the right to refuse to participate in this study and, should you agree to participate in this research, the right to withdraw from this study at any time. You can withdraw from this study at any time during the in-person part or before the final submission of the Honours Thesis.

**WHAT HAPPENS IF YOU SAY, "YES, I WANT TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY"?**  
If you choose to partake in this study, you will be asked to fill out this pre-experiment questionnaire before being shown some news articles on BC drug policy initiatives. We will also ask about your political alignment, age, gender, and public policy priorities. You will be compensated for your time with a \$30 Amazon gift card upon the completion of your participation.

**COULD THIS STUDY BE BAD FOR YOU?**  
We do not anticipate harm resulting from participating in this study. Measures have been taken to anonymize your responses so that your responses cannot be traced back to you. Further details about measures intended to protect your privacy are listed in the confidentiality section below.

**WHAT ARE THE BENEFITS OF PARTICIPATING?**  
You will not receive direct benefit from participating in this study.

**WILL YOU BE PAID FOR THIS RESEARCH?**  
Yes. You will be compensated for your time with a \$30 Amazon gift card.

**CONFIDENTIALITY: HOW WILL YOUR IDENTITY BE PROTECTED?**  
None of the data collected in this study is done with the intent to identify participants. This questionnaire asks for information such as age, gender, city of residence, political views, and voting in the 2024 Provincial Election. There is a small risk that this information could potentially identify an SFU student participant should a confidentiality breach occur. However, the data gathered from this study will be stored on a password-protected server at Simon Fraser University, and only the Principal Investigator and the Student Lead will have access to this data. The stored data will be destroyed by December 2025. You will not be identified by name in any reports detailing this research.

**WHAT IS EYE-TRACKING AND HOW DOES IT WORK?**  
The eye-tracking device is motion sensor bar placed in front of the computer monitor that you will sit at a 60 cm distance from. The device is calibrated by locating the position of your pupils and following the direction of your gaze. There are no known risks associated with the use of this technology. The eye-tracking technology also does not collect any identifying information such as images of the eyes.

**STUDY RESULTS**  
The results of this study will be used in research presentations, in the final Honour's thesis and may be published in an academic journal, for example an Undergraduate research journal. The Honour's essay detailing the results of this research will be available to interested participants.

**WHO CAN YOU CONTACT IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS STUDY?**  
Dr. Eline de Rooij (Principal Investigator), reach her by e-mail at eline\_de\_rooij@sfu.ca. Mary Toma (Student Lead), reach her by e-mail at mta156@sfu.ca. If you have any concerns about your rights as a research participant and/or your experiences while participating in this study, please contact the Director, Research Ethics and Security at hreb@sfu.ca or 778-782-6593.

I agree to participate in this study and proceed with the questionnaire

I do not wish to participate in this study

2.

2. Are you...

A man

A woman

Other (please specify)

3.

3. What is your age?

4.

4. Which City do you reside in?

5.

5. Are you or were you recently an SFU student?

No

Yes (please specify program of study)

6.

6. In general, how interested are you in politics? rank yourself on the scale (0 = not interested at all, 10 = very interested)

0 (not interested at all)    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 (very interested)

7.

7. In politics, people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10? (0 = left, 10 = right)

0 (left)    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 (right)

**8.**

8. What do you think is the most important problem facing BC today? Please rank the following political issues from most important (1) to least important (9) by either selecting a number or by moving the issue up or down the list using your mouse. If you are unsure about the importance of an issue select 'Don't know'.

<input type="text"/>	Economy	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know
<input type="text"/>	Education and Childcare	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know
<input type="text"/>	Environment and Climate Change	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know
<input type="text"/>	Healthcare	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know
<input type="text"/>	Housing	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know
<input type="text"/>	Indigenous Relationships and Reconciliation	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know
<input type="text"/>	Mental Health and Drug Addiction	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know
<input type="text"/>	Public Safety	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know
<input type="text"/>	Seniors	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know

**9.**

9. The BC Provincial election took place in October 2024, did you vote in that election?

Yes I voted

No I did not vote

Not eligible to vote

Prefer not to answer

**10.**

\* 10. In BC Provincial politics, do you usually think of yourself as a...

Conservative

Green

Liberal

NDP

Other (please specify)

**11.**

\* 11. How strongly do you identify as a Conservative?

Very strongly

Somewhat strongly

Not strongly at all

Don't know

**12.**

\* 12. How strongly do you identify as a Green?

Very strongly

Somewhat strongly

Not strongly at all

Don't know

13.

\* 13. How strongly do you identify as a Liberal?

- Very strongly
- Somewhat strongly
- Not strongly at all
- Don't know

14.

\* 14. How strongly do you identify as an NDP?

- Very strongly
- Somewhat strongly
- Not strongly at all
- Don't know

15.

\* 15. If you specified a different political party, how strongly do you identify with them?

- Very strongly
- Somewhat strongly
- Not strongly at all
- Don't know

16.

16. How do you stay informed about political news in BC? (check all that apply)

- Newspaper articles
- News broadcasting channels
- Radio
- Social media posts
- Family and friends
- None of the above
- Other (please specify)

17.

17. How informed do you feel about the position of BC parties on drug-related policies?

- Very informed
- Somewhat informed
- Not informed at all
- Don't know

## APPENDIX 2

The first image where NDP appears on the left and Conservative appears on the right is an example of the treatment document shown to participants:

**How do British Columbia's three main parties compare on these election issues?**

**Mental health and addiction**

**B.C. NDP**

David Eby's NDP government recriminalized the use of hard drugs in public spaces in April, just over a year after it began its decriminalization pilot project. Eby also said he would expand the use of involuntary care in select situations. The party says it will establish a new \$50 million fund for mental health care and continue opening new Foundry centres to support access to care for youth, "quadrupling the number since 2017." It also plans to build another Red Fish Healing Centre, expand specialized treatment for parents going through addiction recovery and people with brain injuries, add Indigenous-led programs and create a treatment centre specifically for construction workers.

**B.C. Green Party**

Rather than focus on expanding involuntary care like the other two parties, the Green platform focuses on ensuring broader access to voluntary care. With former chief coroner Lisa Lapointe on their side, the B.C. Greens are pledging to expand the prescribed safer supply program and plans to have supervised consumption spaces in all public hospitals. It also plans to establish a standard of care for treatment programs and a database to help track outcomes for patients. A review of the Mental Health Act will be completed, psychotherapy will be regulated in the same way as other health professions, and mental health support will be an option for those calling 911.

**B.C. Conservatives**

Party leader John Rustad says he will bring in laws allowing for involuntary care of people suffering from severe addiction disorders, and that the Riverview Hospital in Coquitlam will be redeveloped. After the B.C. NDP walked back its drug decriminalization program in April, the Conservatives are planning to reverse the pilot project altogether. The party says it plans to appoint an addictions specialist to oversee the government's response to the toxic-drug crisis, cut wait times for addiction treatment, develop drug education programs and go after illegal sources of drugs "with new urgency."

*Image 1: Treatment document*

The second image where NDP appears on the right and Conservative appears on the left is an example of the control document shown to participants:

**How do British Columbia's three main parties compare on these election issues?**

**Mental health and addiction**

**B.C. Conservatives**

Party leader John Rustad says he will bring in laws allowing for involuntary care of people suffering from severe addiction disorders, and that the Riverview Hospital in Coquitlam will be redeveloped. After the B.C. NDP walked back its drug decriminalization program in April, the Conservatives are planning to reverse the pilot project altogether. The party says it plans to appoint an addictions specialist to oversee the government's response to the toxic-drug crisis, cut wait times for addiction treatment, develop drug education programs and go after illegal sources of drugs "with new urgency."

**B.C. Green Party**

Rather than focus on expanding involuntary care like the other two parties, the Green platform focuses on ensuring broader access to voluntary care. With former chief coroner Lisa Lapointe on their side, the B.C. Greens are pledging to expand the prescribed safer supply program and plans to have supervised consumption spaces in all public hospitals. It also plans to establish a standard of care for treatment programs and a database to help track outcomes for patients. A review of the Mental Health Act will be completed, psychotherapy will be regulated in the same way as other health professions, and mental health support will be an option for those calling 911.

**B.C. NDP**

David Eby's NDP government recriminalized the use of hard drugs in public spaces in April, just over a year after it began its decriminalization pilot project. Eby also said he would expand the use of involuntary care in select situations. The party says it will establish a new \$50 million fund for mental health care and continue opening new Foundry centres to support access to care for youth, "quadrupling the number since 2017." It also plans to build another Red Fish Healing Centre, expand specialized treatment for parents going through addiction recovery and people with brain injuries, add Indigenous-led programs and create a treatment centre specifically for construction workers.

*Image 2: Control document*

### APPENDIX 3

#### *Frequencies for Program*

<b>Program</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent (%)</b>
Beedie School of Business	2	11.76
Criminology	3	17.65
French Cohort	1	5.88
Interactive Arts and Technology	1	5.88
International Studies	1	5.88
Kinesiology	1	5.88
Molecular Biology and Biochemistry	1	5.88
Physics	1	5.88
Political Science	5	29.41
Psychology	1	5.88
Total	17	100.00

#### *Descriptive Statistics*

	<b>Valid</b>	<b>Missing</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Deviation</b>	<b>Minimum</b>	<b>Maximum</b>
<b>Treatment</b>	17	0	0.47	0.51	0.00	1.00
<b>Gender</b>	17	0	0.53	0.51	0.00	1.00
<b>Age</b>	17	0	19.82	1.24	18.00	22.00
<b>Interest in Politics</b>	17	0	6.76	2.33	2.00	10.00
<b>Left Right Orientation</b>	16	1	4.00	2.28	1.00	9.00
<b>Duration NDP</b>	17	0	26962.71	9729.33	12028.00	47524.00
<b>Duration Cons</b>	17	0	24245.18	9463.14	6812.00	44892.00

**APPENDIX 4**

The following statistics contain an independent sample t-test comparing the gaze duration (milliseconds) towards NDP content in treatment and control groups.

	t	Df	p
<b>Duration NDP</b>	-1.58	15	0.14

	Group	N	Mean	SD	SE	Coefficient of variation
Duration NDP	C	9	23602.44	7676.42	2558.81	0.33
	T	8	30743.00	10870.60	3843.34	0.35

**N = 17**

### APPENDIX 5

The following statistics contain an independent sample t-test comparing the gaze duration (milliseconds) towards Conservative content in treatment and control groups.

	t	Df	p
<b>Duration Cons</b>	-0.52	15	0.61



	Group	N	Mean	SD	SE	Coefficient of variation
Duration Cons	C	9	23101.78	9528.37	3176.12	0.41
	T	8	25531.50	9866.93	3488.48	0.39

**N = 17**

## APPENDIX 6

The following statistics are a result of the paired samples t-test used to determine the duration of time (milliseconds) that Conservative only participants spent gazing at NDP or Conservative content across both treatment groups. For reference, the heat map visualization offered below shows where Conservative participants in the control group focused more of their visual attention towards.

Measure 1		Measure 2	t	df	p	Mean Difference	SE Difference
Duration NDP	-	Duration Cons	3.68	4	0.02	8188.40	2226.46
		<b>N</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>SD</b>	<b>SE</b>	<b>Coefficient of variation</b>	
Duration NDP		5	28334.00	8591.69	3842.32	0.30	
Duration Cons		5	20145.60	9252.21	4137.71	0.46	



### APPENDIX 7

The following statistics are a result of the paired samples t-test used to determine the duration of time (milliseconds) that NDP only participants spent gazing at NDP or Conservative content across both treatment groups.

Measure 1		Measure 2	t	df	p	Mean Difference	SE Difference
Duration NDP	-	Duration Cons	0.46	8	0.66	750.22	1648.18
	N	Mean	SD	SE	Coefficient of variation		
Duration NDP	9	27913.78	11457.71	3819.24	0.41		
Duration Cons	9	27163.56	10408.63	3469.54	0.38		

**APPENDIX 8***Frequencies for Partisanship*

<b>Partisanship</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
<b>NDP</b>	9	52.94
<b>Conservative</b>	5	29.41
<b>Green</b>	1	5.88
<b>Other</b>	2	11.76
<b>Total</b>	17	100.00

*Frequencies for Partisanship Strength*

<b>Partisanship Strength</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
<b>Don't know</b>	2	11.76
<b>Weak NDP</b>	2	11.76
<b>Weak Conservative</b>	2	11.76
<b>Strong NDP</b>	7	41.18
<b>Strong Conservative</b>	3	17.65
<b>Strong Green</b>	1	5.88
<b>Total</b>	17	100.00

## APPENDIX 9

The following tables contain descriptions of the average duration of time (milliseconds) spent gazing at NDP content based on the strength of partisanship across both treatment groups.

*Model Summary - Duration NDP*

Model	R	R <sup>2</sup>	Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	RMSE
M <sub>0</sub>	0.00	0.00	0.00	9729.33
M <sub>1</sub>	0.50	0.25	-0.20	10656.73

*Note.* M<sub>1</sub> includes Treatment, Partisanship Strength

*Coefficients*

Model		Unstandardized	Standard Error	Standardized <sup>a</sup>	t	p
M <sub>0</sub>	(Intercept)	26962.71	2359.71		11.43	< .001
M <sub>1</sub>	(Intercept)	22928.00	7535.45		3.04	0.01
	Treatment (T)	8583.35	5795.68		1.48	0.17
	Partisanship Strength (Weak NDP)	-633.68	11043.70		-0.06	0.96
	Partisanship Strength (Weak Conservative)	-1407.68	11043.70		-0.13	0.90
	Partisanship Strength (Strong NDP)	1686.56	8898.10		0.19	0.85
	Partisanship Strength (Strong Conservative)	1365.10	10467.43		0.13	0.90
	Partisanship Strength (Strong Green)	-11895.35	14280.71		-0.83	0.42

<sup>a</sup> Standardized coefficients can only be computed for continuous predictors.

## APPENDIX 10

The following tables contain descriptions of the average duration of time (milliseconds) spent gazing at Conservative content based on the strength of partisanship across both treatment groups.

*Model Summary - Duration Cons*

Model	R	R <sup>2</sup>	Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	RMSE
M <sub>0</sub>	0.00	0.00	0.00	9463.14
M <sub>1</sub>	0.45	0.21	-0.27	10663.57

*Note.* M<sub>1</sub> includes Treatment, Partisanship Strength


*Coefficients*

Model		Unstandardized	Standard Error	Standardized <sup>a</sup>	t	p
M <sub>0</sub>	(Intercept)	24245.18	2295.15		10.56	<.001
M <sub>1</sub>	(Intercept)	24506.00	7540.28		3.25	8.72×10 <sup>-3</sup>
	Treatment (T)	4924.42	5799.40		0.85	0.42
	Partisanship Strength (Weak NDP)	-412.21	11050.79		-0.04	0.97
	Partisanship Strength (Weak Conservative)	-8750.21	11050.79		-0.79	0.45
	Partisanship Strength (Strong NDP)	720.68	8903.82		0.08	0.94
	Partisanship Strength (Strong Conservative)	-6358.28	10474.15		-0.61	0.56
	Partisanship Strength (Strong Green)	-11474.42	14289.88		-0.80	0.44

<sup>a</sup> Standardized coefficients can only be computed for continuous predictors.

## APPENDIX 11

Heat map visualizations showed no significant effects of cross-cutting exposure leading to a more balanced gaze among participants with weaker partisanship across the two treatment conditions.



## APPENDIX 12

The only balance test indicating a significant difference between the treatment and control group was for gender with a p-value of 0.10. More women were found to be in the treatment group compared to the control group.

**Independent Samples T-Test**

*Independent Samples T-Test*

	t	df	p	Mean Difference	SE Difference
<b>Gender</b>	-1.78	15	0.10	-0.42	0.23

**Note.** Student's t-test.

**Descriptives**

*Group Descriptives*

	Group	N	Mean	SD	SE	Coefficient of variation
<b>Gender</b>	C	9	0.33	0.50	0.17	1.50
	T	8	0.75	0.46	0.16	0.62

**Independent Samples T-Test**

*Independent Samples T-Test*

	t	df	p	Mean Difference	SE Difference
<b>Age</b>	0.22	15	0.83	0.14	0.62

**Note.** Student's t-test.

**Descriptives**

*Group Descriptives*

	Group	N	Mean	SD	SE	Coefficient of variation
<b>Age</b>	C	9	19.89	1.62	0.54	0.08
	T	8	19.75	0.71	0.25	0.04

**Independent Samples T-Test**

*Independent Samples T-Test*

	t	df	p	Mean Difference	SE Difference
Interest in Politics	0.23	15	0.82	0.26	1.17

**Note.** Student's t-test.

**Descriptives**

*Group Descriptives*

	Group	N	Mean	SD	SE	Coefficient of variation
Interest in Politics	C	9	6.89	2.57	0.86	0.37
	T	8	6.63	2.20	0.78	0.33

**Independent Samples T-Test**

*Independent Samples T-Test*

	t	df	p	Mean Difference	SE Difference
Left Right Orientation	0.43	14	0.68	0.50	1.17

**Note.** Student's t-test.

**Descriptives**

*Group Descriptives*

	Group	N	Mean	SD	SE	Coefficient of variation
Left Right Orientation	C	8	4.25	1.91	0.67	0.45
	T	8	3.75	2.71	0.96	0.72

**Contingency Tables**

*Contingency Tables*

Program	Treatment		Total
	C	T	
Beedie School of Business	1	1	2
Criminology	1	2	3
French Cohort	1	0	1
Interactive Arts and Technology	0	1	1
International Studies	0	1	1
Kinesiology	1	0	1
Molecular Biology and Biochemistry	1	0	1
Physics	0	1	1
Political Science	3	2	5
Psychology	1	0	1
Total	9	8	17

*Note.* Each cell displays the observed counts

*Chi-Squared Tests*

	Value	df	p
$X^2$	7.50	9	0.59
N	17		

*Note.* Continuity correction is available only for 2x2 tables.

## Contingency Tables

### *Contingency Tables*

Partisanship	Treatment		Total
	C	T	
NDP	5	4	9
Conservative	2	3	5
Green	0	1	1
Other	2	0	2
Total	9	8	17

*Note.* Each cell displays the observed counts

### *Chi-Squared Tests*

	Value	df	p
$\chi^2$	3.26	3	0.35
N	17		


*Note.* Continuity correction is available only for 2x2 tables.

### APPENDIX 13

Bar graph from SurveyMonkey results of post-experiment questionnaire.

Which BC political party position did you most approve of?


Answered: 17 Skipped: 0



N = 17

Which BC political party position did you least approve of?

Answered: 17 Skipped: 0



N = 17



*Governance and Global Power*

# | Power, Proximity, and Priorities: Unpacking China's Belt and Road Investments

*Ideja Efendija*

**Keywords:** *Belt and Road Initiative, Chinese foreign policy, East Asia, infrastructure diplomacy, geopolitical strategy, international development*

This research paper investigates the variation in Chinese diplomatic engagement under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) by analyzing why some countries receive more BRI-related investment and construction spending than others. The study tests three key hypotheses: that Chinese spending is influenced by (1) access to natural resources, (2) the desire for East Asian regional dominance, and (3) the strategic value of market access.

Using data from the American Enterprise Institute's (AEI) China Global Investment Tracker, BRI-related spending from 2013 to 2022 was aggregated for a representative sample of 21 countries across multiple regions. Countries were then categorized based on their alignment with one of the three hypotheses. Comparative analysis reveals that East Asian countries received the highest proportion of total BRI spending—44%—suggesting that regional dominance in East Asia is a significant driver of Chinese BRI diplomacy. While natural resource availability and market access are influential, they appear secondary to China's strategic goals in its immediate neighborhood.

The findings support the notion that the BRI serves not only economic but also geopolitical objectives, particularly in strengthening China's position in Asia. This study contributes to broader discussions about the BRI's implications for global power dynamics and international development policy.

## Introduction

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), announced by Xi Jinping in 2013 during his visits to Kazakhstan and Indonesia, is a vast collection of infrastructure and development projects spanning from East Asia to Europe<sup>3</sup>. The initiative consists of two primary components: the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ and the ‘Maritime Silk Road’. The Silk Road Economic Belt comprises of a network of land-based infrastructure projects that extends from China through Central Asia to Europe<sup>4</sup>. According to *The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China* website, this portion of the BRI consists of the construction of six international economic corridors: China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor (CMREC), New Eurasian Land Bridge (NELB), China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor (CCWAEC), China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor (CICPEC), China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIMEC)<sup>5</sup>.

The Maritime Silk Road (MSR) includes several port and coastal infrastructure projects in South-East Asia, East Africa, and the Mediterranean.<sup>6</sup> However, while that was the initial plan, the BRI has expanded to include countries beyond its initial scope with numerous Latin American countries joining the BRI in recent years. As of July 2022, 147 countries were participating in the entire [A1] BRI, according to the Green Finance & Development Center.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Du, Michael M. "China's "One Belt, One Road" Initiative: Context, Focus, Institutions, and Implications." *The Chinese Journal of Global Governance* 2, no. 1 (2016): 31.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> 郑成琼. "What Are Six Economic Corridors under Belt and Road Initiative?" The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China. Accessed December 8, 2022. [http://english.scio.gov.cn/beltandroad/2020-08/04/content\\_76345602.htm](http://english.scio.gov.cn/beltandroad/2020-08/04/content_76345602.htm).

<sup>6</sup> Aweis Osman, *China's Maritime Silk Road and the Future of African Arbitration*, in *The Belt and Road Initiative: Law, Economics, and Politics* 734, 734-735 (Julien Chaisse & Jędrzej Górski eds., 2018).

<sup>7</sup> WANG, Christoph NEDOPIL. "Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)." Green Finance & Development Center, July 2022. <https://greenfdc.org/countries-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative-bri/>.

With the BRI, Beijing aimed to revitalize the sluggish Chinese economy by developing new markets for Chinese goods.<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, it was also meant to help offload excess industrial capacity<sup>9</sup>. On top of these domestic, pragmatic goals of the BRI, it also aims to increase economic cooperation and integration. As outlined in the BRI Action Plan, Beijing aims to revive the “Silk Road Spirit” that emphasises “peace and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, mutual learning and mutual benefit.”<sup>10</sup> The initiative’s key cooperation priorities include “policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people bond.”<sup>11</sup> The BRI has now become a centerpiece to Xi Jinping’s foreign policy and is a physical manifestation of China’s growing role on the world stage.

As part of the initiative, Beijing coordinates with different countries on infrastructure projects they require, often through bilateral diplomatic meetings. China and the recipient country then sign a memorandum of understanding (MOU) once talks are completed.<sup>12</sup> The projects range from highway and railroad construction to port development. It even extends to the construction of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and energy developments.<sup>13</sup> Once areas of infrastructure and investment are identified, Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) will help build these projects, often employing Chinese laborers.

The implementation of BRI projects varies significantly between countries, both in scale and focus. Some nations receive extensive Chinese investment, while others receive

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<sup>8</sup> Ye, Min, Cambridge Core All Books, and Cambridge Core EBA eBooks Complete Collection. *The Belt Road and Beyond*. New York, NY; Cambridge, United Kingdom;: Cambridge University Press, 2020, 7.

<sup>9</sup> OECD, "The Belt and Road Initiative in the global trade, investment and finance landscape", *OECD Business and Finance Outlook 2018*, OECD Publishing, Paris, September 2018. [https://doi.org/10.1787/bus\\_fin\\_out-2018-6-en](https://doi.org/10.1787/bus_fin_out-2018-6-en), 4.

<sup>10</sup> State Council of the People's Republic of China. "Action Plan on the Belt and Road Initiative." Initiative offers Road Map for Peace, prosperity. Accessed December 13, 2022.

[http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/publications/2015/03/30/content\\_281475080249035.htm](http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/publications/2015/03/30/content_281475080249035.htm).

<sup>11</sup> Du, Michael M. "China's "One Belt, One Road" Initiative: Context, Focus, Institutions, and Implications." *The Chinese Journal of Global Governance* 2, no. 1 (2016): 32.

<sup>12</sup> Salamatin, Mikkaela. "China's Belt and Road Initiative is Reshaping Human Rights Norms." *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law* 53, no. 4 (2020): 1427-1476.1435.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

comparatively little. This discrepancy raises an important research question: **Why does Chinese diplomacy surrounding the Belt and Road Initiative vary from country to country?**

This paper seeks to explain the variation in BRI-related infrastructure and investment by comparing Chinese spending across 21 recipient countries. It will explore three hypotheses informed by both official Chinese objectives and scholarly interpretations of the BRI's underlying motivations.

Beijing has largely focused on the mutual benefit features of the BRI and has presented it as a “win-win” situation for both China and the recipient country.<sup>14</sup> However different scholars, thinktanks, and organizations have put forward their own explanations for the BRI that go beyond the ones stated by China. This paper first reviews the academic literature on the unofficial motivations behind the BRI. Then, building on that foundation, it formulates three testable hypotheses that will be evaluated using data from a sample of 21 BRI recipient countries. By doing so, this study aims to contribute to our understanding of how BRI-related diplomacy manifests differently across countries.

The BRI is important to discuss as it is a key mechanism through which China expands economic and political influence. Numerous western powers, notably the United States (US) and the European Union (EU), are concerned about the expansion of China's influence and see it as a bid for China to alter the current geopolitical landscape. The BRI has influenced and will continue to influence the international world order. One consequence of the BRI's rise is the emergence of rival initiatives, such as the United States' Build Back Better World Initiative. By investigating the drivers of China's varied BRI engagement, this study enhances our understanding of a major force influencing today's global political economy. Evidently, the BRI

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<sup>14</sup> OECD, "The Belt and Road Initiative in the global trade, investment and finance landscape", *OECD Business and Finance Outlook 2018*, OECD Publishing, Paris, September 2018. [https://doi.org/10.1787/bus\\_fin\\_out-2018-6-en](https://doi.org/10.1787/bus_fin_out-2018-6-en), 5. WEAPON.

has influenced how foreign aid is distributed. An investigation into what informs Chinese diplomacy surrounding different BRI projects will enrich the scholarship on such a prominent project in today's geopolitical climate.

## *Existing Literature*

This specific research question has been relatively under-explored. There are no studies that compare the spending for BRI projects to explain what determines the variation of Chinese diplomacy in various BRI-recipient countries. However, there is a substantial body of literature on the motivations and strategies behind the BRI that go beyond China's stated goals of increased economic cooperation.

China has frequently been criticized for the BRI. One of the most prominent criticisms comes from some scholars, like Carrai, Alam and Asef, who argue that China is engaging in 'debt-trap diplomacy' whereby China leverage the power imbalance present between them and BRI recipient countries to issue loans that are too high to pay back to help countries build their infrastructure projects with the intention of gaining strategic concession upon failure to repay these loads.<sup>15</sup> Carrai's argument was largely based on the infamous Sri Lanka case in which China took control of the deep-sea Hambantota International Port in a 99-year lease after Sri Lanka failed to pay their debts, leaving Sri Lanka's government with only "residual sovereignty over that territory."<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Fahmida Alam and Samin Farhan Asef, "The Implications of BRI in Djibouti: A Critical Geopolitical Analysis," in *Research Association for Interdisciplinary Studies Conference Proceedings*, August 17-18, 2020, 279, <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.400614>.

<sup>16</sup> Carrai, Maria Adele "China's Malleable Sovereignty along the Belt and Road Initiative: The Case of the 99-Year Chinese Lease of Hambantota Port," *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics* 51, no. 4 (2019): 1098.

However, other scholars like Deborah Brautigam, Kevin Acker, and Yufan Huang have pushed back against this interpretation and largely discredited this stance. Their research shows that the Sri Lanka port case was not debt-trap diplomacy by explaining that Chinese banks did not seize the port from Sri Lanka and that they are willing to restructure the terms of the loans.<sup>17</sup> Brautigam and several other scholars also debunked rumors that Kenya had staked the Mombasa Port as collateral for the Chinese loans used to build the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR). Through reconstruction of the contractual arrangements, they showed that this misunderstanding originated from Kenya's Auditor General mislabelling the Kenya Port Authority as a "borrower, responsible for repaying the SGR loans."<sup>18</sup>

Another form of pushback against the idea of "debt-trap diplomacy" comes from some Think Tanks, like Chatham house, who emphasize the role of the recipient country in shaping the BRI projects as they are built through multiple bilateral meetings.<sup>19</sup> Additionally, they posited that China's development financing system is "too fragmented and poorly coordinated to pursue the detailed strategic objectives they have been accused of."<sup>20</sup> Nevertheless, the image of the BRI remains entangled with the "debt-trap diplomacy" narrative.

Furthermore, some pundits from the Asia Society, Daniel R. Russel and Blake H. Berger have warned about the military strategy behind the BRI. They posit that the BRI projects, specifically the ports being built along the Maritime Silk Road may serve future military purposes, despite China's denial of these claims.<sup>21</sup> These ports act as "strategic strongpoints" that

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<sup>17</sup> Acker, Kevin, Deborah Brautigam and Yufan Huang. "Debt Relief with Chinese Characteristics" Working Paper No. 2020/39. China Africa Research Initiative, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC. Retrieved from <http://www.sais-cari.org/publications>, 3.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> WANG, Christoph NEDOPIL. "Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)." Green Finance & Development Center, July 2022. <https://greenfdc.org/countries-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative-bri/>.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Berger, H. Blake and Russel, Daniel R. "Weaponizing the Belt and Road Initiative" Asia Society, September 2020. <https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/weaponizing-belt-and-road-initiative>, 6.

can increase the support provided to the People's Liberation Army (PLA) forces operating abroad.<sup>22</sup> To supplement their position, they highlight the economic underperformance of ports in Sri Lanka and Pakistan, suggesting that the absence of profitability underscores their strategic value over their commercial one.<sup>23</sup> Similarly, other scholars, such as John Mearsheimer, have argued similar geostrategic motivations suggesting that the BRI is part of China's strategy to achieve East Asian dominance and US exclusion in Asia by consolidating their position in the region.<sup>24</sup>

What remains missing in these discussions, however, is an analysis of how these various motivations influence the level of Chinese investment across BRI-recipient countries. This project will add to these debates by bridging the aims of the BRI that have been put forward by pundits to the way in which these aims influence how the BRI policy manifests itself in different countries. It also evaluates which of these aims are most clearly reflected in reality.

## *Methodology*

To investigate the research question, this study compares Chinese BRI-related spending in construction and investment in a sample of 21 BRI recipient countries in order to determine the countries receiving the highest Chinese spending. The central assumption made in this research is that the more Chinese spending a country receives, the greater diplomatic and strategic commitment to that country. Given the evolving nature of the BRI, including recent extensions into space cooperation,<sup>25</sup> this study focuses on a fixed, diverse sample to ensure analytical depth and geographic balance.

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid, 23.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid, 9.

<sup>24</sup> Mearsheimer, John. "China's Unpeaceful Rise," *Current History* 105, no. 690 (2006): 160-162..

<sup>25</sup> Berger, H. Blake and Russel, Daniel R. "Weaponizing the Belt and Road Initiative" Asia Society, September 2020. <https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/weaponizing-belt-and-road-initiative>, 3.

## *Sample Selection*

The countries chosen represent all major regions (East Asia, South America, Africa, Europe, Middle East) in which China has invested in as part of the BRI to ensure a representative sample. The sample includes Cambodia, Singapore, the Philippines, Laos, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Greece, Kenya, Pakistan, Djibouti, Egypt, Turkey, Bangladesh, Algeria, Russia, Angola, Oman, UAE, Chile, and Bolivia.

The raw data used in this research comes from the China Global Investment Tracker data collected by the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). This source has been chosen as it is the “only comprehensive public data set covering China’s global investment and construction.”<sup>26</sup> Using this data, the following testable hypotheses will be investigated:

### *Hypothesis 1*

*The natural resources a country provides influences Chinese engagement and commitment under the BRI, resulting in higher spending in those countries.*

Natural resources such as oil and energy are vital to China. One of Beijing’s main priorities is to ensure a sustainable energy supply to work towards their goal of “becoming a strong and prosperous society by 2049”<sup>27</sup> For this hypothesis to be true, the investigation will demonstrate an increase in the spending on Chinese investment and infrastructure to countries that provide natural resources.

From the sample, the countries with natural resources have been identified as:

1. **Algeria**, for its abundance of oil and for being a leading exporter of oil and petroleum to

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<sup>26</sup> Scissors, Derek. “China Global Investment Tracker | American Enterprise Institute - AEI.” Accessed December 6, 2022. <https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/>.

<sup>27</sup> Berger, H. Blake and Russel, Daniel R. “Weaponizing the Belt and Road Initiative” *Asia Society*, September 2020. <https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/weaponizing-belt-and-road-initiative>, 7.

China.<sup>28</sup> The flagship infrastructure projects part of the BRI in Algeria are the East-West Highway which connects Algeria to Morocco and Tunisia, and the development of the El Hamdania Central Port, set to become Algeria's first deep-water port.<sup>29</sup>

2. **Russia**, for its abundance of energy. Despite Russia's presence in two of the six BRI economic corridors, the main area of cooperation between the two countries has been energy. This is reflected by the two flagship BRI projects in Russia: the Power of Siberia Natural Gas Pipeline, which is set to supply 38 billion cubic meters of natural gas to China annually for 30 years<sup>30</sup> and the Yamal Liquefied Natural Gas Project.<sup>31</sup>
3. **Angola**, for its abundance of oil. Chinese loans been used to construct roads, bridges, power plants, and hospitals. Most importantly, the Caculo-Cabaça Hydropower Station was built by Chinese SOEs as part of the BRI.<sup>32</sup>
4. **Oman** for its abundance of energy. Chinese investments in Oman have focused on building the Sino-Oman industrial city and the Duqum Special Economic Zone.<sup>33</sup>

“According to Lu Ruquan, director of the Strategic Development Department of the

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<sup>28</sup> Ahmad, Tariq, Author, Laney Zhang, Nicolas Boring, George Sadek, Hanibal Goitom, Sayuri Umeda, Kelly Buchanan, et al. *Belt and Road Initiative: China, Cambodia, Caribbean Countries, Djibouti, Egypt, Greece, Kenya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Russian Federation and Central Asian Countries, South America, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom*. Washington, D.C.: The Law Library of Congress, Global Legal Research Directorate, August, 2021. Pdf. <https://www.loc.gov/item/2021687414/>, 58.

<sup>29</sup> Devonshire-Ellis, Chris. “Algeria to Coordinate National Development Plans with China's Belt and Road Initiative,” Silk Road Briefing, July 27, 2021, <https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2021/07/27/algeria-to-coordinate-national-development-plans-with-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative/>.

<sup>30</sup> Ahmad, Tariq, Author, Laney Zhang, Nicolas Boring, George Sadek, Hanibal Goitom, Sayuri Umeda, Kelly Buchanan, et al. *Belt and Road Initiative: China, Cambodia, Caribbean Countries, Djibouti, Egypt, Greece, Kenya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Russian Federation and Central Asian Countries, South America, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom*. Washington, D.C.: The Law Library of Congress, Global Legal Research Directorate, August, 2021. Pdf. <https://www.loc.gov/item/2021687414/>, 146.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> He , Wenping. “Opinion: Bri Injects New Energy into China-Angola Cooperation.” CGTN, 2018. [https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d3d514f77557a4e7a457a6333566d54/share\\_p.html](https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d3d514f77557a4e7a457a6333566d54/share_p.html).

<sup>33</sup> Ahmad, Tariq, Author, Laney Zhang, Nicolas Boring, George Sadek, Hanibal Goitom, Sayuri Umeda, Kelly Buchanan, et al. *Belt and Road Initiative: China, Cambodia, Caribbean Countries, Djibouti, Egypt, Greece, Kenya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Russian Federation and Central Asian Countries, South America, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom*. Washington, D.C.: The Law Library of Congress, Global Legal Research Directorate, August, 2021. Pdf. <https://www.loc.gov/item/2021687414/>, 36.

China National Petroleum Corporation, Oman is China's main energy corridor."<sup>34</sup>

5. **UAE** for its abundance of oil. The flagship BRI projects in the UAE include the China-UAE Industrial Capacity Cooperation Demonstration Zone (ICCDZ).<sup>35</sup> It also includes the new Traders Market Station.<sup>36</sup>
6. **Chile** for its abundance in lithium.<sup>37</sup> The flagship project in Chile is the high-speed line that goes from the capital, Santiago, to Valparaíso.<sup>38</sup>
7. **Bolivia** similarly for its abundance in lithium.<sup>39</sup> The flagship project in Bolivia is the El Espino-Boyube Highway Project that links Bolivia to Paraguay and Argentina. Construction includes the reconstruction of the Parapeti Bridge.<sup>40</sup>

Therefore, if *HI* is supported, the above listed countries should exhibit the highest levels of BRI-related spending by China.

## *Hypothesis 2*

*China's desire for regional dominance in East Asia leads to greater diplomatic and*

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<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> Han, Yang. "UAE Project Progresses under BRI." China Daily, January 2022.

<https://www.chinadailyhk.com/article/256991>.

<sup>36</sup> Solutions, EIU Digital. UAE signs deals with China under Belt and Road Initiative, 2019.

<https://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1857968369>.

<sup>37</sup> Ahmad, Tariq, Author, Laney Zhang, Nicolas Boring, George Sadek, Hanibal Goitom, Sayuri Umeda, Kelly Buchanan, et al. *Belt and Road Initiative: China, Cambodia, Caribbean Countries, Djibouti, Egypt, Greece, Kenya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Russian Federation and Central Asian Countries, South America, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom*. Washington, D.C.: The Law Library of Congress, Global Legal Research Directorate, August, 2021. Pdf. <https://www.loc.gov/item/2021687414/>, 157.

<sup>38</sup> Devonshire-Ellis, Chris. "Algeria to Coordinate National Development Plans with China's Belt and Road Initiative," Silk Road Briefing, July 27, 2021, <https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2021/07/27/algeria-to-coordinate-national-development-plans-with-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative/>.

<sup>39</sup> Hanks, Joshua. "Bolivia, Lithium and China's BRI." Workers World, January 1, 2020.

<https://www.workers.org/2019/11/44493/#:~:text=It%27s%20intended%20as%20an%20outlet.grip%20of%20Washingtongton%20and%20Brussels>.

<sup>40</sup> Ahmad, Tariq, Author, Laney Zhang, Nicolas Boring, George Sadek, Hanibal Goitom, Sayuri Umeda, Kelly Buchanan, et al. *Belt and Road Initiative: China, Cambodia, Caribbean Countries, Djibouti, Egypt, Greece, Kenya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Russian Federation and Central Asian Countries, South America, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom*. Washington, D.C.: The Law Library of Congress, Global Legal Research Directorate, August, 2021. Pdf. <https://www.loc.gov/item/2021687414/>, 67.

*economic engagement with East Asian countries under the BRI.*

For this to be supported, we would expect to see higher BRI-related spending in East Asian countries. From the sample, the East Asian countries have been identified as:

1. **Cambodia.** Major BRI projects include the Lower Sesan II Hydropower Plant, Phnom Penh-Sihanoukville Expressway and developments in the Sihanoukville Province. These developments include a Special Economic Zone and a deep-water port.<sup>41</sup>
2. **Singapore.** The main BRI projects in Singapore include the New International Land-Sea Trade Corridor, which connects the Chinese province of Chongqing to Singapore, and the China-Singapore Demonstration Initiative on Strategic Connectivity.<sup>42</sup>
3. **The Philippines.** The flagship projects in the Philippines include the Kaliwa Dam, overseen by the SOE Energy China, and the Chico River Pump Irrigation Project.<sup>43</sup>
4. **Laos.** The Laos-China Economic Corridor and the Laos-China High-Speed Railway, which connects Vientiane in Laos to Boten on the China-Laos border, are the key BRI projects in Laos.<sup>44</sup>
5. **Indonesia.** The flagship BRI project in Indonesia is the Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed

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<sup>41</sup> Ahmad, Tariq, Author, Laney Zhang, Nicolas Boring, George Sadek, Hanibal Goitom, Sayuri Umeda, Kelly Buchanan, et al. *Belt and Road Initiative: China, Cambodia, Caribbean Countries, Djibouti, Egypt, Greece, Kenya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Russian Federation and Central Asian Countries, South America, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom.* Washington, D.C.: The Law Library of Congress, Global Legal Research Directorate, August, 2021. Pdf. <https://www.loc.gov/item/2021687414/>, 67.

<sup>42</sup> Yee, Gerald. "Eight Years on - an Overview of the Belt and Road Initiative." *The Singapore Law Gazette*, November 23, 2021. <https://lawgazette.com.sg/news/updates/eight-years-on-belt-road-legal-insurance/>.

<sup>43</sup> Ahmad, Tariq, Author, Laney Zhang, Nicolas Boring, George Sadek, Hanibal Goitom, Sayuri Umeda, Kelly Buchanan, et al. *Belt and Road Initiative: China, Cambodia, Caribbean Countries, Djibouti, Egypt, Greece, Kenya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Russian Federation and Central Asian Countries, South America, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom.* Washington, D.C.: The Law Library of Congress, Global Legal Research Directorate, August, 2021. Pdf. <https://www.loc.gov/item/2021687414/>, 124.

<sup>44</sup> Chheang, Vannarith. "2021/99 'BRI Projects in Cambodia and Laos Roll on despite Covid-19' ." *ISEAS*, July 27, 2021. <https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2021-99-bri-projects-in-cambodia-and-laos-roll-on-despite-covid-19-by-vannarith-chheang/#:~:text=MAIN%20BRI%20PROJECTS%20IN%20LAOS&text=The%20Sino%2DLao%20and%20Sino.construct%2C%20connecting%20Kunming%20with%20Singapore.>

Railway.<sup>45</sup>

6. **Malaysia.** The major BRI projects in Malaysia include the East Coast Rail Link (ECRL), the Malaysia-China Kuantan Industrial Park, and developments at the Kuantan Port.<sup>46</sup>
7. **Vietnam.** The flagship BRI projects in Vietnam are both energy related: the Dau Tieng Solar Power Project and the Nam Dinh 1 Coal Power Project.<sup>47</sup>

Therefore, for *H2* to be supported, these countries would receive the highest levels of BRI-related investment and infrastructure spending.

### *Hypothesis 3*

*The most important goal for the BRI is to increase trade by gaining access to new markets and thus countries that provide strategic market access will receive the highest level of BRI investment and infrastructure spending.*

From the sample, the countries identified as providing the most access to new markets are:

1. **Greece** for its access to European markets.<sup>48</sup> The flagship project in Greece is the construction of the Port of Piraeus and the Piraeus Container Terminal, which became the “fourth-busiest container terminal in Europe.”<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> McBeth, John. “China's Belt and Road Staggers and Stalls in Indonesia.” Asia Times. Asia Times, September 17, 2022. <https://asiatimes.com/2022/07/chinas-belt-and-road-staggers-and-stalls-in-indonesia/>.

<sup>46</sup> Ahmad, Tariq, Author, Laney Zhang, Nicolas Boring, George Sadek, Hanibal Goitom, Sayuri Umeda, Kelly Buchanan, et al. *Belt and Road Initiative: China, Cambodia, Caribbean Countries, Djibouti, Egypt, Greece, Kenya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Russian Federation and Central Asian Countries, South America, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom*. Washington, D.C.: The Law Library of Congress, Global Legal Research Directorate, August, 2021. Pdf. <https://www.loc.gov/item/2021687414/>, 87.

<sup>47</sup> Anh, Dang Viet, and Nguyen Le Quynh Chi. “Cdr – the Belt and Road Initiative: Vietnam: ICLG.” Arbitration, Litigation, Dispute Resolution | CDR Magazine. Global Legal Group. Accessed December 13, 2022. <https://iclg.com/cdr-essential-intelligence/1100-cdr-the-belt-and-road-initiative-2021/vietnam#:~:text=The%20remarkable%20BRI%20projects%20in,capital%20of%20USD%202.16%20billion.>

<sup>48</sup> Ibid, 160.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

2. **Kenya** for its access to East and Central African markets.<sup>50</sup> The main BRI project in Kenya is the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) that connects the Mombasa port to Nairobi (the capital city), Naivasha, Kisumu and Malaba, a town on the Kenya-Uganda border.<sup>51</sup>
3. **Pakistan** for its access to new markets via the Indian Ocean. The flagship project in Pakistan is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that includes projects in the energy sector, transportation infrastructure, and the construction of the deep-sea port of Gwadar.<sup>52</sup>
4. **Djibouti** for its location along major international shipping corridors.<sup>53</sup> The main BRI projects in Djibouti consist of the Boraleh Multipurpose Port, the Djibouti International Free Trade Zone and the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway which facilitates access to the Ethiopian market.<sup>54</sup>
5. **Egypt** for its critical access to global markets via the Suez Canal. The flagship projects in Egypt include the Suez Canal Economic Zone and the High-Speed Rail Line running from the Red Sea town of Ain Sokhna to the new administrative capital.<sup>55</sup>
6. **Turkey** for its access to both European and Middle Eastern markets. The main project in Turkey is the Middle Corridor Initiative that links Anatolia to Central Asia and China.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> Ahmad, Tariq, Author, Laney Zhang, Nicolas Boring, George Sadek, Hanibal Goitom, Sayuri Umeda, Kelly Buchanan, et al. *Belt and Road Initiative: China, Cambodia, Caribbean Countries, Djibouti, Egypt, Greece, Kenya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Russian Federation and Central Asian Countries, South America, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom*. Washington, D.C.: The Law Library of Congress, Global Legal Research Directorate, August, 2021. Pdf. <https://www.loc.gov/item/2021687414/>, 37.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Embassy of China. "Latest Progress on the CPEC." Latest progress on the CPEC. Accessed December 13, 2022. [http://pk.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zbqx/201812/t20181230\\_1134724.htm](http://pk.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zbqx/201812/t20181230_1134724.htm).

<sup>53</sup> Ahmad, Tariq, Author, Laney Zhang, Nicolas Boring, George Sadek, Hanibal Goitom, Sayuri Umeda, Kelly Buchanan, et al. *Belt and Road Initiative: China, Cambodia, Caribbean Countries, Djibouti, Egypt, Greece, Kenya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Russian Federation and Central Asian Countries, South America, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom*. Washington, D.C.: The Law Library of Congress, Global Legal Research Directorate, August, 2021. Pdf. <https://www.loc.gov/item/2021687414/>, 16.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid, 15.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid, 25.

<sup>56</sup> Stewart, Megan A., Gönül Tol, and Yörük Işık. "China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Turkey's Middle Corridor: 'Win-Win Cooperation'?" Middle East Institute, December 7, 2022.

7. **Bangladesh** for its access to South Asian markets. Two major BRI projects in Bangladesh include the Padma Bridge and the Payra Power Plant.<sup>57</sup>

For *H3* to be supported, these countries would show the highest levels of BRI-related investment from China.

## *Findings*

The China Global Investment Tracker (AEI) dataset includes Chinese investment and construction spending from 2003 to 2022, including spending on projects not officially categorized under the BRI. For this research, the dataset was modified to include only BRI-related projects, with the time frame restricted to 2013-2022, starting from the year the BRI was announced. This ensures only the most relevant data is included in the analysis.

Below are three tables summarizing Chinese BRI investment and construction spending for the selected sample of 21 countries. Each country is categorized according to the hypothesis it supports. The raw data includes disaggregated spending by various SOEs; however, to simplify the analysis, the values have been aggregated to reflect total BRI-related spending per country. Detailed breakdowns can be found in Appendices A, B, and C.

**Table 1** depicts Chinese spending in both investment and infrastructure in the East Asian countries identified for this research.

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<https://www.mei.edu/publications/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-bri-and-turkeys-middle-corridor-win-win-cooperati>  
[on](https://www.mei.edu/publications/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-bri-and-turkeys-middle-corridor-win-win-cooperati).

<sup>57</sup> 孙晓宇. "BRI Provides Benefits for Bangladesh." Chinadaily.com.cn. Accessed December 13, 2022.  
<https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202110/11/WS6163e762a310cdd39bc6e219.html>.

**Table 1**

EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES	BRI INVESTMENT AND CONSTRUCTION IN US DOLLARS
Cambodia	13,540 million
Singapore	40,760 million
Philippines	17,570 million
Laos	22,520 million
Indonesia	44,250 million
Vietnam	14,630 million
Malaysia	30,060 million
Total Spending:	183,330 million

58

**Table 2** includes Chinese spending in investment and infrastructure in the countries identified for providing market access for this research:

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<sup>58</sup> Scissors, Derek. “China Global Investment Tracker | American Enterprise Institute - AEI.” Accessed December 6, 2022. <https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/>.

**Table 2**

TRADE & MARKET ACCESS COUNTRIES	BRI INVESTMENT AND CONSTRUCTION IN US DOLLARS
Greece	4,210 million
Kenya	9,370 million
Pakistan	53,190 million
Djibouti	1,480 million
Egypt	16,520 million
Turkey	5,780 million
Bangladesh	26,420 million
Total Spending:	116,970 million

<sup>59</sup>

**Table 3** includes Chinese spending in investment and infrastructure in the countries identified for their abundance in natural resources for this research:

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<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

Table 3

NATURAL RESOURCE COUNTRIES	BRI INVESTMENT AND CONSTRUCTION IN US DOLLARS
Algeria	10,750 million
Russia	38,810 million
Angola	11,110 million
Oman	6,390 million
UAE	29,380 million
Chile	15,180 million
Bolivia	4,890 million
Total Spending	116,510 million


60

**Tables 1-3** above also include each country's total BRI-related spending, allowing for comparative analysis. The data has also been represented in bar graph format (**Fig. 1**), showing Chinese BRI-related spending from lowest to highest for each country.

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<sup>60</sup> Scissors, Derek. "China Global Investment Tracker | American Enterprise Institute - AEI." Accessed December 6, 2022. <https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/>.


**Fig. 1**  
**Bar Graph Representing Chinese Spending in Each Country (in millions)**



**Fig. 2** is the next graphical representation of this data. It shows the proportion of total BRI-related spending allocated to countries in each of the three categories: East Asian countries, resource-rich countries, and countries providing access to new markets.

Fig. 2

Pie chart representing proportion of total BRI-related spending in each category



Using this data, we can provide some preliminary answers to the research question. These findings show that the hypothesis that best explains the variance in Chinese BRI-related spending is the desire for East Asian dominance. While all the hypotheses have merit and do influence Chinese spending, the data indicates that Chinese spending is higher in East Asian Countries. As shown in the pie chart of the total spending in all 21 countries, East Asian countries account for 44% of that spending (see Fig. 2). The rest of the 56% was split evenly between the countries that provide natural resources and those that allow access to new markets. Furthermore, the bar graph shows that, from this sample, two of the top three recipient countries, Singapore and Indonesia, are East Asian countries (see Fig. 1). On the other hand, the bottom three least invested in countries in the sample do not include any East Asian countries (see Fig. 1). In fact, the East Asian country with the lowest-ranked investment, Cambodia, still ranks ninth lowest overall (see Fig. 1). Therefore, this research finds that China spends more on BRI

investment and construction projects in East Asian countries. These findings most closely match *H2* of the testable hypotheses. Thus, these findings cement the theory that East Asian dominance is a key objective for China.

## *Conclusion*

While the BRI was initially launched to revitalize the Chinese economy by offloading industrial overcapacity, it has also facilitated greater economic integration between China and all the countries involved. Moreover, it has allowed China easier access to natural resources and new markets to sell its goods. This research shows that Chinese BRI-related spending is highest in East Asian countries, suggesting that the desire for East Asian dominance informs the variance of BRI projects in different countries. These findings offer a preliminary answer to the question, **“Why does Chinese diplomacy surrounding the Belt and Road Initiative vary from country to country?”** While insightful, the results are based on a relatively small sample of 21 countries. As such, they should be considered as a starting point for further investigation. More robust and comprehensive studies are needed to provide validity and extend these conclusions.

Previous extensive research has refuted the idea that China is deliberately pursuing a strategy of “debt-trap diplomacy”. However, this study reveals that the BRI does have geostrategic motivations. The focus on East Asian countries found in this study shows that China’s geopolitical goals for the BRI extend beyond the cooperative objectives outlined in the Action Plan. These findings also reinforce how much China stands to gain from the BRI. While it is constructing infrastructure projects that a lot of the recipient countries need, it is also securing reliable, long-term access to natural resources, access to new markets, as well as building a foundation for its aims of East Asian dominance. These findings are also

consequential considering the rising tensions over Taiwan as East Asian dominance will be a geopolitical advantage in achieving their goals regarding Taiwan's status.

Research on the BRI is important because of the implications the initiative has for the international world order. The BRI represents more than a collection of infrastructure projects; it marks an expansion of Chinese influence to the world. It signals that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is increasingly more willing to adopt an active and critical role in shaping the world order. Through this, Beijing is changing the international geopolitical landscape from one historically centered around the US and its Western allies, to one in which China plays a far more formidable role. With China's long-term goal of East Asian dominance in mind, only time will tell how momentous the BRI is for the future of Asia and the future of the world.

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## APPENDIX

### APPENDIX A: Raw Data on East Asian Countries

#### BRI-related Investment and Construction Spending in Cambodia:

Year	Month	Investor	Quantity in Millions	Share Size	Transaction Party	Sector	Subsector	Country	Region	BRI	Greenfield	
750	2013	December	Huamei Power	\$ 410	51%	Royal Group	Energy	Hydro	Cambodia	East Asia	1	G
751	2015	May	China Communications Construct	\$ 150			Transport	Autos	Cambodia	East Asia	1	
752	2015	June	Shanghai Construction	\$ 120			Transport	Autos	Cambodia	East Asia	1	
753	2015	December	China International Trust and Inv	\$ 260		Chip Mong Insee	Real estate	Construction	Cambodia	East Asia	1	
754	2016	March	China National Machinery Indust	\$ 100			Energy		Cambodia	East Asia	1	
755	2016	April	Guangdong Heng Fu	\$ 360	100%		Agriculture		Cambodia	East Asia	1	G
756	2016	June	Anhui Conch	\$ 120		Battambang Cement	Real estate	Construction	Cambodia	East Asia	1	G
757	2016	October	China National Machinery Indust	\$ 120			Energy		Cambodia	East Asia	1	
758	2017	February	China Youth Travel Services	\$ 250			Real estate	Property	Cambodia	East Asia	1	G
759	2017	April	China State Construction Engineer	\$ 160			Entertainment		Cambodia	East Asia	1	
760	2017	April	Sino Great Wall	\$ 560		Cambodia Petrochemical	Energy	Oil	Cambodia	East Asia	1	
761	2017	May	Sino Great Wall	\$ 120			Real estate	Construction	Cambodia	East Asia	1	
762	2017	June	China State Construction Engineer	\$ 130			Real estate	Construction	Cambodia	East Asia	1	
763	2017	December	Hengtong Group	\$ 200		Inner Renewable Energy	Energy	Alternative	Cambodia	East Asia	1	
764	2018	March	Kunming Iron	\$ 500	100%		Transport	Aviation	Cambodia	East Asia	1	
765	2018	April	Sino Great Wall	\$ 300			Transport	Autos	Cambodia	East Asia	1	
766	2018	May	China Communications Construct	\$ 120			Transport	Autos	Cambodia	East Asia	1	
767	2018	December	China Communications Construct	\$ 2,080			Transport	Autos	Cambodia	East Asia	1	
768	2019	January	Shanghai Construction	\$ 260			Transport	Autos	Cambodia	East Asia	1	
769	2019	March	China Communications Construct	\$ 1,950			Transport	Autos	Cambodia	East Asia	1	G
770	2019	June	China International Trust and Inv	\$ 320			Agriculture		Cambodia	East Asia	1	
771	2019	June	China State Construction Engineer	\$ 200			Tourism		Cambodia	East Asia	1	
772	2019	October	China Energy Engineering, China N	\$ 190		50% MAN, Wartsila	Energy		Cambodia	East Asia	1	
773	2019	November	Yuetai	\$ 110			Real estate	Property	Cambodia	East Asia	1	G
774	2019	November	China Railway Construction	\$ 190			Tourism		Cambodia	East Asia	1	
775	2020	January	China Huadian Corporation (Huadi	\$ 1,190			Energy	Coal	Cambodia	East Asia	1	G
776	2020	March	China Communications Construct	\$ 190			Transport	Autos	Cambodia	East Asia	1	
777	2020	April	China Railway Construction	\$ 180			Entertainment		Cambodia	East Asia	1	
778	2020	August	China State Construction Engineer	\$ 600			Transport	Aviation	Cambodia	East Asia	1	
779	2020	September	Power Construction Corp. (PowerC	\$ 150		Royal Progress	Real estate	Construction	Cambodia	East Asia	1	
780	2020	November	Sinosteel	\$ 670		Cambodian Royal	Energy	Coal	Cambodia	East Asia	1	G
781	2020	November	China Minmetals	\$ 410			Transport	Aviation	Cambodia	East Asia	1	
782	2021	January	China National Machinery Indust	\$ 400			Energy	Hydro	Cambodia	East Asia	1	G
783	2022	January	Hodo Group	\$ 300			Transport	Autos	Cambodia	East Asia	1	G
784	2022	April	China State Construction Engineer	\$ 110			Real estate	Construction	Cambodia	East Asia	1	
3858				\$ 15,540								
3859												
3870												

#### BRI-related Investment and Construction Spending in Singapore:

Year	Month	Investor	Quantity in Millions	Share Size	Transaction Party	Sector	Subsector	Country	Region	BRI	Greenfield	
2855	2013	November	Power Construction Corp. (PowerChi	\$ 150			Transport	Rail	Singapore	East Asia	1	
2856	2013	November	Yuande	\$ 120			Real estate	Construction	Singapore	East Asia	1	
2857	2014	February	Bank of China, China Life, Hupu Inves	\$ 160	2%	Global Logistics Properties	Logistics		Singapore	East Asia	1	
2858	2014	May	Alibaba	\$ 210	10%	Singapore Post	Logistics		Singapore	East Asia	1	
2859	2014	May	Shanghai Shierlong	\$ 290			Transport	Rail	Singapore	East Asia	1	
2860	2014	July	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 190			Real estate	Construction	Singapore	East Asia	1	
2861	2014	July	Power Construction Corp. (PowerChi	\$ 200	50%	Sembcorp	Transport	Rail	Singapore	East Asia	1	
2862	2014	August	MCC	\$ 380			Real estate	Property	Singapore	East Asia	1	G
2863	2014	September	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 100			Real estate	Construction	Singapore	East Asia	1	
2864	2014	September	Shanghai Tunnel Engineering	\$ 270			Transport	Rail	Singapore	East Asia	1	
2865	2015	January	Jiangsu Changjiang, Semiconductor	\$ 1,860	100%	Temasek	Technology		Singapore	East Asia	1	
2866	2015	March	China International Trust and Invest	\$ 750	55%	United Envirotech	Utilities		Singapore	East Asia	1	
2867	2015	May	MCC	\$ 250			Real estate	Property	Singapore	East Asia	1	G
2868	2015	June	China Minsheng Investment	\$ 1,500			Finance	Investment	Singapore	East Asia	1	G
2869	2015	July	Alibaba	\$ 150		Singapore Post	Logistics		Singapore	East Asia	1	
2870	2015	October	China Investment Corporation (CIC)	\$ 100		Grab Taxi	Transport	Autos	Singapore	East Asia	1	
2871	2015	December	China Communications Construction	\$ 100	100%		Real estate	Property	Singapore	East Asia	1	G
2872	2015	December	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 110			Real estate	Construction	Singapore	East Asia	1	
2873	2016	March	Sinochem	\$ 180	55%	Hailcyon Agri	Agriculture		Singapore	East Asia	1	
2874	2016	March	China Communications Construction	\$ 130			Transport	Rail	Singapore	East Asia	1	
2875	2016	April	Alibaba	\$ 1,000	51%	Lazada	Consumer		Singapore	East Asia	1	
2876	2016	April	China Ocean Shipping (COSCO)	\$ 100	77%	Pteris	Logistics		Singapore	East Asia	1	
2877	2016	April	China Minmetals	\$ 140			Transport	Rail	Singapore	East Asia	1	
2878	2016	April	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 400			Real estate	Construction	Singapore	East Asia	1	
2879	2016	May	Qinglian	\$ 460		Shunfu Ville	Real estate	Property	Singapore	East Asia	1	
2880	2016	August	China Railway Engineering	\$ 180			Transport	Rail	Singapore	East Asia	1	
2881	2016	October	Shenzhen Government	\$ 990	100%	ACFI Capital	Finance		Singapore	East Asia	1	
2882	2016	December	Qinglian	\$ 220			Real estate	Property	Singapore	East Asia	1	G
2883	2016	December	Shanghai Tunnel Engineering	\$ 220			Transport	Rail	Singapore	East Asia	1	
2884	2016	December	Shanghai Tunnel Engineering	\$ 110		Woh Hup	Transport	Rail	Singapore	East Asia	1	
2885	2017	February	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 220			Real estate	Property	Singapore	East Asia	1	G
2886	2017	February	China Minmetals	\$ 110	100%		Real estate	Property	Singapore	East Asia	1	G
2887	2017	May	Lozan Property, Nanshan Group	\$ 750			Real estate	Property	Singapore	East Asia	1	G

Year	Month	Investor	Quantity in Millions	Share Size	Transaction Party	Sector	Subsector	Country	Region	BRI	Greenfield
2885	2017 June	Alibaba	\$ 1,200	32%	Liuzia	Consumer		Singapore	East Asia		1
2889	2017 July	Didi Chuxing	\$ 500		Grab Taxi	Transport	Autos	Singapore	East Asia		1
2890	2017 August	Yanlord-led consortium	\$ 220	18%	Perennial Real Estate	Real estate	Property	Singapore	East Asia		1
2891	2017 September	HNA	\$ 1,030	100%	CWT	Logistics		Singapore	East Asia		1
2892	2017 September	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 120			Transport	Rail	Singapore	East Asia		1
2893	2017 October	China Investment Corporation (CIC)	\$ 370	10%	Equis Energy	Energy	Alternative	Singapore	East Asia		1
2894	2017 October	Tencent	\$ 470	20%	See	Entertainment		Singapore	East Asia		1
2895	2017 October	China Railway Engineering	\$ 280			Transport	Rail	Singapore	East Asia		1
2896	2017 November	China Vanke, Hupu, Hillhouse Capita	\$ 9,060	79%	Global Logistics Property	Logistics		Singapore	East Asia		1
2897	2017 November	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 150			Transport	Rail	Singapore	East Asia		1
2898	2017 November	Shanghai Tunnel Engineering	\$ 350			Utilities		Singapore	East Asia		1
2899	2017 December	Guoteng	\$ 100			Real estate	Construction	Singapore	East Asia		1
2900	2018 March	Alibaba	\$ 2,000			Consumer		Singapore	East Asia		1
2901	2018 May	Guoteng	\$ 130		Tampines	Real estate	Construction	Singapore	East Asia		1
2902	2018 June	China Communications Construction	\$ 200	100%		Transport	Shipping	Singapore	East Asia		1
2903	2018 June	YY	\$ 870	32%	Bigo	Entertainment		Singapore	East Asia		1
2904	2018 August	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 160			Real estate	Property	Singapore	East Asia		1
2905	2018 October	China Minmetals	\$ 250			Real estate	Construction	Singapore	East Asia		1
2906	2019 January	Hebei Steel	\$ 330	70%	Tata Steel	Metals	Steel	Singapore	East Asia		1
2907	2019 January	Shanghai Tunnel Engineering	\$ 450			Transport	Autos	Singapore	East Asia		1
2908	2019 March	YY	\$ 1,080	68%	Bigo	Entertainment		Singapore	East Asia		1
2909	2019 April	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 110			Real estate	Construction	Singapore	East Asia		1
2910	2019 April	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 140		Tee Yih Jie Food	Real estate	Agriculture	Singapore	East Asia		1
2911	2019 May	China Railway Engineering	\$ 530			Transport	Autos	Singapore	East Asia		1
2912	2019 May	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 170			Real estate	Construction	Singapore	East Asia		1
2913	2019 July	China Mobile Communications	\$ 120			Technology	Telecom	Singapore	East Asia		1 G
2914	2019 July	Guoteng	\$ 140			Real estate	Property	Singapore	East Asia		1
2915	2019 July	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 390		Singapore Institute of Technolog	Other	Education	Singapore	East Asia		1
2916	2019 July	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 260			Real estate	Construction	Singapore	East Asia		1
2917	2019 August	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 210		JTC	Real estate	Construction	Singapore	East Asia		1
2918	2019 September	Shanghai Tunnel Engineering	\$ 340			Transport	Rail	Singapore	East Asia		1
2919	2019 October	China Communications Construction	\$ 200	40%		Utilities		Singapore	East Asia		1
2920	2019 October	Shanghai Tunnel Engineering	\$ 280			Transport	Aviation	Singapore	East Asia		1

Year	Month	Investor	Quantity in Millions	Share Size	Transaction Party	Sector	Subsector	Country	Region	BRI	Greenfield
2919	2019 October	China Communications Construction	\$ 200	40%		Utilities		Singapore	East Asia		1
2920	2019 October	Shanghai Tunnel Engineering	\$ 230			Transport	Aviation	Singapore	East Asia		1
2921	2019 November	Yanlord	\$ 420	33%	United Engineers	Real estate	Property	Singapore	East Asia		1
2922	2019 November	Tianjin Zhonghuan Semi	\$ 300	29%	Maxson Solar	Energy	Alternative	Singapore	East Asia		1
2923	2019 November	China Railway Construction	\$ 540			Transport	Autos	Singapore	East Asia		1
2924	2019 November	China Railway Construction	\$ 540			Transport	Autos	Singapore	East Asia		1
2925	2019 December	China Railway Construction	\$ 140			Transport	Autos	Singapore	East Asia		1
2926	2019 December	China Railway Construction	\$ 160			Transport	Rail	Singapore	East Asia		1
2927	2020 February	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 100	70%	JTC	Real estate	Construction	Singapore	East Asia		1
2928	2020 April	China Communications Construction	\$ 320	31%		Utilities		Singapore	East Asia		1
2929	2020 May	Alibaba	\$ 600	50%		Real estate	Property	Singapore	East Asia		1
2930	2020 June	China Maple Leaf Educational	\$ 490		Southern Capital and HPEF CapIt	Other	Education	Singapore	East Asia		1
2931	2020 July	Power Construction Corp. (PowerChi	\$ 330			Utilities		Singapore	East Asia		1
2932	2020 December	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 180			Utilities		Singapore	East Asia		1
2933	2021 January	China Communications Construction	\$ 140			Transport	Rail	Singapore	East Asia		1
2934	2021 February	China Communications Construction	\$ 360			Transport	Rail	Singapore	East Asia		1
2935	2021 March	Tencent-led consortium	\$ 140		PetSnap	Technology		Singapore	East Asia		1
2936	2021 March	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 130		Taisei	Transport	Rail	Singapore	East Asia		1
2937	2021 April	China Railway Construction	\$ 190			Transport	Rail	Singapore	East Asia		1
2938	2021 April	China Minmetals	\$ 320			Real estate	Construction	Singapore	East Asia		1
2939	2021 May	Guoteng	\$ 140			Real estate	Construction	Singapore	East Asia		1
2940	2021 May	China Minmetals	\$ 790			Transport	Rail	Singapore	East Asia		1
2941	2021 July	China Communications Construction	\$ 160	50%	UES	Utilities		Singapore	East Asia		1
2942	2021 September	Alibaba	\$ 200		Ninja Van	Logistics		Singapore	East Asia		1
2943	2021 December	Shanghai Tunnel Engineering	\$ 400	70%	IT Sambo	Transport	Rail	Singapore	East Asia		1
2944	2022 February	China Communications Construction	\$ 250			Transport	Rail	Singapore	East Asia		1
2945	2022 February	Power Construction Corp. (PowerChi	\$ 180			Transport	Rail	Singapore	East Asia		1
3868			\$ 40,760								

### BRI-related Investment and Construction Spending in Philippines:

Year	Month	Investor	Quantity in Millions	Share Size	Transaction Party	Sector	Subsector	Country	Region	BRI	Greenfield
2525	2014	January	China General Technology (Genera	\$ 210			Energy	Coal	Philippines	East Asia	1
2526	2014	May	Power Construction Corp. (PowerCh	\$ 1,000	70%	Ayala and Power Partners	Energy	Coal	Philippines	East Asia	1
2527	2016	June	China International Trust and Inve	\$ 150		Century Peak	Real estate	Construction	Philippines	East Asia	1
2528	2016	November	China Energy Engineering	\$ 280			Energy	Coal	Philippines	East Asia	1
2529	2016	November	Qingdao Hengshun Zhongsheng	\$ 440			Energy	Alternative	Philippines	East Asia	1
2530	2017	February	Alibaba	\$ 190	23%	Mynt	Consumer		Philippines	East Asia	1
2531	2017	February	China Railway Engineering	\$ 110	70%		Real estate	Construction	Philippines	East Asia	1
2532	2017	December	China Communications Constructio	\$ 1,670		GNPD	Energy	Coal	Philippines	East Asia	1
2533	2018	July	China Communications Constructio	\$ 100			Transport	Autos	Philippines	East Asia	1
2534	2018	October	China Energy Engineering	\$ 350		Limay	Energy	Gas	Philippines	East Asia	1
2535	2018	November	China Railway Engineering	\$ 270			Transport	Rail	Philippines	East Asia	1
2536	2018	November	China Energy Engineering	\$ 230			Energy	Hydro	Philippines	East Asia	1
2537	2018	December	Huskin Cement	\$ 250		Holdim	Real estate	Construction	Philippines	East Asia	1
2538	2019	January	China Railway Construction	\$ 800	9%		Transport	Rail	Philippines	East Asia	1 G
2539	2019	January	State Grid	\$ 400	40%		Energy	Hydro	Philippines	East Asia	1 G
2540	2019	April	China Energy Engineering	\$ 800			Energy	Hydro	Philippines	East Asia	1
2541	2019	September	China Telecom	\$ 760	40%	Mistatel	Technology	Telecom	Philippines	East Asia	1 G
2542	2019	October	Redco	\$ 100		Infradev	Transport	Rail	Philippines	East Asia	1
2543	2019	December	Panhua	\$ 3,500			Metals	Steel	Philippines	East Asia	1 G
2544	2019	December	China Communications Constructio	\$ 360	50%	SM Prime	Real estate	Construction	Philippines	East Asia	1
2545	2020	March	Huawei Technologies	\$ 190			Technology		Philippines	East Asia	1
2546	2020	September	China State Construction Engineer	\$ 1,260			Transport	Rail	Philippines	East Asia	1
2547	2021	January	China Communications Constructio	\$ 940			Transport	Rail	Philippines	East Asia	1
2548	2021	December	China Communications Constructio	\$ 270			Transport	Autos	Philippines	East Asia	1
2549	2021	December	Power Construction Corp. (PowerCh	\$ 230			Utilities		Philippines	East Asia	1
2550	2022	January	China Railway Engineering	\$ 2,770			Transport	Rail	Philippines	East Asia	1
2551	2022	January	Power Construction Corp. (PowerCh	\$ 140			Energy	Alternative	Philippines	East Asia	1
2552	2022	June	China Communications Constructio	\$ 410			Transport	Autos	Philippines	East Asia	1
3069				\$ 17,670							

### BRI-related Investment and Construction Spending in Laos:

Year	Month	Investor	Quantity in Millions	Share Size	Transaction Party	Sector	Subsector	Country	Region	BRI	Greenfield
1560	2017	March	State Development and Investme	\$ 310		Phong Sub Thavy	Energy	Hydro	Laos	East Asia	1
1561	2017	July	Hongshi	\$ 210	70%		Real estate	Construction	Laos	East Asia	1 G
1562	2017	August	Yunnan Provincial Overseas Inves	\$ 130	75%	Leo State Fuel Company, Leo-	Energy	Oil	Laos	East Asia	1 G
1563	2018	January	Shandong Sun Paper	\$ 140			Other	Timber	Laos	East Asia	1
1564	2018	January	Power Construction Corp. (PowerC	\$ 110			Energy	Hydro	Laos	East Asia	1
1564	2018	February	Hebei Construction	\$ 140			Energy	Hydro	Laos	East Asia	1 G
1565	2018	April	Yunnan Construction Engineering	\$ 1,230	95%		Transport	Autos	Laos	East Asia	1 G
1566	2018	April	China National Machinery Industr	\$ 110			Health		Laos	East Asia	1
1567	2018	April	China National Machinery Industr	\$ 600			Energy	Hydro	Laos	East Asia	1
1568	2018	June	Chifeng Jilong	\$ 280	90%	Minmetals	Metals		Laos	East Asia	1
1569	2018	July	Shandong Sun Paper	\$ 640			Other	Timber	Laos	East Asia	1
1570	2018	October	China Railway Corp, China Railwa	\$ 4,170	70%		Transport	Rail	Laos	East Asia	1 G
1571	2019	July	China National Machinery Industr	\$ 350			Energy	Alternative	Laos	East Asia	1
1572	2020	April	Power Construction Corp. (PowerC	\$ 320			Energy	Hydro	Laos	East Asia	1
1573	2020	May	China Railway Engineering	\$ 140			Transport	Rail	Laos	East Asia	1
1574	2020	December	Southern Power Grid	\$ 2,400			Energy		Laos	East Asia	1
1575	2022	May	China Western Power Industrial	\$ 410			Energy	Alternative	Laos	East Asia	1
3058				\$ 22,520							
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### BRI-related Investment and Construction Spending in Indonesia:

Year	Month	Investor	Quantity Millions	Share Size	Transaction Party	Sector	Subsector	Country	Region	BRI	Greenfield
1222	2013	October	China Communications Constructi	\$ 900	70%	Daya Bumindo	Shipping	Indonesia	East Asia		1
1278	2013	December	MCC	\$ 185		SMI	Metals	Indonesia	East Asia		1
1385	2014	April	China National Machinery Industr	\$ 670		BTM	Energy	Indonesia	East Asia		1
1424	2014	July	China Investment Corporation (CI	\$ 1,360	19%	Bumi Resources Minerals	Energy	Indonesia	East Asia		1
1429	2014	July	State Development and Investme	\$ 320			Real estate	Indonesia	East Asia		1 G
1442	2014	July	China State Construction Engineer	\$ 990			Metals	Indonesia	East Asia		1
1457	2014	August	Hongtao	\$ 840	56%	Well Harvest	Metals	Indonesia	East Asia		1 G
1548	2014	November	Sinoma	\$ 350		Cemindo Gemilang	Real estate	Indonesia	East Asia		1
1579	2014	December	China National Chemical Enginee	\$ 440		PKG	Chemicals	Indonesia	East Asia		1
1612	2015	February	China Communications Constructi	\$ 100		PT. Suluh Cemerlang	Real estate	Indonesia	East Asia		1 G
1613	2015	February	SAIC Motor (Shanghai Auto), Wu	\$ 390			Transport	Indonesia	East Asia		1 G
1630	2015	March	China Huadian Corporation (Huad	\$ 870	55%	Bukit Asam	Energy	Indonesia	East Asia		1 G
1686	2015	May	Sinosteel	\$ 120		DBM	Metals	Indonesia	East Asia		1
1686	2015	May	China Energy Engineering	\$ 240			Energy	Indonesia	East Asia		1
1735	2015	July	Tsingshan Holding	\$ 510	50%	Bintang Delapan	Metals	Indonesia	East Asia		1 G
1776	2015	August	China Communications Constructi	\$ 120		WIKA and PP	Transport	Indonesia	East Asia		1
1781	2015	August	Power Construction Corp. (PowerC	\$ 110			Energy	Indonesia	East Asia		1
1859	2015	November	Shenhua	\$ 570	75%	PLN	Energy	Indonesia	East Asia		1 G
1873	2015	November	MCC	\$ 260			Transport	Indonesia	East Asia		1
1874	2015	November	MCC	\$ 110		Tsingshan	Metals	Indonesia	East Asia		1
1877	2015	November	Sinosteel	\$ 180		Pt CPS Indonesia Medan	Energy	Indonesia	East Asia		1
1890	2015	December	Shenhua	\$ 1,320	70%	PLN	Energy	Indonesia	East Asia		1 G
1907	2015	December	China National Machinery Industr	\$ 1,160		PT Bantaeng Sigma Energi	Energy	Indonesia	East Asia		1
2015	2016	March	China State Construction Engineer	\$ 300			Real estate	Indonesia	East Asia		1
2014	2016	May	Qianhai Zone Authority	\$ 200			Transport	Indonesia	East Asia		1 G
2086	2016	May	State Development and Investme	\$ 120	40%	Genting Singapore	Energy	Indonesia	East Asia		1
2100	2016	June	Sinosteel	\$ 140		BOSOWA	Energy	Indonesia	East Asia		1
2188	2016	August	Sino Great Wall	\$ 230		PT Wanxiang Nickel	Metals	Indonesia	East Asia		1
2241	2016	October	Power Construction Corp. (PowerC	\$ 250	70%	PLN	Energy	Indonesia	East Asia		1
2293	2016	November	China National Chemical Enginee	\$ 890		Sumber Segara Primadaya	Energy	Indonesia	East Asia		1
2323	2016	December	Tsingshan Holding	\$ 490		Bintang Delapan	Metals	Indonesia	East Asia		1 G
2328	2016	December	Harbin Electric	\$ 1,470		Malaysia's YTL	Energy	Indonesia	East Asia		1
2335	2016	December	China National Building Material	\$ 170		PT Semen Baturaja Persero	Real estate	Indonesia	East Asia		1
2356	2017	January	China National Off-shore Oil (CNO	\$ 1,040	14%		Energy	Indonesia	East Asia		1
2371	2017	January	China National Building Material	\$ 230		Indoserena Dwimakmur	Real estate	Indonesia	East Asia		1
2404	2017	February	China Communications Constructi	\$ 640			Transport	Indonesia	East Asia		1
2417	2017	March	China Fortune	\$ 300			Real estate	Indonesia	East Asia		1 G
2418	2017	March	China Communications Constructi	\$ 110			Real estate	Indonesia	East Asia		1

Year	Month	Investor	Quantity Millions	Share Size	Transaction Party	Sector	Subsector	Country	Region	BRI	Greenfield
2417	2017	March	China Fortune	\$ 300			Real estate	Indonesia	East Asia		1 G
2419	2017	March	China Communications Constructi	\$ 110			Real estate	Indonesia	East Asia		1
2526	2017	June	China Nonferrous Metal Mining	\$ 200	51%		Metals	Indonesia	East Asia		1
2546	2017	July	Tencent	\$ 150		Go-Jek	Transport	Indonesia	East Asia		1
2577	2017	August	JD.com	\$ 100		Go-Jek	Transport	Indonesia	East Asia		1
2580	2017	August	Alibaba	\$ 500		Tokopedia	Consumer	Indonesia	East Asia		1
2669	2017	November	China Communications Constructi	\$ 170			Transport	Indonesia	East Asia		1
2719	2018	January	China Railway Engineering	\$ 2,460	40%		Transport	Indonesia	East Asia		1 G
2720	2018	January	Tsingshan Holding	\$ 400	57%	Eramet	Metals	Indonesia	East Asia		1
2725	2018	January	China Minmetals	\$ 120			Metals	Indonesia	East Asia		1
2731	2018	January	China Minmetals	\$ 130			Real estate	Indonesia	East Asia		1
2781	2018	March	Zhefu Holdings	\$ 850	53%		Energy	Indonesia	East Asia		1 G
2799	2018	March	China Energy Engineering	\$ 120		Indo Green Power	Energy	Indonesia	East Asia		1
2857	2018	May	China Jinliang Environment	\$ 110	95%	Redstone Alumina	Energy	Indonesia	East Asia		1
2858	2018	May	Shandong Nanshan Aluminum	\$ 390			Metals	Indonesia	East Asia		1 G
2864	2018	May	China Minmetals	\$ 100			Metals	Indonesia	East Asia		1
2871	2018	May	Power Construction Corp. (PowerC	\$ 300			Energy	Indonesia	East Asia		1
2947	2018	August	Power Construction Corp. (PowerC	\$ 150		Toba	Energy	Indonesia	East Asia		1
2952	2018	September	China GEM-led consortium	\$ 610	87%	Sulawesi	Metals	Indonesia	East Asia		1 G
2965	2018	September	Hongshi	\$ 300			Real estate	Indonesia	East Asia		1 G
3073	2019	January	Tencent, JD.Com	\$ 340		Go-Jek	Transport	Indonesia	East Asia		1
3097	2019	February	Jiangsu Delong	\$ 1,620			Metals	Indonesia	East Asia		1 G
3133	2019	March	China Minmetals	\$ 180			Metals	Indonesia	East Asia		1
3163	2019	April	China National Chemical Enginee	\$ 160			Energy	Indonesia	East Asia		1
3176	2019	May	Jiangsu Lianfa	\$ 100	50%	PT Ungeran Seri Garments	Other	Indonesia	East Asia		1
3228	2019	July	China Energy Engineering	\$ 440			Energy	Indonesia	East Asia		1 G
3235	2019	July	China Energy Engineering	\$ 220			Real estate	Indonesia	East Asia		1
3245	2019	August	Cherntun Mining	\$ 150	36%	Prioritas Gading	Metals	Indonesia	East Asia		1 G
3254	2019	August	China Energy Engineering	\$ 240			Real estate	Indonesia	East Asia		1
3290	2019	September	China Minmetals	\$ 140			Metals	Indonesia	East Asia		1
3238	2019	October	China Communications Constructi	\$ 1,650	49%	Jasamarga	Transport	Indonesia	East Asia		1
3320	2019	November	Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt, China Mc	\$ 1,240	97%		Metals	Indonesia	East Asia		1 G
3364	2019	December	Zhejiang Legend	\$ 600			Metals	Indonesia	East Asia		1 G
3405	2020	January	Aluminum Corporation of China (C	\$ 520	75%	Aneka Tambang and Asahan	Metals	Indonesia	East Asia		1
3414	2020	February	Xiamen Nianguo	\$ 1,040			Metals	Indonesia	East Asia		1 G
3419	2020	February	Power Construction Corp. (PowerC	\$ 980			Energy	Indonesia	East Asia		1
3427	2020	March	Zhejiang Legend	\$ 530			Metals	Indonesia	East Asia		1 G
3430	2020	March	State Development and Investme	\$ 300	75%		Energy	Indonesia	East Asia		1 G

Year	Month	Investor	Quantity Millions	Share Size	Transaction Party	Sector	Subsector	Country	Region	BRI	Greenfield
3427	2020	March	Zhejiang Legend	\$ 530				Indonesia	East Asia		1 G
3430	2020	March	State Development and Investmei	\$ 300	75%			Indonesia	East Asia		1 G
3432	2020	March	Inner Mongolia Yili Industrial	\$ 140				Indonesia	East Asia		1 G
3437	2020	May	China Railway Engineering	\$ 1,370				Indonesia	East Asia		1
3434	2020	August	China Energy Engineering	\$ 160		Abadi		Indonesia	East Asia		1
3547	2020	November	Nanjing Iron-led consortium	\$ 440	100%			Indonesia	East Asia		1 G
3556	2020	November	Power Construction Corp. (PowerCI	\$ 130				Indonesia	East Asia		1
3611	2020	December	Datang	\$ 390	75%	Sinarmas		Indonesia	East Asia		1
3614	2021	March	Power Construction Corp. (PowerCI	\$ 1,360				Indonesia	East Asia		1
3622	2021	April	Boyu Capital, Hillhouse Capital	\$ 1,300		J&T Express		Indonesia	East Asia		1
3663	2021	June	China Energy Engineering, China E.	\$ 930				Indonesia	East Asia		1
3667	2021	July	China Risun-led consortium	\$ 220				Indonesia	East Asia		1 G
3694	2021	September	Chengtun Mining, Tsingshan Hold	\$ 230	65%	Stellar		Indonesia	East Asia		1 G
3700	2021	September	Tsingshan Holding, Shanghai Hua	\$ 140				Indonesia	East Asia		1 G
3705	2021	September	Power Construction Corp. (PowerCI	\$ 110				Indonesia	East Asia		1
3733	2021	November	Primavera Capital, Tencent	\$ 100		GoTo		Indonesia	East Asia		1
3755	2021	December	Chengtun Mining	\$ 250	70%	Extension		Indonesia	East Asia		1 G
3775	2022	January	Zhejiang Weiming	\$ 270	70%	Indigo		Indonesia	East Asia		1 G
3824	2022	March	China Minmetals	\$ 230		Delong		Indonesia	East Asia		1
3825	2022	March	China Energy Engineering	\$ 310				Indonesia	East Asia		1
3837	2022	May	Hunan Zhongwei	\$ 290	70%	Rigueza		Indonesia	East Asia		1 G
3863	2022	June	China National Machinery Industr	\$ 180	60%			Indonesia	East Asia		1
3868				\$ 44,250							

BRI-related Investment and Construction Spending in Vietnam:

Year	Month	Investor	Quantity Millions	Share Size	Transaction Party	Sector	Subsector	Country	Region	BRI	Greenfield
3750	2013	October	Harbin Electric, China Energy Engin	\$ 870		CLP		Vietnam	East Asia		1
3751	2014	November	Texhong Textile	\$ 210				Vietnam	East Asia		1 G
3752	2015	July	China Energy Engineering	\$ 1,310	70%	LAKS Resources		Vietnam	East Asia		1 G
3753	2015	July	Southern Power Grid, State Power	\$ 1,760	55%, 40%	Vinacom		Vietnam	East Asia		1 G
3754	2015	November	China Railway Engineering	\$ 260				Vietnam	East Asia		1
3755	2015	December	Sailun Tire	\$ 190				Vietnam	East Asia		1
3756	2017	January	Trina Solar	\$ 100	100%			Vietnam	East Asia		1 G
3757	2017	January	China Minmetals	\$ 230				Vietnam	East Asia		1
3758	2017	July	China State Construction Engineer	\$ 110				Vietnam	East Asia		1
3759	2017	July	China Huadian Corporation (Huad	\$ 810		Janakusa		Vietnam	East Asia		1
3760	2017	November	Guizhou Tyre	\$ 250	100%			Vietnam	East Asia		1 G
3761	2018	January	China Tianying	\$ 160				Vietnam	East Asia		1 G
3762	2018	January	China Minmetals	\$ 100		Hoa Phat Company		Vietnam	East Asia		1
3763	2018	June	Power Construction Corp. (PowerCI	\$ 390		B Grimm, Xuan Cau		Vietnam	East Asia		1
3764	2018	December	Shenzhen Huafu	\$ 360				Vietnam	East Asia		1 G
3765	2018	December	Sailun Tire	\$ 180	65%	Cooper Tire and Rubber		Vietnam	East Asia		1 G
3766	2019	January	GoerTek	\$ 260	100%			Vietnam	East Asia		1 G
3767	2019	January	China Poly	\$ 110		Merubeni		Vietnam	East Asia		1
3768	2019	January	Shenxi Construction Investment	\$ 520				Vietnam	East Asia		1
3769	2019	February	China Minmetals	\$ 130		China Tianying		Vietnam	East Asia		1
3770	2019	April	China New Hope	\$ 170				Vietnam	East Asia		1 G
3771	2020	January	China Energy Engineering	\$ 750				Vietnam	East Asia		1
3772	2020	May	China Energy Engineering	\$ 1,400		ACWA and Taekwang		Vietnam	East Asia		1
3773	2020	September	Power Construction Corp. (PowerCI	\$ 180		Bamboo Capital		Vietnam	East Asia		1
3774	2020	October	Global Logistics Properties	\$ 750	30%	SEA Logistics Partners		Vietnam	East Asia		1 G
3775	2020	October	Power Construction Corp. (PowerCI	\$ 310				Vietnam	East Asia		1
3776	2020	November	JA Solar	\$ 320	100%			Vietnam	East Asia		1 G
3777	2020	December	Xinghai Group	\$ 240				Vietnam	East Asia		1 G
3778	2020	December	Power Construction Corp. (PowerCI	\$ 460				Vietnam	East Asia		1
3779	2021	January	Sailun Tire	\$ 430				Vietnam	East Asia		1
3780	2021	January	China Energy Engineering	\$ 430				Vietnam	East Asia		1
3781	2021	May	Alibaba	\$ 210	3%	Masan		Vietnam	East Asia		1
3782	2021	September	Jinko Solar	\$ 500				Vietnam	East Asia		1 G
3783	2022	March	China Minmetals	\$ 170				Vietnam	East Asia		1
3868				\$ 14,630							

BRI-related Investment and Construction Spending in Malaysia:

Year	Month	Investor	Quantity in Millions	Share Size	Transaction Party	Sector	Subsector	Country	Region	BRI	Greenfield
2029	2013 December	Guangzhou R&I Properties	\$ 1,370	100%		Real estate	Property	Malaysia	East Asia		1 G
2030	2018 December	China Railway Construction	\$ 1,190			Transport	Autos	Malaysia	East Asia		1
2031	2014 April	Shanghai Greenland	\$ 180			Real estate	Property	Malaysia	East Asia		1 G
2032	2014 July	Shandong Daiyin	\$ 200	100%		Other	Textiles	Malaysia	East Asia		1 G
2033	2014 August	China Petroleum and Chemical (Sinopec)	\$ 1,330		Petronas	Energy	Oil	Malaysia	East Asia		1
2034	2014 October	Shanghai Electric	\$ 240		Sarawak Energy	Energy	Coal	Malaysia	East Asia		1
2035	2014 November	Xinyi Glass	\$ 200	100%		Real estate	Construction	Malaysia	East Asia		1 G
2036	2015 January	Shanghai Greenland	\$ 650			Real estate	Property	Malaysia	East Asia		1 G
2037	2015 January	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 430			Real estate	Construction	Malaysia	East Asia		1
2038	2015 March	Jinko Solar	\$ 100	100%		Energy	Alternative	Malaysia	East Asia		1 G
2039	2015 May	SAIC Motor (Shanghai Auto)	\$ 280	48%	Weststar Maxus	Transport	Autos	Malaysia	East Asia		1
2040	2015 July	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 100			Real estate	Construction	Malaysia	East Asia		1
2041	2015 October	Nantong Fujitsu	\$ 370	85%	AMD	Technology		Malaysia	East Asia		1
2042	2015 October	China Communications Construction	\$ 550			Transport	Shipping	Malaysia	East Asia		1
2043	2015 November	China General Nuclear Power, Souther	\$ 2,200	100%	LMDB	Energy		Malaysia	East Asia		1 G
2044	2015 November	China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC)	\$ 180	40%		Chemicals		Malaysia	East Asia		1
2045	2016 January	Zhushou Kibing	\$ 210	100%		Real estate	Construction	Malaysia	East Asia		1 G
2046	2016 January	China Minmetals	\$ 210		Shanghai Greenland	Tourism		Malaysia	East Asia		1
2047	2016 March	China General Nuclear Power	\$ 100			Energy	Alternative	Malaysia	East Asia		1 G
2048	2016 May	Guangxi Investment	\$ 140			Metals	Aluminum	Malaysia	East Asia		1 G
2049	2016 June	Xibo Long	\$ 240	100%		Energy	Alternative	Malaysia	East Asia		1 G
2050	2016 June	China National Chemical Engineering	\$ 240		PRINSIP HASIL	Real estate	Construction	Malaysia	East Asia		1
2051	2016 July	China Minmetals	\$ 110		Guangxi Beibu	Metals	Steel	Malaysia	East Asia		1
2052	2016 July	Beijing Enterprises (BEHL)	\$ 190			Utilities		Malaysia	East Asia		1
2053	2016 August	China Railway Engineering	\$ 370			Transport	Rail	Malaysia	East Asia		1
2054	2016 September	China Communications Construction	\$ 250			Transport	Rail	Malaysia	East Asia		1
2055	2016 October	China Petroleum and Chemical (Sinopec)	\$ 190		PETRONAS	Chemicals		Malaysia	East Asia		1
2056	2016 October	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 230			Real estate	Construction	Malaysia	East Asia		1
2057	2016 November	China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC)	\$ 110	35%	Petronas	Chemicals		Malaysia	East Asia		1
2058	2016 December	China Communications Construction	\$ 1,080	50%	Bina Puri	Tourism		Malaysia	East Asia		1 G
2059	2017 January	China Minmetals	\$ 1,850			Metals	Steel	Malaysia	East Asia		1
2060	2017 March	Qingdao Lu Haifeng	\$ 280	100%		Agriculture		Malaysia	East Asia		1 G
2061	2017 March	Power Construction Corp. (PowerChina)	\$ 150	50%	Sarawak Energy	Energy	Gas	Malaysia	East Asia		1

Year	Month	Investor	Quantity in Millions	Share Size	Transaction Party	Sector	Subsector	Country	Region	BRI	Greenfield
2060	2017 March	Qingdao Lu Haifeng	\$ 280	100%		Agriculture		Malaysia	East Asia		1 G
2061	2017 March	Power Construction Corp. (PowerChina)	\$ 150	50%	Sarawak Energy	Energy	Gas	Malaysia	East Asia		1
2062	2017 May	China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC)	\$ 100			Chemicals		Malaysia	East Asia		1
2063	2017 June	China Galaxy Securities	\$ 120	50%	CIMB	Finance	Investment	Malaysia	East Asia		1
2064	2017 June	Zhejiang Geely	\$ 110	50%	DRB	Transport	Autos	Malaysia	East Asia		1
2065	2017 June	Courty Garden	\$ 280			Real estate	Property	Malaysia	East Asia		1 G
2066	2017 July	China Energy Engineering	\$ 490	70%	Sarawak Energy	Energy	Hydro	Malaysia	East Asia		1
2067	2017 August	Shandong Hengyuan	\$ 140			Energy	Oil	Malaysia	East Asia		1
2068	2017 October	China Minmetals	\$ 340			Tourism		Malaysia	East Asia		1
2069	2017 December	China Railway Construction	\$ 210		M101	Tourism		Malaysia	East Asia		1
2070	2017 December	China Communications Construction	\$ 110			Transport	Rail	Malaysia	East Asia		1
2071	2018 January	China Minmetals	\$ 170			Real estate	Construction	Malaysia	East Asia		1
2072	2018 April	China Railway Construction, China Ra	\$ 2,120			Transport	Rail	Malaysia	East Asia		1
2073	2018 July	Agile Property	\$ 840			Real estate	Property	Malaysia	East Asia		1 G
2074	2018 August	Fujian Construction Engineering	\$ 180		SWT	Real estate	Construction	Malaysia	East Asia		1
2075	2018 September	Tianchai Huailian	\$ 440	76%	Unisem	Technology		Malaysia	East Asia		1
2076	2018 November	China National Building Material	\$ 140			Utilities		Malaysia	East Asia		1
2077	2018 December	China Communications Construction	\$ 2,350			Transport	Rail	Malaysia	East Asia		1
2078	2019 February	Xian Long	\$ 140			Energy	Alternative	Malaysia	East Asia		1 G
2079	2019 July	Power Construction Corp. (PowerChina)	\$ 110			Energy	Hydro	Malaysia	East Asia		1
2080	2019 August	China International Trust and Investm	\$ 110			Real estate	Construction	Malaysia	East Asia		1
2081	2019 September	Nine Dragons	\$ 290			Other	Timber	Malaysia	East Asia		1
2082	2019 November	Jingping Paper	\$ 300			Other	Timber	Malaysia	East Asia		1 G
2083	2019 December	China Railway Engineering	\$ 340	24%		Real estate	Construction	Malaysia	East Asia		1 G
2084	2019 December	Zhejiang Xinshengde	\$ 290			Other	Timber	Malaysia	East Asia		1 G
2085	2019 December	China Minmetals	\$ 510			Metals	Steel	Malaysia	East Asia		1
2086	2020 March	China Everbright	\$ 140	62%	Laureate	Other	Education	Malaysia	East Asia		1
2087	2020 July	Risen Energy	\$ 320			Energy	Alternative	Malaysia	East Asia		1
2088	2021 March	Nine Dragons	\$ 300			Other	Timber	Malaysia	East Asia		1 G
2089	2022 January	Jianlong Investment	\$ 210	60%		Metals	Steel	Malaysia	East Asia		1 G
2090	2022 January	China Minmetals	\$ 100		Eastern Steel	Metals	Steel	Malaysia	East Asia		1
3868			\$ 80,060								

APPENDIX B: Raw Data on countries that allow access to new markets

BRI-related Investment and Construction Spending in Greece:

Year	Month	Investor	Quantity Millions	Share Size	Transaction Party	Sector	Subsector	Country	Region	BRI	Greenfield
2016	July	China Ocean Shipping (COSCO)	\$ 320	51%		Transport	Shipping	Greece	Europe	1	
2016	October	State Grid	\$ 350	24%	Public Power	Energy		Greece	Europe	1	
2016	December	Fosun	\$ 200		Lambda	Transport	Aviation	Greece	Europe	1	
2017	May	Shanghai Gongbao, KaixinRong	\$ 560		Forthnet	Technology	Telecom	Greece	Europe	1	G
2017	November	China Energy Investment	\$ 1,640	75%	Copelouzos	Energy	Alternative	Greece	Europe	1	G
2018	November	China Nonferrous Metal Mining	\$ 940		Mytilineos	Metals	Aluminum	Greece	Europe	1	
2019	February	China Energy Engineering, Zhejiao	\$ 320		MINOS	Energy	Alternative	Greece	Europe	1	
2019	September	China Ocean Shipping (COSCO)	\$ 370			Transport	Shipping	Greece	Europe	1	
2021	October	China Ocean Shipping (COSCO)	\$ 110	16%		Transport	Shipping	Greece	Europe	1	
			\$ 4,210								

BRI-related Investment and Construction Spending in Kenya:

Year	Month	Investor	Quantity Millions	Share Size	Transaction Party	Sector	Subsector	Country	Region	BRI	Greenfield
2013	November	China National Machinery Industry	\$ 290			Health		Kenya	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2014	June	Jiangxi International Cooperation (	\$ 100			Health		Kenya	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2014	August	China Communications Constructio	\$ 480			Transport	Shipping	Kenya	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2015	May	China International Trust and Inve	\$ 120	80%	International Finance Corpora	Real estate	Property	Kenya	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	G
2015	May	Power Construction Corp. (PowerCh	\$ 130		Aperture Green Power	Energy	Alternative	Kenya	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2015	August	Sinoma	\$ 290		Dangote	Real estate	Construction	Kenya	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2016	January	China North Industries (Norinco),	\$ 120			Energy		Kenya	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2016	February	China National Machinery Industry	\$ 220		Kipeto	Energy	Alternative	Kenya	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2016	May	China National Machinery Industry	\$ 180			Energy		Kenya	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2016	July	Fujian Construction Engineering	\$ 160			Transport	Autos	Kenya	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2016	August	Fujian Construction Engineering	\$ 100	100%		Real estate	Construction	Kenya	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	G
2016	August	State Grid	\$ 720			Energy		Kenya	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2016	October	Jiangxi International Cooperation (	\$ 140			Energy	Alternative	Kenya	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	G
2016	October	Jiangxi International Cooperation (	\$ 130			Energy	Alternative	Kenya	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2017	February	Aviation Industry Corp. (AVIC), Jiang	\$ 310	39%	Two Rivers	Real estate	Property	Kenya	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2017	March	Hensai International Cooperation (	\$ 170			Transport	Autos	Kenya	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2017	July	China National Machinery Industry	\$ 130			Energy		Kenya	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2017	July	Guangdong New South	\$ 1,000			Other	Industry	Kenya	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2017	August	Power Construction Corp. (PowerCh	\$ 250			Transport	Autos	Kenya	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2017	November	China Energy Engineering	\$ 360			Energy	Hydro	Kenya	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2018	February	Power Construction Corp. (PowerCh	\$ 100			Energy	Alternative	Kenya	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2018	February	Power Construction Corp. (PowerCh	\$ 270			Energy		Kenya	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2018	May	Tebin Electric Apparatus (TEBA),	\$ 130			Energy	Gas	Kenya	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2018	August	China Railway Construction	\$ 300			Transport	Autos	Kenya	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2018	August	Aviation Industry Corp. (AVIC), Shan	\$ 250			Energy	Hydro	Kenya	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2018	September	China Communications Constructio	\$ 400			Energy	Oil	Kenya	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2019	April	Huawei Technologies	\$ 170	100%		Technology	Telecom	Kenya	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	G
2019	July	State Development and Investmen	\$ 240			Real estate	Construction	Kenya	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2019	August	Power Construction Corp. (PowerCh	\$ 150			Energy	Hydro	Kenya	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2019	December	China Communications Constructio	\$ 420			Transport	Autos	Kenya	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	G
2020	January	Jiangxi Transportation Engineering	\$ 140			Transport	Autos	Kenya	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2021	April	China Communications Constructio	\$ 170			Transport	Autos	Kenya	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2022	January	Fujian Construction Engineering	\$ 170			Health		Kenya	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2022	June	Jiangxi International Cooperation (	\$ 190			Energy	Hydro	Kenya	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
			\$ 9,370								

BRI-related Investment and Construction Spending in Pakistan:

Year	Month	Investor	Quantity in Millions	Share Size	Transaction Party	Sector	Subsector	Country	Region	BRI	Greenfield
2393	2013 December	China Communications Constructi	\$ 100			Logistics		Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2394	2014 January	Power Construction Corp. (PowerCl	\$ 240			Energy	Hydro	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2395	2014 February	China Communications Constructi	\$ 230			Transport	Aviation	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2396	2014 March	Shandong Ruyi	\$ 120			Other	Textiles	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2397	2014 March	United Energy, Ningbo Orient	\$ 250			Energy	Alternative	Pakistan	West Asia	1	G
2398	2014 March	China Communications Constructi	\$ 220			Transport	Shipping	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2399	2014 April	China Mobile Communications	\$ 520	100%	Spectrum	Technology	Telecom	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2400	2014 April	China Communications Constructi	\$ 130			Transport	Shipping	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2401	2014 August	Power Construction Corp. (PowerCl	\$ 130			Energy	Alternative	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2402	2014 August	China National Chemical Enginee	\$ 240		NRL	Energy	Oil	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2403	2014 September	China National Machinery Industr	\$ 1,130		Sindh Engro	Energy	Coal	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2404	2014 November	China Energy Engineering	\$ 140			Transport	Autos	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2405	2014 December	China National Machinery Industr	\$ 100		Tenaga	Energy	Alternative	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2406	2015 March	China Railway Construction, China	\$ 160			Transport	Autos	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2407	2015 April	Power Construction Corp. (PowerCl	\$ 1,070	51%	Al Mirqab Capital	Energy	Coal	Pakistan	West Asia	1	G
2408	2015 June	China Railway Corp. (PowerCl	\$ 1,620			Transport	Rail	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2409	2015 July	Huaneng Power	\$ 1,810	100%	Sahivali Coal-Fired Power Sta	Energy	Coal	Pakistan	West Asia	1	G
2410	2015 August	Power Construction Corp. (PowerCl	\$ 120			Energy	Alternative	Pakistan	West Asia	1	G
2411	2015 August	ZTE (Zhongxing Telecommunicatio	\$ 460	100%		Energy	Alternative	Pakistan	West Asia	1	G
2412	2015 September	Harbin Electric	\$ 1,100			Energy	Gas	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2413	2015 September	China National Nuclear	\$ 9,580			Energy	Energy	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2414	2015 October	China National Machinery Industr	\$ 150	35%	Engo	Energy	Energy	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2415	2015 November	Zhuhai Port Holdings, China State	\$ 1,620			Transport	Shipping	Pakistan	West Asia	1	G
2416	2015 December	China Railway Construction	\$ 1,460		Zahir Khan and Brothers Engi	Transport	Autos	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2417	2015 December	Shanghai Construction Enginee	\$ 2,880			Transport	Autos	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2418	2015 December	Power Construction Corp. (PowerCl	\$ 100			Energy	Alternative	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2419	2016 January	China Energy Engineering	\$ 990	20%	Suki Kinari	Energy	Hydro	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2420	2016 January	China Communications Constructi	\$ 1,320			Transport	Autos	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2421	2016 January	Power Construction Corp. (PowerCl	\$ 220			Transport	Shipping	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2422	2016 February	Three Gorges	\$ 1,650			Energy	Hydro	Pakistan	West Asia	1	G
2423	2016 April	China National Machinery Industr	\$ 420	35%	Engo	Energy	Coal	Pakistan	West Asia	1	G
2424	2016 April	Power Construction Corp. (PowerCl	\$ 910			Energy	Gas	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2425	2016 July	Three Gorges	\$ 220	100%		Energy	Alternative	Pakistan	West Asia	1	G
2426	2016 July	China Energy Engineering	\$ 530		KAPCO	Energy	Coal	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2427	2016 August	China International Trust and Inv	\$ 190		Gharibal	Real estate	Construction	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2428	2016 December	Power Construction Corp. (PowerCl	\$ 1,080		Lucky Electric	Energy	Coal	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2429	2017 February	China Mobile Communications	\$ 200			Technology	Telecom	Pakistan	West Asia	1	G
2430	2017 February	China National Building Material	\$ 130		Cheret Cement	Real estate	Construction	Pakistan	West Asia	1	

Year	Month	Investor	Quantity in Millions	Share Size	Transaction Party	Sector	Subsector	Country	Region	BRI	Greenfield
2432	2017 February	China National Building Material	\$ 190		Pioneer	Real estate	Construction	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2433	2017 March	State Power Investment Corporati	\$ 1,480	74%	HUBCO	Energy	Coal	Pakistan	West Asia	1	G
2434	2017 March	China National Building Material	\$ 180		Bestway	Real estate	Construction	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2435	2017 March	China Energy Engineering	\$ 910			Energy	Hydro	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2436	2017 April	China National Machinery Industr	\$ 170	35%	TheiNova	Energy	Coal	Pakistan	West Asia	1	G
2437	2017 May	China Communications Constructi	\$ 470			Energy	Coal	Pakistan	West Asia	1	G
2438	2017 July	China State Construction Enginee	\$ 380			Transport	Aviation	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2439	2017 August	China Minmetals	\$ 200			Energy	Alternative	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2440	2017 September	China Railway Engineering	\$ 100			Transport	Rail	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2441	2017 September	China National Machinery Industr	\$ 520			Energy	Gas	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2442	2017 September	China Communications Constructi	\$ 140			Transport	Autos	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2443	2017 December	China Energy Engineering	\$ 1,720			Energy	Hydro	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2444	2018 March	Alibaba	\$ 180	45%		Finance	Banking	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2445	2018 April	Alibaba	\$ 150	100%	Rocket Internet	Consumer	Consumer	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2446	2018 April	Harbin Electric	\$ 280		Siemens	Energy	Coal	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2447	2018 May	China National Machinery Industr	\$ 260			Energy	Coal	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2448	2018 September	Shanghai Electric	\$ 980	51%		Energy	Coal	Pakistan	West Asia	1	G
2449	2018 December	State Grid	\$ 1,760			Energy	Energy	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2450	2019 February	Three Gorges	\$ 900			Energy	Hydro	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2451	2019 April	Datang	\$ 970	100%		Energy	Coal	Pakistan	West Asia	1	G
2452	2019 April	China Communications Constructi	\$ 120	91%		Other	Industry	Pakistan	West Asia	1	G
2453	2019 April	China Energy Engineering	\$ 1,290	70%	Descon	Energy	Hydro	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2454	2019 April	Shanghai Electric	\$ 960			Energy	Coal	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2455	2019 November	Power Construction Corp. (PowerCl	\$ 340			Energy	Hydro	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2456	2019 December	Harbin Electric	\$ 220		K-Electric	Energy	Gas	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2457	2020 June	Power Construction Corp. (PowerCl	\$ 1,930	70%		Energy	Hydro	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2458	2020 July	China Energy Engineering	\$ 1,230	80%	Larab	Energy	Hydro	Pakistan	West Asia	1	G
2459	2020 September	China Communications Constructi	\$ 130			Other	Industry	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2460	2021 March	China Energy Engineering	\$ 470	90%	Ghulam Rasool	Energy	Hydro	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2461	2021 May	Power Construction Corp. (PowerCl	\$ 350			Energy	Hydro	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2462	2021 May	Harbin Electric	\$ 160			Energy	Gas	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2463	2021 June	Harbin Electric	\$ 240			Energy	Hydro	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2464	2021 June	Gansu International Cooperation	\$ 140			Utilities	Utilities	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2465	2022 April	China National Chemical Enginee	\$ 310		Deewoo	Energy	Gas	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2466	2022 May	China Energy Engineering	\$ 150			Transport	Autos	Pakistan	West Asia	1	
2467	2022 May	China Communications Constructi	\$ 130		Al-Fajr	Utilities	Utilities	Pakistan	West Asia	1	

### BRI-related Investment and Construction Spending in Djibouti:

Year	Month	Investor	Quantity Millions	Share Size	Transaction Party	Sector	Subsector	Country	Region	BRI	Greenfield
2015	January	China Railway Construction	\$ 600			Transport	Aviation	Djibouti	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2018	July	China Merchants	\$ 370			Logistics		Djibouti	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2020	October	China Merchants	\$ 510			Transport	Shipping	Djibouti	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	G
			\$ 1,480								

### BRI-related Investment and Construction Spending in Egypt:

Year	Month	Investor	Quantity Millions	Share Size	Transaction Party	Sector	Subsector	Country	Region	BRI	Greenfield
2014	July	Sinoma	\$ 370			Real estate	Construction	Egypt	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2015	April	China Railway Construction	\$ 630		Egypt Rail	Transport	Rail	Egypt	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2016	May	China National Building Material	\$ 180			Other	Industry	Egypt	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	G
2016	March	State Grid, Power Construction Cor.	\$ 780			Energy		Egypt	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2016	June	Sinoma	\$ 1,180			Real estate	Construction	Egypt	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2017	May	China National Machinery Industry	\$ 400			Agriculture		Egypt	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2017	August	Aviation Industry Corp. (AVIC), CH	\$ 1,240			Transport	Rail	Egypt	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2017	October	Power Construction Corp. (PowerC), CH	\$ 1,930		Sokhna Refinery and Petroche	Energy	Oil	Egypt	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2018	January	Zhejiang Chint	\$ 150		ACWA	Energy	Alternative	Egypt	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2018	March	China Communications Constructi	\$ 120			Logistics		Egypt	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2018	April	Tebian Electric Apparatus (TBEA)	\$ 180			Energy	Alternative	Egypt	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2018	August	China National Building Material	\$ 180		Acciona	Other	Industry	Egypt	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2018	September	China Minerals	\$ 670			Other	Textiles	Egypt	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2018	September	China State Construction Engineer	\$ 3,050			Real estate	Construction	Egypt	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2019	July	China State Construction Engineer	\$ 840			Chemicals		Egypt	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2019	December	China State Construction Engineer	\$ 850			Chemicals		Egypt	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2020	January	China Energy Engineering	\$ 290			Energy	Alternative	Egypt	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2020	October	China Communications Constructi	\$ 380			Logistics		Egypt	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2021	June	China State Construction Engineer	\$ 1,320			Real estate	Construction	Egypt	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2021	June	China National Building Material	\$ 440			Real estate	Construction	Egypt	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2021	August	Three Gorges	\$ 350		Alcazar	Energy	Alternative	Egypt	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2021	October	China National Building Material	\$ 340			Other	Industry	Egypt	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	G
			\$ 16,520								

### BRI-related Investment and Construction Spending in Turkey:

Year	Month	Investor	Quantity in Millions	Share Size	Transaction Party	Sector	Subsector	Country	Region	BRI	Greenfield
2014	April	Industrial and Commercial Bank of	\$ 320	75%	Tekstil Bankisi	Finance	Banking	Turkey	West Asia	1	
2015	February	China National Machinery Industry	\$ 380	75%	CE DAS and OEPSAS	Energy		Turkey	West Asia	1	
2015	May	Sinoma	\$ 150		Limak Holdings	Real estate	Construction	Turkey	West Asia	1	
2015	May	Sinoma	\$ 100		Notranim Cimenlo	Energy	Construction	Turkey	West Asia	1	
2015	September	China Merchants, China Investor	\$ 920	65%	Fine Liman	Logistics		Turkey	West Asia	1	
2016	January	Dongfang Electric Corporation	\$ 660		Hattat	Energy	Coal	Turkey	West Asia	1	
2016	May	Bank of China	\$ 110	100%		Finance	Banking	Turkey	West Asia	1	
2016	December	ZTE (Zhongxing Telecommunications)	\$ 100	48%	Nelas	Technology	Telecom	Turkey	West Asia	1	
2017	November	Power Construction Corp. (PowerChi)	\$ 1,090		Teyjo	Energy	Coal	Turkey	West Asia	1	
2018	September	State Power Investment Corporation	\$ 1,320	78%		Energy	Coal	Turkey	West Asia	1	G
2019	November	China Electronics Technology	\$ 110		Kaylon	Energy	Alternative	Turkey	West Asia	1	
2021	April	Alibaba	\$ 350		Trendyol	Consumer		Turkey	West Asia	1	
2022	March	China National Chemical Engineer	\$ 150			Chemicals		Turkey	West Asia	1	
			\$ 5,790								

### BRI-related Investment and Construction Spending in Bangladesh:

Year	Month	Investor	Quantity in Millions	Share Size	Transaction Party	Sector	Subsector	Country	Region	BRI	Greenfield
2013	November	China National Machinery Industry	\$ 180		Pacific Bangladesh Telecom	Technology	Telecom	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	
2014	March	Shanghai Electric	\$ 190		North-West Power	Energy	Gas	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	
2015	July	Power Construction Corp. (PowerChi)	\$ 750	30%	S Alam	Energy	Coal	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	G
2015	July	Power Construction Corp. (PowerChi)	\$ 1,360		S Alam	Energy	Coal	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	
2015	November	ZTE (Zhongxing Telecommunications)	\$ 150			Technology		Bangladesh	West Asia	1	
2015	December	Power Construction Corp. (PowerChi)	\$ 1,550			Transport	Shipping	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	
2016	February	Power Construction Corp. (PowerChi)	\$ 110			Energy	Oil	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	
2016	March	China General Technology (Genertec)	\$ 780	50%	North-West Power Generation	Energy	Coal	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	G
2016	March	China Energy Engineering	\$ 780	50%	Genertec and North-West Power	Energy	Coal	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	
2016	April	China Energy Engineering	\$ 220			Energy		Bangladesh	West Asia	1	
2016	May	China National Machinery Industry	\$ 200			Energy	Oil	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	
2016	October	Tobian Electric Apparatus (TBEA)	\$ 850		Dhaka Power	Energy		Bangladesh	West Asia	1	
2016	October	Jiangsu Yongding, China National M	\$ 1,140			Energy		Bangladesh	West Asia	1	
2016	December	China Communications Constructor	\$ 390			Transport	Shipping	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	
2016	December	Power Construction Corp. (PowerChi)	\$ 280		Sembcorp	Energy		Bangladesh	West Asia	1	
2017	March	China Energy Engineering	\$ 110			Transport	Autos	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	
2017	May	Power Construction Corp. (PowerChi)	\$ 190			Transport	Rail	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	
2017	June	China Communications Constructor	\$ 110			Other	Industry	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	G
2017	August	China Energy Conservation and Envi	\$ 120			Utilities		Bangladesh	West Asia	1	
2017	September	China Railway Engineering	\$ 110		Tama's Construction	Transport	Rail	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	
2018	February	Shanghai Stock Exchange, Shenzhen	\$ 160	25%		Finance	Investment	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	
2018	March	China Railway Construction	\$ 210		Max Infrastructure	Transport	Rail	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	
2018	April	Power Construction Corp. (PowerChi)	\$ 360	92%	Barishal	Energy	Coal	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	G
2018	July	China Railway Engineering	\$ 2,760			Transport	Rail	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	
2018	July	Hunan Construction Engineering	\$ 330			Utilities		Bangladesh	West Asia	1	
2018	August	Kunming Iron	\$ 2,130			Metals	Steel	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	G
2018	August	Power Construction Corp. (PowerChi)	\$ 280			Utilities		Bangladesh	West Asia	1	
2018	October	China National Chemical Engineerin	\$ 400		Mitsubishi Heavy	Agriculture		Bangladesh	West Asia	1	
2018	November	China National Petroleum Corp. (CN)	\$ 780			Energy	Oil	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	
2018	December	Sichuan Road and Bridge	\$ 180			Transport	Autos	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	
2019	February	China Communications Constructor	\$ 700			Transport	Autos	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	
2019	March	China State Construction Engineerin	\$ 220			Transport	Autos	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	
2019	April	China North Industries (Norinco)	\$ 790	50%	Rural Power	Energy	Coal	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	G
2019	October	Power Construction Corp. (PowerChi)	\$ 2,360			Real estate	Construction	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	
2019	October	China North Industries (Norinco)	\$ 780			Energy	Coal	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	

Year	Month	Investor	Quantity Millions	Share Size	Transaction Party	Sector	Subsector	Country	Region	BRI	Greenfield
2019	October	Power Construction Corp. (PowerCh	\$ 2,360			Real estate	Construction	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	
2019	October	China North Industries (Norinco)	\$ 780			Energy	Coal	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	
2019	November	Harbin Electric	\$ 100		Rural Power	Energy	Gas	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	
2020	February	Shandong Gaosu, Power Constructio	\$ 860	70%		Transport	Autos	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	G
2020	March	Beijing Urban Construction	\$ 260			Transport	Aviation	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	
2020	March	Power Construction Corp. (PowerCh	\$ 130		PowerPac	Energy		Bangladesh	West Asia	1	
2020	June	Shanghai Electric	\$ 180		North West	Energy	Gas	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	
2020	July	China State Shipbuilding	\$ 120			Transport	Shipping	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	
2020	August	Jiangsu Yabang	\$ 300			Other	Textiles	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	G
2021	April	Jiangsu Yongding, Harbin Electric	\$ 360			Energy	Gas	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	
2021	September	China Railway Engineering, China G	\$ 240			Transport	Autos	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	
2021	September	Shanghai Greenland, China Genera	\$ 230			Transport	Autos	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	
2021	October	China Railway Construction, Chang	\$ 180			Transport	Aviation	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	
2021	November	China National Machinery Industry	\$ 300			Energy	Alternative	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	G
2022	January	China Communications Construction	\$ 240	63%		Transport	Autos	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	G
2022	January	State Power Investment Corporation	\$ 120			Energy	Alternative	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	G
2022	January	China Communications Construction	\$ 150			Transport	Autos	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	
2022	March	Shandong Gaosu	\$ 140			Transport	Autos	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	
2022	April	China Railway Engineering	\$ 450			Technology	Telecom	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	
2022	June	China General Technology (Generat	\$ 170			Energy	Alternative	Bangladesh	West Asia	1	G
			\$ 26,420								

APPENDIX C: Raw Data on countries with abundant natural resources

BRI-related Investment and Construction Spending in Algeria

Year	Month	Investor	Quantity Millions	Share Size	Transaction Party	Sector	Subsector	Country	Region	BRI	Greenfield
2013	October	Power Construction Corp. (PowerCh	\$ 510		SKTM	Energy	Alternative	Algeria	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2013	December	China Railway Construction	\$ 1,180			Transport	Autos	Algeria	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2014	April	Sinoma	\$ 260		Ciment Lafarge Souakri	Real estate	Construction	Algeria	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2014	April	China State Construction Engineerin	\$ 230		SAPTA and EVSM	Transport	Autos	Algeria	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2014	June	China State Construction Engineerin	\$ 800			Transport	Aviation	Algeria	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2014	October	China State Construction Engineerin	\$ 750		SIH	Tourism		Algeria	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2014	October	China Communications Construction	\$ 130			Logistics		Algeria	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2015	June	Sinoma	\$ 270		SARL Biskra Ciment	Real estate	Construction	Algeria	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2015	November	Sinosteel	\$ 140			Metals	Steel	Algeria	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2016	January	China State Construction Engineerin	\$ 1,720	49%	Algeria Harbour Group	Transport	Shipping	Algeria	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2016	April	China Minmetals	\$ 110			Real estate	Construction	Algeria	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2016	May	China National Building Material	\$ 230		Zahana	Real estate	Construction	Algeria	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2016	June	Sinosteel	\$ 260		Tosyali	Metals	Steel	Algeria	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2016	July	Sinosteel	\$ 160		AQS	Metals	Steel	Algeria	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2016	November	China National Petroleum Corp. (CN	\$ 410		Sonatrach	Energy	Oil	Algeria	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2016	November	China Minmetals	\$ 460		ThyssenKrupp	Real estate	Construction	Algeria	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2018	March	China National Building Material	\$ 130			Real estate	Construction	Algeria	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2019	January	China Communications Construction	\$ 440		Sonatrach	Energy	Gas	Algeria	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2019	December	China National Petroleum Corp. (CN	\$ 120			Energy	Oil	Algeria	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2020	May	China State Construction Engineerin	\$ 120			Logistics		Algeria	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2022	February	China Petroleum and Chemical (Sinc	\$ 180		Skidda	Energy	Gas	Algeria	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2022	May	China Petroleum and Chemical (Sinc	\$ 430	70%	SONATRACH	Energy	Oil	Algeria	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2022	May	China Petroleum and Chemical (Sinc	\$ 520		Sonatrach	Chemicals		Algeria	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2022	May	Sinosteel	\$ 1,100		Tosyali	Metals	Steel	Algeria	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
			\$ 10,750								

BRI-related Investment and Construction Spending in Russia:

Year	Month	Investor	Quantity in Millions	Share Size	Transaction Party	Sector	Subsector	Country	Region	BRI	Greenfield
2635	2013	October	China National Petroleum Corp. (CN	\$ 620	49%	Rosneft	Energy	Oil	Russian Federation	West Asia	1
2636	2013	December	Shenhua	\$ 460	50% en+		Energy	Coal	Russian Federation	West Asia	1 G
2637	2014	March	China State Construction Engineeri	\$ 710			Real estate	Construction	Russian Federation	West Asia	1
2638	2014	May	China National Machinery Industry	\$ 180		Eurocement	Real estate	Construction	Russian Federation	West Asia	1
2639	2014	May	Sinoma	\$ 150		Eurocement	Real estate	Construction	Russian Federation	West Asia	1
2640	2014	July	China National Off-shore Oil (CNOC)	\$ 1,640			Energy	Gas	Russian Federation	West Asia	1
2641	2014	September	China National Petroleum Corp. (CN	\$ 990	10%	Rosneft	Energy	Oil	Russian Federation	West Asia	1
2642	2014	October	Lifan	\$ 290	100%		Transport	Autos	Russian Federation	West Asia	1 G
2643	2014	November	Power Construction Corp. (PowerChi	\$ 1,460	49%	Rushydro	Energy	Hydro	Russian Federation	West Asia	1 G
2644	2014	November	Harbin Electric	\$ 450	100%		Energy	Alternative	Russian Federation	West Asia	1 G
2645	2014	December	China National Petroleum Corp. (CN	\$ 940	20%	Novatek	Energy	Gas	Russian Federation	West Asia	1 G
2646	2015	April	Cybermut	\$ 100		Skolkovo Foundation	Technology		Russian Federation	West Asia	1 G
2647	2015	May	Great Wall Motor	\$ 510			Transport	Autos	Russian Federation	West Asia	1 G
2648	2015	May	Sinosteel	\$ 670		Chek-Su. VK	Metals	Steel	Russian Federation	West Asia	1
2649	2015	June	ZOJE Resources	\$ 440			Agriculture		Russian Federation	West Asia	1 G
2650	2015	June	China Railway Engineering	\$ 380		JSC Russian Railways	Transport	Rail	Russian Federation	West Asia	1
2651	2015	August	Anhui Conch	\$ 310	100%		Real estate	Construction	Russian Federation	West Asia	1 G
2652	2015	September	State Administration of Foreign Excl	\$ 1,210	10%	Novatek	Energy	Gas	Russian Federation	West Asia	1
2653	2015	October	China National Machinery Industry	\$ 1,780		Siberian Wood	Other	Timber	Russian Federation	West Asia	1
2654	2015	December	China Petroleum and Chemical (SIN	\$ 1,340	10%	Sibur	Energy	Gas	Russian Federation	West Asia	1
2655	2015	December	Highland Fund	\$ 100	13%	Monist Nickel	Metals		Russian Federation	West Asia	1 G
2656	2016	June	China National Chemical Engineeri	\$ 440			Chemicals		Russian Federation	West Asia	1
2657	2016	November	Beijing Enterprises (BEHL)	\$ 1,080	20%	Rosneft	Energy	Gas	Russian Federation	West Asia	1
2658	2016	November	Sinosteel	\$ 180		Eurasia Mining	Metals		Russian Federation	West Asia	1
2659	2016	November	China Energy Engineering	\$ 260		Rybinsk Power	Energy	Gas	Russian Federation	West Asia	1
2660	2016	December	State Administration of Foreign Excl	\$ 1,150	10%	Sibur	Energy	Gas	Russian Federation	West Asia	1
2661	2017	March	China National Chemical Engineeri	\$ 1,170		Gesprom	Energy	Oil	Russian Federation	West Asia	1
2662	2017	April	China National Petroleum Corp. (CN	\$ 2,520			Energy	Gas	Russian Federation	West Asia	1
2663	2017	April	China Railway Construction	\$ 390		Mosinzhpromekt	Transport	Rail	Russian Federation	West Asia	1
2664	2017	June	China Minerals	\$ 390			Real estate	Construction	Russian Federation	West Asia	1
2665	2017	July	China Energy Engineering	\$ 1,470			Energy	Gas	Russian Federation	West Asia	1
2666	2017	October	CEFC China Energy	\$ 500	EN+		Energy		Russian Federation	West Asia	1
2667	2017	November	China Investment Corporation (CIC)	\$ 100	6%	Eurasia Drilling	Energy	Oil	Russian Federation	West Asia	1
2668	2018	January	China National Chemical Engineeri	\$ 420			Energy	Oil	Russian Federation	West Asia	1
2669	2018	April	China National Building Material	\$ 190		Prominvest	Real estate	Construction	Russian Federation	West Asia	1

Year	Month	Investor	Quantity in Millions	Share Size	Transaction Party	Sector	Subsector	Country	Region	BRI	Greenfield
2668	2018	April	China National Building Material	\$ 190		Prominvest	Real estate	Construction	Russian Federation	West Asia	1
2670	2018	September	Alibaba	\$ 480	10%	Mail.ru	Technology		Russian Federation	West Asia	1
2671	2018	September	Liaoning Port	\$ 150	49%	RDZ	Logistics		Russian Federation	West Asia	1 G
2672	2018	December	Sinosteel	\$ 680		Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel W	Metals		Russian Federation	West Asia	1
2673	2019	February	China National Chemical Engineeri	\$ 1,480			Chemicals		Russian Federation	West Asia	1
2674	2019	March	China Investment Corporation (CIC)	\$ 100			Metals	Steel	Russian Federation	West Asia	1
2675	2019	April	China National Petroleum Corp. (CN	\$ 4,040	20%		Energy	Gas	Russian Federation	West Asia	1
2676	2019	April	China Railway Construction	\$ 420			Transport	Rail	Russian Federation	West Asia	1
2677	2019	July	China Railway Construction	\$ 110		Afi Development	Real estate	Construction	Russian Federation	West Asia	1
2678	2019	July	Bomesc Offshore Engineering	\$ 610		Technip	Energy	Gas	Russian Federation	West Asia	1
2679	2019	August	Halier	\$ 340			Consumer		Russian Federation	West Asia	1 G
2680	2020	September	Great Wall Motor	\$ 540			Transport	Autos	Russian Federation	West Asia	1
2681	2020	October	China National Chemical Engineeri	\$ 890		RusGasDobryha	Chemicals		Russian Federation	West Asia	1
2682	2020	October	China National Chemical Engineeri	\$ 450		SHCHEKINGAZOT	Agriculture		Russian Federation	West Asia	1
2683	2021	January	China Petroleum and Chemical (SIN	\$ 360	40%	SIBUR	Chemicals		Russian Federation	West Asia	1 G
2684	2021	January	China National Chemical Engineeri	\$ 450			Chemicals		Russian Federation	West Asia	1
2685	2021	March	China Petroleum and Chemical (SIN	\$ 900			Energy	Gas	Russian Federation	West Asia	1
2686	2021	August	China National Chemical Engineeri	\$ 290			Chemicals		Russian Federation	West Asia	1
2687	2021	December	China National Chemical Engineeri	\$ 1,330		RusGasDobryha	Chemicals		Russian Federation	West Asia	1
2688				\$ 38,810							

### BRI-related Investment and Construction Spending in Angola:

Year	Month	Investor	Quantity in Millions	Share Size	Transaction Party	Sector	Subsector	Country	Region	BRI	Greenfield
2014	January	Tebian Electric Apparatus (TEFA)	\$ 760			Energy	Hydro	Angola	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2014	August	China National Machinery Industry	\$ 990		Soyo	Energy	Gas	Angola	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2014	November	China International Trust and Inves	\$ 120			Agriculture		Angola	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2015	December	China International Trust and Inves	\$ 610			Utilities		Angola	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2016	February	China Communications Construction	\$ 830		Caio Porto	Transport	Shipping	Angola	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2016	May	China Communications Construction	\$ 350			Transport	Autos	Angola	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2016	June	China National Machinery Industry	\$ 400			Energy		Angola	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2016	June	China Railway Construction	\$ 120			Utilities		Angola	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2016	June	Power Construction Corp. (PowerChi	\$ 680			Utilities		Angola	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2016	August	China Communications Construction	\$ 440			Transport	Shipping	Angola	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2016	August	China Railway Engineering	\$ 130			Real estate	Construction	Angola	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2016	December	China Railway Construction	\$ 190			Transport	Aviation	Angola	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2017	January	China Railway Engineering	\$ 160			Transport	Autos	Angola	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2017	January	China Railway Engineering	\$ 130			Utilities		Angola	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2017	June	China Energy Engineering	\$ 2,770	61%	Boreal Investments	Energy	Hydro	Angola	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2017	July	China Communications Construction	\$ 200			Energy	Alternative	Angola	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2017	July	Aviation Industry Corp. (AVIC)	\$ 1,400			Transport	Aviation	Angola	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2019	October	Power Construction Corp. (PowerChi	\$ 140			Utilities		Angola	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2019	November	Power Construction Corp. (PowerChi	\$ 360			Agriculture		Angola	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2021	November	Power Construction Corp. (PowerChi	\$ 150			Health		Angola	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
2021	December	Power Construction Corp. (PowerChi	\$ 160			Transport	Aviation	Angola	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	
			\$ 11,110								

### BRI-related Investment and Construction Spending in Oman:

Year	Month	Investor	Quantity in Millions	Share Size	Transaction Party	Sector	Subsector	Country	Region	BRI	Greenfield
2015	June	Simligh	\$ 300		Oman Sugar	Agriculture		Oman	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2016	May	Power Construction Corp. (PowerChin	\$ 2,300		Mitsui, ACWA, DIDIC	Energy	Gas	Oman	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2017	June	Power Construction Corp. (PowerChin	\$ 330			Energy	Gas	Oman	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2017	September	Ningxia Wangfang	\$ 1,040			Other	Industry	Oman	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	G
2018	August	China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC)	\$ 320		Ras Markaz	Energy	Oil	Oman	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2019	December	State Grid	\$ 970	49%	Oman Electricity Transmission	Energy		Oman	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2020	March	Hunan Construction Engineering, Chir	\$ 320			Utilities		Oman	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2020	August	China National Chemical Engineering	\$ 410		Sohar Asphalt	Chemicals		Oman	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
2020	September	Power Construction Corp. (PowerChin	\$ 400			Energy	Alternative	Oman	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
			\$ 6,800								

BRI-related Investment and Construction Spending in UAE:

Month	Investor	Quantity in Millions	Share Size	Transaction Party	Sector	Subsector	Country	Region	BRI	Greenfield
3269 2014 April	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 110			Transport	Autos	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3270 2014 April	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 100			Transport	Aviation	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3271 2014 May	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 100			Transport	Autos	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3272 2014 August	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 380		Skai	Tourism		UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3273 2015 February	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 170		Arenco	Tourism		UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3274 2015 May	China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC)	\$ 380		ADNOC	Energy	Oil	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3275 2015 July	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 130		Demec Crescent	Tourism		UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3276 2015 October	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 130			Transport	Autos	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3277 2015 January	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 170		Nakheel	Real estate	Construction	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3278 2015 April	Harbin Electric State Administration	\$ 820		ACWA	Energy		UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	G
3279 2015 May	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 120			Real estate	Construction	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3280 2016 June	Harbin Electric	\$ 2,350		DEWA	Energy	Coal	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3281 2016 September	China Ocean Shipping (COSCO)	\$ 670	90%		Logistics		UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3282 2016 November	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 150		Demec	Tourism		UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3283 2016 December	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 200		HEI	Energy	Coal	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3284 2017 January	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 300			Real estate	Construction	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3285 2017 February	China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC)	\$ 1,770	8%		Energy	Oil	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	G
3286 2017 February	China North Industries (Norinco)	\$ 890	4%		Energy	Oil	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	G
3287 2017 February	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 220			Transport	Autos	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3288 2017 June	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 170			Real estate	Construction	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3289 2017 June	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 350		Arenco	Tourism		UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3290 2017 July	Jiangsu Overseas Cooperation and Inv	\$ 300			Other	Industry	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	G
3291 2017 July	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 170			Transport	Autos	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3292 2017 July	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 110			Real estate	Construction	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3293 2017 September	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 2,170			Real estate	Property	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3294 2017 November	China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC)	\$ 1,520		ADNOC	Energy	Oil	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3295 2018 January	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 140			Consumer		UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3296 2018 February	China National Machinery Industry G	\$ 1,140		Nakheel	Real estate	Construction	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3297 2018 March	China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC)	\$ 1,180	10%		Energy	Oil	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	G
3298 2018 March	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 160		Demec	Real estate	Construction	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3299 2018 April	China International Trust and Investm	\$ 120			Energy		UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3300 2018 April	Shanghai Electric	\$ 1,030		ACWA	Energy	Alternative	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3301 2018 July	State Administration of Foreign Excha	\$ 930	24%	ACWA	Energy	Alternative	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	G

Month	Investor	Quantity in Millions	Share Size	Transaction Party	Sector	Subsector	Country	Region	BRI	Greenfield
3302 2018 July	China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC)	\$ 1,600		Abu Dhabi Oil	Energy	Oil	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3303 2018 August	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 350		Emear	Real estate	Construction	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3304 2018 September	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 140		Demec	Real estate	Construction	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3305 2018 October	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 100			Technology	Telecom	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3306 2018 October	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 220			Transport	Autos	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3307 2019 January	Roadbot Tyre	\$ 610	100%		Transport	Autos	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	G
3308 2019 March	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 210		SK Engineering	Transport	Rail	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3309 2019 March	Power Construction Corp. (PowerChin	\$ 270			Energy	Gas	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3310 2019 April	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 190			Transport	Autos	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3311 2019 April	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 200			Entertainment		UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3312 2019 May	Power Construction Corp. (PowerChin	\$ 460		ACWA	Utilities		UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3313 2019 June	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 120		Deira	Real estate	Construction	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3314 2019 June	China Railway Construction	\$ 600		Ghantoot	Transport	Rail	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3315 2019 July	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 120		Emear	Real estate	Property	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3316 2019 August	China National Chemical Engineering	\$ 460		MAC	Real estate	Construction	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3317 2019 November	China Energy Engineering	\$ 370		ACWA	Utilities		UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3318 2019 December	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 110			Real estate	Construction	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3319 2019 December	China Railway Construction	\$ 600			Transport	Rail	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3320 2020 February	Power Construction Corp. (PowerChin	\$ 230		Larsen and Toubro	Transport	Rail	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3321 2020 July	Jinko Solar	\$ 180	20%	Al Dhafra	Energy	Alternative	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	G
3322 2020 July	China Railway Rolling Stock Corp. (CR	\$ 120			Transport	Rail	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3323 2020 August	Shanghai Electric	\$ 560			Energy	Alternative	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3324 2020 September	China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC)	\$ 140			Energy	Oil	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3325 2020 September	China National Chemical Engineering	\$ 500		Ghantoot	Chemicals		UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3326 2020 November	China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC)	\$ 520		ADNOC	Energy	Oil	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3327 2020 December	China National Machinery Industry G	\$ 800			Energy	Alternative	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3328 2022 January	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 170		Select	Real estate	Construction	UAE	Arab Middle East and North Africa	1	
3066		\$ 29,380								

### BRI-related Investment and Construction Spending in Chile:

Month	Investor	Quantity in Millions	Share-Size	Transaction Party	Sector	Subsector	Country	Region	BRI	Greenfield
2016 September	Chengdu Tianqi	\$ 210	2%	Sociedad Quimica y Minera	Metals		Chile	South America	1	
2016 November	State Power Investment Corporation	\$ 140			Energy	Alternative	Chile	South America	1	G
2018 January	Southern Power Grid	\$ 1,300	28%	Transelect	Energy		Chile	South America	1	
2018 May	Chengdu Tianqi	\$ 4,070	24%	Nutrien	Metals		Chile	South America	1	
2018 June	Three Gorges	\$ 240	100%	Cornelio Brennan	Energy	Hydro	Chile	South America	1	
2018 November	Legend	\$ 830	94%	Australis Seafoods	Agriculture		Chile	South America	1	
2019 August	Huawei Technologies	\$ 100			Technology	Telecom	Chile	South America	1	G
2019 October	State Grid	\$ 2,280		Semora	Energy		Chile	South America	1	
2020 November	State Grid	\$ 8,080	96%	Naturgy	Energy		Chile	South America	1	
2020 November	Power Construction Corp. (PowerChin	\$ 160			Energy	Hydro	Chile	South America	1	
2021 April	China Railway Construction	\$ 800			Transport	Autos	Chile	South America	1	G
2021 May	China Communications Construction	\$ 220			Health		Chile	South America	1	G
2021 September	Power Construction Corp. (PowerChin	\$ 220		EDF and AME	Energy	Alternative	Chile	South America	1	
2022 February	China Railway Construction	\$ 960			Transport	Rail	Chile	South America	1	
2022 March	State Power Investment Corporation	\$ 300			Energy	Alternative	Chile	South America	1	G
2022 March	China Railway Engineering	\$ 270			Health		Chile	South America	1	G
2022 May	Sinovac	\$ 100			Health		Chile	South America	1	G
		\$ 15,180								

### BRI-related Investment and Construction Spending in Bolivia:

Month	Investor	Quantity in Millions	Share-Size	Transaction Party	Sector	Subsector	Country	Region	BRI	Greenfield
2013 October	China Aerospace Science and Technol	\$ 500		Tupac Katari	Technology	Telecom	Bolivia	South America	1	
2013 October	China National Machinery Industry	\$ 100			Transport	Rail	Bolivia	South America	1	
2014 April	Power Construction Corp. (PowerChin	\$ 110			Transport	Autos	Bolivia	South America	1	
2014 June	Power Construction Corp. (PowerChin	\$ 240		ENDE	Energy	Hydro	Bolivia	South America	1	
2014 August	China Railway Construction	\$ 580			Transport	Autos	Bolivia	South America	1	
2015 July	China National Machinery Industry	\$ 180			Chemicals		Bolivia	South America	1	
2015 September	China Railway Engineering	\$ 250			Transport	Autos	Bolivia	South America	1	
2016 January	Power Construction Corp. (PowerChin	\$ 430			Transport	Autos	Bolivia	South America	1	
2016 April	Beijing Urban Construction	\$ 300			Transport	Aviation	Bolivia	South America	1	
2016 September	Three Gorges	\$ 990			Energy	Hydro	Bolivia	South America	1	
2017 May	Power Construction Corp. (PowerChin	\$ 280			Transport	Autos	Bolivia	South America	1	
2017 August	Power Construction Corp. (PowerChin	\$ 190			Energy	Hydro	Bolivia	South America	1	
2018 February	China Communications Construction	\$ 190			Transport	Autos	Bolivia	South America	1	
2018 March	Sinosteel	\$ 420		El Mutun	Metals	Steel	Bolivia	South America	1	
2018 June	Power Construction Corp. (PowerChin	\$ 110			Utilities		Bolivia	South America	1	
2018 September	China State Construction Engineering	\$ 120			Transport	Autos	Bolivia	South America	1	
2018 October	China National Machinery Industry	\$ 100		Yacimientos de Litio	Chemicals		Bolivia	South America	1	
		\$ 4,800								

# | Does the World Need the United Nations? Analyzing the Organization's Roles, Bodies, and Effectiveness

*Aryan Sharifi*

**Keywords:** *United Nations, international cooperation, international law, multilateralism, peace*

This paper examines the essential question: “Does the world need the United Nations?” amidst increasing scrutiny regarding its effectiveness, cost, and alignment with member state interests. Despite these criticisms and acknowledged limitations, the essay argues that the United Nations (UN) remains indispensable for global order.

The analysis evaluates the effectiveness of the UN's effectiveness by focusing examining on its principal roles and key bodies. It explores how the General Assembly (UNGA) fosters international cooperation by, reducing transaction costs for diplomacy and facilitating agreements, such as the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement, while addressing critiques of its non-binding resolutions. It examines the Security Council's (UNSC) critical function in maintaining international peace and security through tools such as peacekeeping and sanctions, using the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict as a case study and considering the controversy surrounding the veto power. Further, it assesses the International Court of Justice's (ICJ) role in promoting international law by interpreting treaties and settling state disputes, highlighted by the Whaling in the Antarctic case, while contextualizing procedural delays within the constraints of state sovereignty.

The paper concludes that the UN's weaknesses often stem from the inherent challenges of international relations in an anarchic system rather than fatal institutional flaws, affirming its necessary role and emphasizing the importance of continued member- state commitment and funding to for preventing conflict and promoteing global governance.

## *Introduction*

Since its inception in 1945, the United Nations (UN) has been viewed as a bastion of peace. Increasingly, however, many of the UN's member states have been calling its effectiveness into question, especially since it costs 53 billion dollars to maintain (UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination, n.d.). Most notably, the UN's chief financial contributor, the United States (US), faces growing domestic pressure to decrease the amount of taxpayer money going into the organization. Moreover, many (mainly Republican) Americans believe that most UN treaties and policies are not in accordance with US interests. American discontent with the intergovernmental institution materialized during Trump's first term as president (Council on Foreign Relations, 2024). While in power, Donald Trump suspended and cut funding to several UN agencies, including the UN Population Fund, the UN Program on HIV/AIDS, the World Health Organization, and the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees. Additionally, the Trump administration withdrew from the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, UN Human Rights Council and the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement (Daley, 2020; Finoh, 2018). Although Joe Biden's administration reversed most of these decisions, Donald Trump, having been re-elected following the 2024 US presidential election, has once again embarked upon a policy of withdrawal and disengagement not too different from his first term in office.

Political leaders such as Donald Trump claim that the UN, in its current form, is ineffective and constantly underperforms (Rascoe, 2017). Is there truth to such claims? If there is, especially since it is so costly to maintain, does the world really need the United Nations? This paper will evaluate the central bodies and roles of the United Nations, whether it has been successful in fulfilling those roles, and how the political context of the UN's operation affects the

use of its powers. This essay will argue that, despite its weaknesses, the United Nations is necessary because it fosters international cooperation, maintains international peace and security, and promotes international law (United Nations, 2017, 4–5).

## *International Cooperation*

The United Nations is instrumental in fostering international cooperation, and it accomplishes this through the General Assembly (UNGA) (United Nations, 2017, 4–5). Comprised of 193 members, each representing a nation-state, “the General Assembly is the organization’s main deliberative body, addressing a varied and large number of agenda items during its regular three-month session, held from September to December, and in follow-up sessions in succeeding months” (Fasulo, 2021, 84). During these three months, member states vote on a variety of issues ranging from the UN budget itself to humanitarian, economic and security matters (Hanhimäki, 2015, 35). Every country has one vote, and resolutions are passed by a simple majority—except for decisions on “peace and security, admission of new members, and budgetary matters,” which require a two-thirds majority (35).

In this forum, countries have the opportunity to debate key issues in world politics within an established framework of rules, norms and procedures (Weiss & Daws, 2018). This feature of the General Assembly significantly reduces the transaction costs associated with cooperation (Keohane, 1984, 89–90). Transaction costs entail both temporal and financial dimensions. If countries were to conduct negotiations without international regimes such as the UN General Assembly, it would cost them far more than it does now because the Assembly’s established “principles and rules can be applied to a wide variety of particular issues,” making it unnecessary

to renegotiate the basics every time a new problem arises (p. 90). In this way, the United Nations encourages international cooperation.

A pertinent example of the United Nations' vitality in cooperation is the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement. In response to the rising threat of climate change, world leaders banded together and agreed upon a set of measures to combat global warming in the 2015 Paris Conference (Mingst et. al, 2022, 283). Convened by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change at the 21st Conference of the Parties, signatories of the Paris Climate Agreement pledged to keep global warming beneath 2°C, abandon fossil fuels by 2050, preserve forests, set ambitious targets to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and provide updates regarding their progress, and support developing countries in adopting "greener economies" (284). Such a historical accord was only made possible through the UN's diplomatic channels, enabling actors to coordinate their efforts.

A commonly levelled criticism against the General Assembly's resolutions is that their nonbinding characteristics render them useless. Nonbinding resolutions are not legally enforceable, so nation-states can choose not to follow them. The inability to enforce UNGA resolutions is a product of the political context in which states operate, rather than a flaw in the Assembly. Realist International Relations scholarship defines the world as anarchic, since there is no global governing body to enforce laws and punish violators (Weiss & Daws, 2018, 3). In principle, all nation-states should recognize one another as equal and sovereign within the global sphere. Sovereignty grants states the right to self-determination and freedom from external interference. Violation of a nation-state's sovereignty is seen as an act of war (7–9).

Recognizing the importance of this concept in cultivating global peace, the United Nations enshrined the principle of sovereignty within its charter (United Nations, 2017, 4–5).

Accordingly, there is concern that if the majority of the UNGA's resolutions were to become legally binding, it could provoke war, which is the opposite of what the UNGA is meant to do. A lack of enforceability, however, does not render the motions useless, as they carry significant moral weight and norm-setting power (Mingst et. al, 2022, 29). Due to the fact that the United Nations is widely accepted as a legitimate entity, states are expected to comply with UNGA's resolutions, even though they are nonbinding. Those nation-states that go against the rulings risk damaging their reputation in the international community, which can prevent other countries from trusting them as potential future partners. Along these lines, UNGA declarations encourage a norm of compliance that is pivotal to nurturing cooperation.

## *International Peace and Security*

In addition to cultivating international cooperation, the United Nations maintains international peace and security, and the Security Council (UNSC) is the principal proponent of this task. Consisting of fifteen members, five of which are permanent and ten of which are rotating, the Security Council is “charged with making the world a safer, more stable place by preventing or stopping armed conflict among and even within nations” (Fasulo, 2021, 56). To accomplish this goal, the UNSC has various tools at its disposal, such as mediation, ceasefire directives, military observers and peacekeeping forces, economic sanctions, arms embargoes, financial penalties and restrictions, travel bans, severance of diplomatic relations, blockades or even collective military action (United Nations, 2017, 8–9). Unlike decisions passed by the General Assembly, those issued by the Security Council are legally binding (Fasulo, 2021, 57). Of the tools available to the Security Council, ceasefire directives, peacekeeping forces and sanctions are the most effective at creating peace and security because they, “decrease the

duration of international conflicts by mitigating commitment problems” (Shannon et. al, 2010, 1123). Commitment problems arise when, “disputants have an incentive to break an agreement they might reach to end a conflict” (1125). Ceasefire directives, peacekeeping forces and sanctions, “mitigate commitment problems by increasing the costs of continued fighting and enforcing agreements, both of which encourage combatants to cease hostilities and come to the table” (1126); thus, the costs of reneging on an agreement offset the incentives. Since ceasefire directives typically precede more punitive measures, disputants are incentivized to end their hostilities earlier and come to the bargaining table. Once a ceasefire deal is reached, the employment of peacekeeping forces as third-party enforcers assures all sides of the conflict that the ceasefire and subsequent peace agreements will be respected, effectively encouraging disputants to commit to settlements. Sanctions coerce combatants to maintain the peace, as they know they will be punished should they resume hostilities. Hence, the UNSC’s mechanisms promote peace and security by reducing the duration of international conflicts through moderating commitment problems.

The war between Ethiopia and Eritrea demonstrates the Security Council’s critical role in international peace and security. Shortly after Eritrea’s independence from Ethiopia in 1993, the two countries went to war over territorial and economic disputes in 1998 (Lyons, 2009, 167–168). As the humanitarian situation became dire on both sides, the Security Council collaborated with the Organization of African Unity to broker a ceasefire agreement in 2000. Afterwards, the UNSC created the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, a peacekeeping operation tasked with ensuring adherence to the ceasefire deal by both sides (Fasulo, 2021, 136). Although the ceasefire put an end to large-scale warfare, border skirmishes between Ethiopia and Eritrea continued well after the deal. Nevertheless, sanctions and arms

embargoes imposed by the Security Council prevented these skirmishes from escalating into full-blown war (Fasulo, 2021, 136; Lyons, 2009, 169–170). Therefore, the UNSC’s intervention was critical in de-escalating the situation.

One of the significant controversies surrounding the Security Council is its use of the veto. Since the UNSC’s five permanent members (P5)—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia and China—have veto power, they are considered more influential than the ten rotating members, which are elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms (Fasulo, 2021, 59–60). Essentially, the P5 can use their veto to strike down any proposed legislation; for this to happen, only one of the P5 needs to cast a veto. Therefore, even if fourteen of the UNSC’s fifteen constituents vote in favour of a piece of legislation, a single veto can nullify the motion; this has led to concerns that the Security Council does not represent the will of the majority. Contrary to popular belief, however, most of the resolutions originating from the UNSC are not vetoed. From 2014 to 2018, of the 339 resolutions considered, 319 were adopted, while only 20 were vetoed, meaning that the Council approved 94 per cent of the resolutions during this duration (61–62). Also, if a P5 councillor wishes to voice their disapproval of a bill, they can abstain from voting rather than resort to using their veto. On that account, the fears revolving around the Council’s use of the veto are misplaced.

## *International Law*

Another way in which the United Nations is impactful is through its promotion of international law. Instrumental in this development is the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which serves as the UN’s “principal judicial organ” (United Nations, 2017, 233), entrusted with giving “advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by UN organs and agencies” and

settling legal disputes (Fasulo, 2021, 165). Noticeably, the International Court of Justice hears cases solely involving “governments and UN bodies,” not individuals (165). Jurisdiction-wise, the ICJ encompasses member states willing to provide advanced consent; this means that states can choose whether to be bound by the Court’s rulings (Ku, 2018, 195).

Situated in The Hague, the ICJ has proven vital in clarifying and interpreting international law, statutes and treaties. Furthermore, its, “pronouncements are widely perceived as authoritative statements of international law, and are studied closely by other courts and tribunals, legal scholars and advisers to states” (United Nations, 2017, 233). With the ICJ’s assistance, states gain a clear understanding of their rights and responsibilities under international law. These aforementioned functions help raise awareness regarding existing international legal norms and facilitate their implementation by the global community.

A case ruling illustrating the ICJ’s contribution to international law is the *Whaling Decision* (Peel, 2015, 1), which refers to the ICJ’s verdict on the *Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand Intervening)* court case. In this lawsuit, Australia and New Zealand accused Japan of violating the tenets of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW). Under the second phase of the Japanese Whale Research Program under Special Permit in the Antarctic (JARPA II), Japan conducted whaling on a massive scale. JARPA II took advantage of a clause within the ICRW which permits the killing of whales “for purposes of scientific research” (1). An interpretation of this clause was in order, and the ICJ was assigned to it. According to the ICJ’s interpretation, while the program “entails scientific research,” it was not conducted for “the purposes of scientific research” as the clause had outlined (Young, 2015, 65). As a result, the lawsuit concluded in favour of Australia and New Zealand, with the ICJ instructing Japan to, “revoke any extant authorization permit or license granted in relation to

JARPA II, and refrain from granting any further permits in pursuance of that programme” (United Nations, 2017, 234). Japan would subsequently adhere to the Court’s verdict. Here, by interpreting the article, the ICJ not only resolved the dispute between the parties but also established a legal precedent for future proceedings.

Some observers note how proceedings within the International Court of Justice typically take at least four years to conclude (234). Much can happen during this time frame, these observers proclaim, and the Court’s final verdict may no longer be relevant or applicable to present conditions. Although these assertions are accurate, they once more reflect the political context in which the ICJ operates rather than reveal weaknesses inherent in the institution. Just as legally enforcing UNGA resolutions presents challenges, expediting the ICJ’s evaluative procedures proves challenging in a world of sovereign nation-states. The speed at which the hearings proceed largely depends on the party’s willingness to cooperate. As the International Court of Justice cannot compel the parties to cooperate, some hearings take longer to conclude than others.

Nevertheless, the Court is more than capable of issuing swift judgments when those involved decide to collaborate. For instance, “in 1999, it delivered an order for provisional measures 24 hours after an urgent request by Germany in a case against the United States (*LaGrand*) concerning alleged violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in the trial and sentencing for murder of two German nationals. The case itself was dealt with in 28 months” (234). Hence, the length of the ICJ’s proceedings is dependent on the nation-states themselves and is not a product of the Court’s shortcomings.

## *Conclusion*

Ultimately, even with its limitations, the world needs the United Nations, which fosters international cooperation, maintains international peace and security, and promotes international law. Without international cooperation, peace, security and the rule of law, humanity could descend into another world war. As an intergovernmental institution, the United Nations derives its legitimacy from the strength of its members' commitments to the organization. Consequently, it is all the more important for nation-states to commit to protecting this institution and allow its funding to continue.

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*La Théorie et Langue Politique*

# | Revitalisation des langues autochtones: Analyse de la Loi sur les Langues Autochtones (LLA) 2019

*Adria Diallo-Leconte*

**Mots clés:** *Langues autochtones, politiques linguistiques, tradition étatique, contexte constitutif, territorialité dynamique*

L'érosion des langues autochtones au Canada constitue une menace pour la transmission de l'héritage culturel et la survie linguistique des Premiers Peuples. Jusqu'à 2019, les langues autochtones au Canada ne possédaient pas de protection légale ni de reconnaissance de leur statut. La rédaction de la Loi sur les langues autochtones de 2019 s'insère dans ce vide juridique et agit comme un cadre légal pour la protection et la revitalisation des langues autochtones. Pourtant, la loi reste un projet fondé dans des traditions canadiennes en matière de politiques linguistiques qui relèguent les langues autochtones au profit des langues officielles. Cet essai cherche à analyser comment le contexte constitutionnel et la tradition étatique dans laquelle s'insère la loi influencent les recommandations que celle-ci émet. L'étude des politiques linguistiques nous permet d'observer en quoi la promulgation de la loi tente d'actualiser les enjeux de la protection linguistique des langues autochtones. Cet essai utilise un cadre d'analyse centré sur le Principe de la Territorialité Dynamique et les traditions étatiques canadiennes. Il vise à analyser comment les lacunes de la loi, telles que le fédéralisme canadien, la complexité des espaces et l'égalité assumée des statuts des langues, empiètent sur leur revitalisation. Malgré certaines insuffisances conceptuelles, la loi représente toutefois une avancée pour la protection des langues autochtones et introduit une rupture contextuelle dans les traditions étatiques canadiennes en matière de politiques linguistiques.

## *Introduction*

Au Canada, les langues autochtones sont les langues de souche du territoire, pourtant celles-ci font aujourd'hui face à une menace d'érosion importante. Recensant plus de 70 langues autochtones sur son territoire (Statistique Canada, 2021), l'héritage colonial qui marque l'histoire de ces langues, ancré dans la volonté de les assimiler aux langues coloniales, fait que celles-ci sont aujourd'hui, pour la plupart, menacées de disparition.

Toutefois, certaines ruptures étatiques ont permis de réinscrire à l'agenda politique la protection des langues autochtones au XXI<sup>e</sup> siècle, menant, en 2019, à la rédaction de la Loi sur les Langues Autochtones (LLA), une politique linguistique visant à protéger ces langues. On pense notamment au contexte international, et à la Déclaration des Nations Unies sur les droits des peuples autochtones, qui met en avant la nécessité de protéger ces langues. Au Canada, le processus de réconciliation, qui vise à réparer certains torts historiquement commis par le gouvernement canadien depuis sa création en 1867, accéléré par l'arrivée du gouvernement libéral de Trudeau en 2015, a permis de remettre à l'ordre du jour les questions des communautés autochtones. La LLA est donc rédigée en 2019 dans ce contexte de rupture politique et symbolique.

Afin de comprendre la signification de la LLA pour les politiques linguistiques canadiennes et évaluer les avancées qu'elle tente de légiférer, il s'agit d'observer les cadres normatifs et politiques dans lesquels la loi opère. En analysant la LLA dans le cadre théorique de la tradition étatique, ainsi que du principe de la territorialité dynamique, il est possible d'examiner comment le contexte constitutif canadien influence la loi, ainsi que de mettre en lumière les défis conceptuels qui subsistent.

## *Synthèse de la Loi sur les Langues Autochtones*

La Loi sur les langues autochtones, sanctionnée en 2019, peut d'abord être appréhendée en trois parties principales : l'énonciation de ses objectifs, le rôle des acteurs ayant pour but de mettre en place ces objectifs et les moyens par lesquels les acteurs sont incités à les atteindre. L'ensemble de ces éléments relève, de manière générale, à l'aménagement de la politique linguistique sur les langues autochtones.

Les buts et objectifs de la politique linguistique s'inscrivent dans l'esprit de la réconciliation avec les peuples autochtones, en reconnaissant que les pratiques discriminatoires, telles que les pensionnats, ont contribué à l'érosion des langues autochtones. En effet, la loi répond au rapport déposé en 2012 par la Commission de vérité et réconciliation du Canada en particulier au quatorzième appel qui réclame l'adoption d'une loi fédérale sur les langues autochtones (Commission de vérité et réconciliation, 2012). La loi a donc pour but principal de revitaliser les langues autochtones en soutenant la promotion de celles-ci à travers la société canadienne. Comme l'indique l'article 5 de la loi, qui définit son objet, en soutenant la promotion des langues autochtones ainsi que les efforts pour leur insertion notamment dans le milieu politique fédéral, mais aussi dans la société civile, par la promotion d'organismes spécialisés en matière de langues autochtones, et de soutenir leur apprentissage (LLA, 2019, art. 5).

L'objectif de la revitalisation de ces langues peut se référer à un aménagement du statut, dans l'idée que la loi doit permettre de mettre en valeur leur importance pour les communautés autochtones afin d'en assurer la réappropriation, la revitalisation et le maintien.

La loi établit ensuite les principaux acteurs chargés de mettre en place les stratégies et plans de revitalisation des langues. Le Bureau du commissaire aux langues autochtones est l'acteur principal chargé de rédiger les plans et les rapports et de superviser les financements des projets (LLA, 2019, art. 12). Il s'agit d'un organisme indépendant de l'État, non rattaché à la fonction publique fédérale, dirigé par un commissaire nommé sous recommandation du ministre du Patrimoine. Le Bureau collabore avec d'autres acteurs, tels que les gouvernements et corps dirigeants autochtones mentionnés dans la loi, pour déterminer les mesures à prendre afin d'atteindre les objectifs énoncés. Enfin, les institutions fédérales sont aussi considérées comme des acteurs de la loi linguistique selon l'article 10, car elles sont incitées à participer à l'intégration et à la valorisation des langues autochtones dans les institutions et services publics.

Troisièmement, la loi décrit les moyens et aménagements prévus pour parvenir aux objectifs qu'elle énonce, tels que l'aménagement du corpus des langues autochtones, comme indiqué au paragraphe 5(b)(iii), qui a pour but de codifier et de normaliser les lexiques et grammaires de certaines de ces langues en créant des « documents permanents ». Au-delà de cet aménagement du corpus, il est aussi question d'encourager la collaboration entre les différents acteurs de cette loi. En effet, les domaines d'intervention visés sont peu définis ; il s'agit uniquement d'incitations à collaborer entre les gouvernements, comme l'exemple du Bureau du commissaire, qui collabore avec les gouvernements autochtones, mais aussi avec les gouvernements provinciaux et territoriaux.

Chacun de ces éléments fonctionne entre eux pour tenter d'établir des moyens et actions concrètes, qui permettront d'atteindre les objectifs fixés par la loi. D'abord, les aménagements peuvent être interprétés comme des mesures permettant de tracer la voie vers l'atteinte des objectifs de la loi. L'aménagement du code des langues, par exemple, permettrait d'accroître les

capacités de revitalisation en facilitant l'éducation de ces langues, contribuant à l'augmentation du nombre de locuteurs et à la promotion de leur apprentissage (Drapeau et Corbeil 1992, 389).

D'un autre côté, les acteurs désignés par la loi sont responsables de la majorité des développements de ces objectifs ainsi que de la gestion des différents projets visant à soutenir la promotion des langues. La responsabilité de la création de documents permanents ayant pour but la codification des langues, par exemple, est implicitement attribuée au Bureau du commissaire et devrait être mise en place à travers une collaboration entre les acteurs nommés par la loi.

Dans leur ensemble, les différentes parties de la loi se complètent pour tenter d'établir un plan d'action général énonçant les acteurs et les projets pouvant prendre place pour participer à la revitalisation et à la promotion des langues autochtones.

## *Cadre d'analyse*

La loi sur les langues autochtones peut être analysée à travers le principe de territorialité linguistique dynamique (PTLD) et le concept d'espaces, tel que développé par Forgues (2020), ainsi que par le concept de la tradition étatique. Traditionnellement, la territorialité linguistique repose sur l'idée qu'une langue minoritaire nécessite un territoire défini pour assurer sa survie et sa vitalité, sans quoi les langues minoritaires sont vouées à être « étouffées » par les langues dominantes (Laponce, 2001).

Le PTLD s'appuie sur ce constat pour repenser la territorialisation, notamment pour les groupes n'ayant pas accès à un territoire rigidement déterminé, ou dont la communauté n'est pas assez concentrée pour être territorialisée. Le PTLD va au-delà de la simple délimitation d'une langue unique sur un territoire établi, car il tente de prendre en compte les spécificités démographiques et culturelles des groupes aux langues minoritaires. Dans le cas des langues

autochtones, la complexité de territorialiser les langues de manière rigide renforce la conception de la territorialité comme un aspect dynamique. De plus, le territoire pour les langues autochtones possède des portées symboliques puissantes qui doivent être prises en compte lors des discussions sur les langues et leur place sur un territoire. Selon certaines compréhensions du monde, les langues et le territoire sont inséparables et offrent des relations symbiotiques entre les langues et les territoires qui se répercutent sur différents niveaux, mentaux, physiques ou encore spirituels (Chiblow et Meighan 2022, 208). Le territoire devient alors un concept central pour les langues autochtones puisqu'il ne peut pas être dissocié des relations qu'elles entretiennent sur celui-ci.

Dans le contexte canadien, les deux langues officielles, français et anglais, dominent le territoire national linguistique où les langues autochtones sont fragmentées et dispersées sur plusieurs provinces, ce qui rend leur territoire large et peu concentré, comme pour la communauté linguistique micmac qui s'étend de la Nouvelle-Écosse, au Nouveau-Brunswick, à Terre-Neuve, au Québec et au Maine et au Massachusetts (Takam 2013, 40). Le PTLD permet de rassembler les locuteurs sans pour autant établir des frontières rigides autour d'un territoire dont les frontières linguistiques ont été historiquement délimitées par les puissances coloniales depuis la Loi sur les langues officielles de 1969 (LLO, 1969).

Le PTLD a été défini par Nenad Stojanovic dans son étude de la *Loi sur les langues* du canton des Grisons en Suisse, mais il peut être davantage précisé à travers les concepts d'espaces et de complétude institutionnelle proposés par Forgues et ses collègues (2020). L'espace se réfère ici à un ensemble de lieux non territorialisés, qui répondent aux besoins des communautés pour lesquelles ils sont développés. Un espace, au sens large, est formé de différentes institutions visant à répondre aux besoins d'une communauté, qui peuvent être sociales, institutionnelles,

communautaires et peuvent parfois être considérées comme des territoires institutionnels ou numériques (Forgues 2020, 36). Dans le cas des langues autochtones, il pourrait s'agir de la mise en place de programmes scolaires, de stations de radio ou d'organismes communautaires qui permettraient de rassembler les locuteurs de certaines langues entre eux et de raviver leur utilisation. Cela s'inscrit dans la continuité des appels à l'action qui cherchent à implémenter différents lieux et organisations où les langues pourraient être utilisées, permettant l'idée de l'implémentation d'espaces ancrée dans les dynamiques des recommandations autochtones. Le seizième appel, par exemple, recommande la création de programmes et de diplômes postsecondaires en langues autochtones, ce qui permettrait l'utilisation des langues autochtones dans des espaces non territorialisés et rassemblant les locuteurs. Ces nouvelles conceptions du territoire ne répondent pas à une région géographique rigide mais plutôt à des espaces qui, ensemble, forment une collectivité territoriale fonctionnant dans la langue de la minorité qui les revendiquent. De plus, ils peuvent aussi s'ancrer dans une conception immatérielle du territoire grâce à l'idée d'un territoire numérique. À l'ère de la technologie, ce concept permet de créer des lieux de rassemblement pour les communautés, souvent autour de l'organisation et de la création de plateformes numériques ou de réseaux virtuels.

Toutefois, analyser la LLA selon les concepts de territoires dynamiques doit aussi se faire en prenant en compte l'importance de ce que Forgues (2020) nomme la complétude institutionnelle. Ce concept met l'accent sur le fait que la concentration et la multiplicité des institutions, qui offrent divers services, assurent la vitalité d'une minorité linguistique car elles facilitent l'accès et l'utilisation des langues de ces institutions et participent donc au maintien de celle-ci. Selon ces concepts de la territorialité dynamique, l'analyse ne peut se limiter à observer comment la LLA tente de développer des espaces pour les communautés des langues

autochtones minoritaires, mais doit aussi examiner comment ces espaces sont conçus et perçus comme un ensemble visant à revigorer, ou non, les langues autochtones.

Finalement, il est nécessaire d’ancrer une analyse de la LLA dans le concept de tradition étatique, comme cadre théorique, pour comprendre l’importance du PTLD. La tradition étatique, en tant que concept analytique, se réfère à l’analyse reposant sur le postulat de l’autonomie relative de l’État (Cardinal et Sonntag, 2016). Il s’agit de prendre en compte les normes et schémas institutionnels se développant dans le cadre des pratiques étatiques, dans l’analyse de l’élaboration de ses politiques publiques. En outre, le prisme de la tradition étatique, comme cadre d’analyse de la LLA, permet de considérer la manière dont les choix politiques sont réalisés. La tradition fédéraliste canadienne, par exemple, permet de comprendre la coexistence de différentes politiques linguistiques selon les paliers de gouvernement (Cardinal et Sonntag, 2016).

## *Analyse de la Loi sur les Langues Autochtones*

### *Le contexte constitutif des territoires institutionnels*

La rédaction d’une loi linguistique ne peut se faire sans l’application du cadre de la tradition étatique au régime linguistique décrit dans la loi. Le cadre d’analyse proposé par Albaugh et ses collègues (2024) permet de mettre en avant la façon dont le contexte constitutif des politiques linguistiques d’un gouvernement influence les politiques publiques (Albaugh et al 2024, 12). Dans cet esprit, le cadre normatif de la loi, concernant les mesures de développement institutionnelles, s’ancre dans le contexte constitutif des traditions étatiques canadiennes, qui favorisent l’aménagement des langues coloniales, le français et l’anglais, à travers la construction d’institutions et d’espaces.

Ces résultats politiques prennent place dans le contexte qui mène d'abord aux premières versions de la Loi sur les langues officielles (LLO) en 1969, et mettent ainsi en avant les principes normatifs qui guident les actions étatiques canadiennes en matière de langues minoritaires. L'aménagement du statut du français, ainsi que le développement de celui-ci au sein des institutions fédérales, dans le but d'atteindre une égalité réelle avec l'anglais, s'inscrivent dans le contexte du compromis des langues officielles coloniales et peuvent être perçus comme les principes normatifs qui guident les politiques linguistiques canadiennes. Ces principes normatifs, avec le temps, sont adoptés par les pratiques institutionnelles et ainsi dirigent les régimes linguistiques reflétant les pratiques et les conceptions du langage de l'État et de ses populations (Albaugh et al 2024, 13). Il faut ainsi comprendre l'émergence de la LLA, et son inclination vers une territorialité dynamique des langues autochtones, comme étant insérés dans le contexte constitutif plus large qui forme la tradition étatique canadienne en matière de politique linguistique. Les recours aux espaces, incités dans la LLO, agissent comme un paramètre institutionnel qui contraint la LLA à suivre cette même logique. Ainsi, la LLA s'inscrit dans une continuité étatique qui vise à assurer le développement des politiques linguistiques selon des principes de territorialité dynamique, ancrés dans les principes normatifs des politiques canadiennes et fondés sur une tradition étatique héritée du contexte constitutif des langues officielles.

Cela pose toutefois différentes questions quant à la capacité de développer des contextes et cadres de protection des langues autochtones en se basant sur des concepts et des pratiques implantés par des puissances coloniales. En effet, si les logiques des traditions étatiques canadiennes sont ancrées dans les pratiques politiques occidentales, leurs applications concrètes aux langues autochtones, telles qu'une reconnaissance au niveau fédéral, risquent de reproduire

des catégories conceptuelles propres à l'État tel qu'il est compris par les logiques occidentales et coloniales. Cela questionne donc la validité et la pertinence d'essayer de catégoriser les langues autochtones et les dynamiques actuelles en utilisant des cadres empruntés aux logiques coloniales pour répondre aux besoins des communautés autochtones canadiennes.

### *Problèmes conceptuels de la LLA dans les perspectives de la tradition étatique et du PTLD*

#### *Aspect préliminaire de la LLA*

Malgré ce contexte constitutif, la LLA se présente comme une loi que l'on peut encore considérer comme préliminaire, ancrée dans les fondements normatifs, de la réconciliation et de la hausse des demandes des communautés linguistiques minoritaires dans lequel elle émerge. Comparée aux avancées de la LLO, qui a été revue cinq fois, la LLA de 2019 est une première version tentant d'aménager le statut des langues autochtones et d'établir un cadre pour assurer leur vitalité et leur promotion dans la vie quotidienne et culturelle canadienne. L'aspect préliminaire de la loi, ainsi que le contexte normatif dans lequel elle est érigée, présentent plusieurs points de discordance conceptuels qui peuvent entraver la capacité de la loi à atteindre les objectifs qu'elle établit.

Premièrement, d'un point de vue linguistique, la LLA reste un document peu contraignant, écrit dans un langage incitateur plutôt que rigide. L'utilisation de verbes comme « pouvoir faire », ou des tournures rendant les actions non-obligatoires, telles que « s'il en a la capacité », ainsi que le manque de précision des mesures recommandées dans la loi, peuvent entraver la mise en place de mécanismes de protection des langues (LLA 2019, 10.1). Cela laisse une marge d'interprétation aux acteurs et peut retarder le développement des services que la loi

cherche à promouvoir, notamment en raison de l'absence de mécanismes de contrôle s'assurant de l'application des recommandations de la loi.

Ces limites quant à l'interprétation de la loi semblent ainsi bénéficier aux pouvoirs gouvernementaux au détriment des capacités des peuples autochtones à agir directement. En effet, cela permet aux autorités fédérales d'agir de manière discrétionnaire en ce qui concerne les actions concrètes pouvant être entreprises.. La loi ne rend aucune action obligatoire notamment l'intégration de services en langues autochtones (LLA 2019, art. 10.1), ce qui peut, à long terme, limiter leur insertion dans les pratiques politiques canadiennes. Le manque de coercition présent dans la LLA peut ainsi reproduire des logiques assimilatrices et continuer à invisibiliser les langues autochtones, en particulier au sein des fonctions publiques et des services fédéraux, en ne reconnaissant aucune obligation de les intégrer et de les promouvoir dans les contextes politiques canadiens. Cela donne un aspect symbolique à la loi, sans pour autant garantir que ces recommandations puissent avoir un impact tangible.

### *Enjeux du fédéralisme.*

Le contexte constitutif du Canada repose sur les compromis entre les langues coloniales en mettant à l'écart les langues autochtones, dont les politiques visaient l'assimilation, jusqu'au contexte politique de la réconciliation. Le fédéralisme canadien, dans lequel la loi prend forme, s'inscrit dans cette tradition du compromis, ce qui restreint les capacités de redistribution des pouvoirs législatifs qui permettraient aux populations autochtones de s'autogouverner et de mettre en œuvre les services dont elles ont besoin pour assurer la vitalité de leurs langues. Selon Huron, cette dynamique implique que la redistribution de l'autorité fédérale, en matière de gestion linguistique, se fait au niveau provincial sans coordination, créant une confusion

juridique et politique quant aux responsabilités des institutions provinciales en matière de législation des langues autochtones (Huron 2024, 218). Cette situation peut notamment se traduire par des difficultés à acquérir les fonds nécessaires au développement de services, par exemple des programmes scolaires ou des centres culturels. En conséquence, cette limite inhérente au fédéralisme canadien et à la tradition étatique complexifie l'application de la LLA, notamment au niveau des pouvoirs provinciaux. La loi s'insère dans un contexte constitutif qui ne lui est pas favorable, dont la tradition n'établit pas de ligne directrice qui faciliterait les transferts de pouvoirs, d'investissement et de services du niveau fédéral au provincial, pour enfin servir les communautés autochtones. Le fédéralisme peut donc apparaître comme un frein à la reconnaissance et à l'habilitation des langues autochtones et leurs locuteurs dans le cadre de l'application de la LLA, puisqu'il entrave l'organisation des ressources budgétaires, des acteurs concernés et des services qui cherchent à revitaliser et protéger les langues autochtones.

De plus, selon le cadre théorique du PTLTD, la LLA se présente comme un outil normatif visant à mettre de l'avant les besoins politiques pour la revitalisation des langues autochtones. Les dispositions institutionnelles dominent les recommandations formulées dans la loi, lesquelles cherchent à développer différentes institutions qui permettraient d'assurer la vitalité de ces langues. Il est ainsi possible de concevoir la loi comme une tentative d'établir un cadre permettant aux langues autochtones d'atteindre une certaine institutionnalisation des langues grâce au développement d'espaces répondant à une pluralité de besoins.

La section 5, qui énonce les objets de la loi, exprime cette volonté d'encourager les programmes éducatifs, notamment par le soutien à des activités d'apprentissage linguistique et culturel (LLA 2019, art. 5). Dans une conception territoriale dynamique, ces recommandations

normatives doivent être envisagées comme permettant aux langues autochtones d'être utilisées dans divers secteurs afin d'en assurer la vitalité.

La section 10 de la LLA met également en avant cette volonté de développer des services institutionnels en langues autochtones, en incitant les institutions fédérales à répondre à ce besoin lorsqu'elles en ont la capacité (LLA 2019, art. 10.1). Cela renvoie à la volonté d'aménager le statut des langues autochtones en les érigeant au stade de langues institutionnelles fédérales, un objectif qui ne peut toutefois être obtenu que par le développement d'espaces, au sein des institutions fédérales, facilitant le recours des populations aux langues autochtones.

Les espaces, désignant les collectivités dans leur ensemble, cherchent donc à inciter une utilisation formelle ou informelle des langues minoritaires en offrant une multitude de différents services culturels, sociaux et politiques. Cette démarche cherche à normaliser l'usage des langues autochtones, surtout dans la vie quotidienne, et à renforcer une perception positive de ces langues auprès des populations canadiennes, ce qui contribue à légitimer le rôle de ces langues pour le Canada et de ses différentes cultures.

### ***Complexité du développement d'espace.***

Une autre issue de la LLA réside dans le fait que le développement d'espaces, conçus comme des territoires non rigides, vise à répondre à une répartition non concentrée des populations autochtones, laquelle empêche une territorialité au sens strict du terme. En effet, pour assurer sa vitalité et son maintien, toute langue nécessite des espaces lui permettant d'être utilisée de différentes manières; ces espaces permettraient de diversifier les usages quotidiennes des langues autochtones, que ce soit dans des écoles, des commerces ou des services publics.

Pourtant, bien que la LLA encourage une institutionnalisation des langues et la création de services, elle n'incite aucunement à une complétude institutionnelle qui permettrait de garantir la survie des langues autochtones. La LLA ne prescrit en effet aucune recommandation quant au nombre d'institutions à mettre en place ni au type d'institutions à développer. Les espaces étant d'autant plus compliqués à instaurer si les populations concernées se répandent de manière sporadique sur de vastes territoires, l'absence de complétude institutionnelle risque de ne pas assurer une utilisation concrète des langues dans divers contextes, mais plutôt de les réduire à quelques situations limitées, ce qui contraindrait une revitalisation complète des langues. Par exemple, si une province décidait de mettre en place des programmes d'immersion dans certaines langues autochtones sur des territoires précis sans développer d'autres espaces utilisant les langues autochtones en dehors du milieu scolaire, cela pourrait avoir comme effet de réduire les langues à un seul contexte scolaire sans permettre leur utilisation dans des situations variées.


Les populations autochtones sont de plus en plus dispersées au Canada, de sorte que le manque de concentration des différentes communautés complexifie le développement d'une panoplie d'institutions visant à répondre à des besoins variés. Certaines langues sont réparties sur plus de trois provinces, parfois même à l'échelle de l'entièreté du territoire, ce qui, compte tenu du manque de coordination interprovinciale et du concept de complétude institutionnelle, complexifie largement la possibilité de développer des institutions, notamment en matière d'éducation.

En effet, la conception de programmes d'immersion ne peut se faire qu'en fonction de la population locutrice présente dans les régions concernées ; en l'absence d'un nombre de locuteurs, la mise en place de programmes scolaires semble impossible puisque ceux-ci risqueraient de ne pas être utilisés. Les espaces fonctionnants autour de la complétude qu'ils

exercer, la dispersion des communautés autochtones ralentit la capacité de développer les espaces nécessaires et condamne, en quelque sorte, les langues autochtones à être moins utilisées car le nombre d'institutions les promouvant demeurant restreint.

**Figure 1**

*Subdivisions de recensement avec au moins 100 personnes qui parlent une langue autochtone assez bien pour tenir une conversation, (Statistique Canada, 2021)*



Le concept d'espace ne se limite toutefois pas aux institutions concrètes et physiques. Pour faire face à l'enjeu de la dispersion des communautés, il est possible d'envisager le développement d'espaces numériques, tels que des cours de langues en ligne, des sites culturels ou d'autre plateformes, qui permettrait aux populations de faire usage de leur langue et de se rassembler afin de contrer les effets de cette dispersion.

### **Égalité formelle des langues autochtones.**

Finalement, la LLA ne fait pas de distinction entre les différentes langues autochtones qu'elle vise à protéger et à promouvoir, et fait usage de la terminologie générique de « langue autochtone » sans nécessairement évoquer les nuances qui existent au sein de ces langues et communautés. En reprenant le concept du « je t'aime, je t'étouffe » de Laponce, qui décrit la manière dont les langues dominantes langues minoritaires lorsqu'elles cohabitent sur un même territoire (Laponce 2001, 485), il est possible de concevoir une telle dynamique au sein des différentes langues autochtones. La loi omet en effet de faire la distinction entre les langues que l'on peut considérer comme stables, dont le nombre de locuteurs permet d'assumer le maintien comme c'est le cas du cree, de l'inuktitut et de l'ojibwé qui possèdent chacune plus de 20 000 locuteurs, et les langues qui possèdent parfois de moins d'un millier de locuteurs, comme le kutenai, qui n'est aujourd'hui parlée que par 170 personnes (Radio-Canada, 2018). Cette absence de distinction pose un problème d'universalisation des langues et démontre une logique égalité formelle assumée entre celles-ci, sans prise en compte des besoins différenciés des communautés. On peut imaginer que certaines langues en voie d'érosion n'ont peut-être pas la même volonté d'institutionnaliser leur langue dans les institutions politiques que des langues comme l'inuktitut qui a été officialisé au Nunavut. Ainsi, en englobant les langues autochtones sous une terminologie ne faisant pas les distinctions nécessaires, la LLA assure en quelque sorte la vitalité des langues stables, mais peut compromettre la survie de langues minoritaires au sein du groupe qu'elle homogénéise.

## *Conclusion*

La Loi sur les langues autochtones représente finalement une avancée conséquente pour la protection des langues minoritaires au Canada. On peut l'appréhender comme une rupture contextuelle qui permet, dans le sillage de la réconciliation, de mettre en avant les droits des peuples autochtones du Canada, au-delà de la tradition du bilinguisme qui fondait jusqu'alors les politiques linguistiques canadiennes. Bien que la loi soit encore assez préliminaire, ses objectifs et ses modes d'action qui cherchent à protéger les langues autochtones, notamment en matière de revitalisation et d'habilitation, offrent une nouvelle perspective sur le développement des politiques de protection des langues minoritaires. Ancrée dans le contexte constitutif de la tradition étatique canadienne, la LLA suit toutefois les chemins institutionnels normatifs en matière de politiques linguistiques.

Une analyse de celle-ci selon le principe de la territorialité dynamique et de la tradition étatique met donc en lumière les façons dont les régimes linguistiques influencent les actions politiques, notamment les choix d'institutionnalisation des langues et le développement d'espaces. Cela présente également comment ces traditions peuvent restreindre le chemin vers une protection et une égalité réelle des langues. Le manque de nuance dans la catégorisation des langues, l'absence de distinction entre leurs statuts respectifs, mais aussi le contexte géographique de ces langues ne sont pas forcément pris en compte et agissent comme des facteurs pouvant ralentir la revitalisation et le maintien de ces langues.

En soi, malgré les avancées pertinentes de la LLA, certains de ses principes demeurent à approfondir afin d'assurer l'atteinte de ses objectifs. Il est possible d'assumer que cette loi est encore à un stade préliminaire et que des révisions permettront, avec le temps, de codifier

différents aspects et spécificités des langues autochtones pour permettre de se diriger vers une égalité réelle de ses langues et une protection pérenne au sein des sociétés canadiennes.

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*La Théorie et Langue Politique*

# | Égalité, exclusion et logique du capital: La critique de Marx des droits libéraux dans le sillage de la Révolution française

*Sophia Nguyen*

Cet article propose une reconstruction critique de la théorie marxienne de l'égalité, en situant son intervention dans la rupture juridico-politique inaugurée par la Révolution française. Si la Révolution a aboli les privilèges féodaux sous la bannière des droits universels, elle a simultanément réinscrit la domination dans une forme nouvelle : l'intronisation du sujet bourgeois comme porteur juridique de la « liberté », de « l'égalité » et de la « propriété ». À travers une relecture de *Sur la Question juive*, du *Capital* et de la *Critique du programme de Gotha*, l'article montre comment les « droits de l'homme » apparaissent comme une théologie sécularisée de l'individualisme possessif, transformant l'inégalité structurelle en équivalence juridique.

Sur le plan méthodologique, cet article repose sur une analyse textuelle approfondie des écrits de Marx et sur une critique comparative des théories libérales et contemporaines. Afin de mieux situer la pensée marxiste dans son contexte historique et théorique, de nombreuses théories sont également comparées et mises en contraste.

L'analyse met Marx en dialogue avec Locke, Rousseau, Tocqueville, Rawls, Losurdo et les théoriciens critiques contemporains afin de montrer que l'égalité libérale n'est pas une transcendance, mais une technologie de domination. La théorie de la plus-value y occupe une place centrale : l'exploitation n'est pas une pathologie du capitalisme, mais son fonctionnement normal, rendu invisible par le discours des droits. Enfin, l'article explore les exclusions persistantes — genrées, raciales, et coloniales — comme des dimensions constitutives du libéralisme, et conclut que Marx ne rejette pas l'égalité mais la radicalise : l'émancipation n'est pas la perfection du droit bourgeois, mais son abolition, ouvrant l'horizon d'une socialité libérée de la marchandise et du salariat.

## *Introduction: La ruse bourgeoise de l'égalité*

La Révolution française, tout en abolissant les privilèges aristocratiques et en déclarant les droits universels de l'homme, a jeté les bases juridiques et idéologiques d'une société structurée autour du travail salarié, de la propriété privée et de la domination de classe. Ce qui a émergé dans son sillage, comme l'a diagnostiqué Karl Marx avec une clarté chirurgicale, n'était pas l'émancipation de l'homme dans sa totalité humaine. L'intronisation de « l'homme égoïste », dépouillé de ses liens communautaires et reconstitué en tant que sujet juridique de l'échange, ne constituait pas une libération égalitaire. En outre, la Révolution transfigure le pouvoir de classe en forme juridique : le droit bourgeois supprime le droit féodal, et l'égalité bourgeoise se substitue au privilège nobiliaire. Néanmoins, l'exclusion persiste, maintenant obscurcie sous le signe de l'inclusion.

Cet essai entreprend une reconstruction critique de la théorie de Marx sur l'égalité formelle et des droits libéraux, telle qu'elle est notamment articulée dans *Sur la question juive*, *Le Capital* et la *Critique du programme de Gotha*. En retraçant la fonction idéologique de « l'égalité » telle qu'elle est mobilisée dans la pensée libérale, je place Marx en dialogue non seulement avec Rousseau et Locke — les architectes du discours des Lumières sur les droits — mais aussi avec Tocqueville, Rawls, Losurdo et les études marxistes contemporaines. L'argumentation se déroule en trois étapes : premièrement, elle situe la critique de Marx dans le cadre de la rupture historique de la Révolution française ; deuxièmement, elle analyse les limites idéologiques et structurelles de l'égalité libérale ; et troisièmement, elle développe la conception alternative de Marx de l'émancipation en tant qu'abolition, et non perfection, du droit bourgeois.

## *1. La ruse historique: Du privilège féodal à l'égalité bourgeoise*

La Révolution française n'a pas marqué l'avènement d'un ordre social véritablement égalitaire, mais plutôt la réarticulation de la domination à travers le langage abstrait des droits. Dans *Sur la question juive* (1843), sa première critique de l'émancipation libérale, Marx affirme que les soi-disant « droits de l'homme » constituent une théologie sécularisée du sujet bourgeois : la « liberté » devient la liberté de propriété ; « l'égalité » devient l'équivalent devant la loi ; la « sécurité » devient la protection de l'individu intéressé.

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Jean-Jacques Rousseau avait eu l'intuition de ce danger des décennies plus tôt. Dans son *Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes*(1755), Rousseau avertissait que la propriété privée institutionnalise l'inégalité sous couvert de liberté : « Le premier homme qui, ayant enclos un terrain, s'avisa de dire : « Ceci est à moi », et trouva des gens assez simples pour le croire, fut le véritable fondateur de la société civile. » Alors que Rousseau pensait qu'une république juste pouvait atténuer cette tendance grâce à la volonté générale, Marx considérait que de telles tentatives étaient, en fin de compte, futiles dans le cadre d'une base économique capitaliste.

Ainsi, la Révolution n'a pas éliminé l'exclusion, elle lui a simplement donné un nouveau masque. Comme l'écrit Losurdo (2011), le libéralisme « a émancipé le citoyen blanc, mâle et propriétaire en excluant de la sphère politique les esclaves, les travailleurs, les femmes et les peuples colonisés ». La critique de Marx vise précisément ce noyau idéologique.

## 2. L'idéologie de l'égalité

Selon Marx, l'égalité bourgeoise n'est pas un principe juridique neutre, mais une forme sociale qui reflète et reproduit la logique du capital. Comme il l'écrit dans *La Critique du programme de Gotha* (1875), « le droit, par sa nature même, ne peut consister qu'en l'application d'une norme égale ». En d'autres termes, le droit présuppose toujours une mesure commune, une règle formelle censée s'appliquer à tous sans distinction.

Cette contradiction est mise à nu dans *Le Capital* (1890), où Marx déconstruit la fiction libérale du « travailleur libre ». Dans la sphère de l'échange, le travailleur apparaît comme l'égal du capitaliste : le salaire est le prix convenu de la force de travail. Mais dans le domaine caché de la production, la logique est inversée : le travailleur produit plus de valeur qu'il n'en reçoit, et cette plus-value est expropriée par le capital. Marx écrit avec une ironie cinglante : « Cette sphère... est en fait le véritable Eden des droits humains innés. C'est seulement ici que règnent la liberté, l'égalité, la propriété et Bentham. » La loi sanctifie cette relation précisément en dissimulant sa structure coercitive.

John Locke, dont le *Traité du gouvernement civil* est à la base de la théorie libérale de la propriété, fournit le cadre philosophique de cette illusion. Locke définit la propriété comme le fruit du travail individuel, mais sa théorie présuppose à la fois l'enclosure des terres communes et

l'existence du travail salarié. Marx renverse ainsi Locke : au lieu que le travail engendre la propriété, c'est la propriété qui aliène le travail.

Même la tentative de John Rawls, à la fin du XXe siècle, de créer un cadre plus équitable met en évidence la pertinence de la critique idéologique de Marx. Les œuvres de Rawls, et en particulier la *Théorie de la justice*, n'échappent pas à cette logique. Son « principe de différence », selon lequel l'inégalité est justifiable si elle profite aux individus les plus défavorisés, repose ironiquement sur le cadre même de la propriété privée et du travail salarié que Marx critique. En acceptant comme acquis la légitimité du capital et des relations de marché, Rawls limite la justice à la distribution au sein du capitalisme. Cependant, il ne remet pas en question l'inégalité générale ni les mécanismes structurels dont elle découle. Comme le soutient Cohen dans *Rescuing Justice and Equality* (2008), Rawls présuppose la propriété privée et exclut ainsi toute critique de la structure capitaliste. Marx, en revanche, insiste sur le fait que l'égalité doit être structurelle et non distributive.

### ***3. De l'émancipation politique à l'émancipation humaine: L'égalité révolutionnaire de Marx***

Si les droits libéraux sont des formes idéologiques qui masquent la domination de classe, alors le dépassement du capitalisme ne peut pas simplement étendre ces droits — il doit les nier. Comme l'écrit Marx dans *l'Idéologie allemande* (1846), « le communisme n'est pas pour nous un état de choses... à établir », mais plutôt « le mouvement réel qui abolit l'état actuel des choses ». L'émancipation n'est pas la perfection de l'égalité libérale, mais sa transcendance.

Il ne s'agit pas seulement de redistribuer les richesses, mais d'abolir la forme marchande elle-même, c'est-à-dire la logique selon laquelle le travail, la vie et même le temps deviennent des biens à vendre. Cela exige également la socialisation de la production, dans laquelle les moyens de vie sont contrôlés collectivement. L'égalité n'est plus ici une équivalence juridique, mais la condition communautaire de la liberté. Le célèbre dicton, « De chacun selon ses capacités, à chacun selon ses besoins », n'est pas une formule utopique, mais l'antithèse logique de l'échange marchand.

Le marxisme féministe de Silvia Federici approfondit ce point. Dans *Caliban et la sorcière* (2004), elle démontre comment l'ordre capitaliste a exigé l'expropriation violente non seulement des paysans de la terre, mais aussi des femmes de la sphère de l'autonomie reproductive. Ainsi, l'égalité dans le capitalisme est toujours fondée sur des exclusions fondamentales : du travail, du genre, de la race et de la colonie.

William Clare Roberts, dans *Marx's Inferno*, recadre *le Capital* comme une œuvre de théorie politique : pour Marx, le problème central n'est pas l'inégalité en soi, mais la domination. L'abolition des formes sociales capitalistes devient ainsi la condition préalable à toute réalisation significative de la liberté humaine.

#### ***4. Travail, plus-value et structure de l'exploitation***

La pierre angulaire théorique de la critique mature de Marx des inégalités capitalistes est sa théorie de la plus-value, développée de manière exhaustive dans *Le Capital*, tome I, et préfigurée dans les *Grundrisse* (1993). Cette théorie marque une rupture décisive avec les

conceptions moralistes ou volontaristes de l'exploitation. Pour Marx, l'exploitation capitaliste n'est pas le produit d'une manipulation juridique ou de personnes malveillantes, mais une caractéristique structurelle d'un système dans lequel la force de travail est transformée en marchandise. Plus important encore, Marx ne présente pas la relation salariale comme une véritable forme de vol. Cependant, il est important de noter que l'échange entre le travailleur et le capitaliste est, en quelque sorte, « égal » dans la logique de l'échange de marchandises. Ce qui rend l'exploitation possible, c'est la nature inhabituelle de la force de travail en tant que marchandise : sa valeur d'usage pour le capitaliste est qu'elle peut produire plus de valeur que le coût de sa reproduction.

Il s'agit là d'une différence fondamentale entre la vente de travail et la vente de la force de travail. Le travailleur ne vend pas le produit de son travail, mais sa capacité à travailler pendant une certaine période. Comme Marx le dit succinctement, « la valeur de la force de travail est déterminée par la valeur des produits nécessaires à la production, au développement, au maintien et à la perpétuation de la force de travail » (Marx 1990, I.6). En d'autres termes, lorsque cette force de travail est appliquée à la production, elle génère plus de valeur que le salaire réel versé au travailleur. Elle crée ainsi une plus-value que le capitaliste exproprie sous forme de profit. L'exploitation est donc inhérente au mode de production capitaliste. Cet exemple montre que l'exploitation ne nécessite pas de contrats inégaux ou d'employeurs immoraux.

La critique de Marx n'est pas seulement une analyse économique, mais aussi une analyse profondément ontologique. Ses catégories remettent en question les conditions mêmes dans lesquelles l'activité humaine est aliénée, réifiée et instrumentalisée sous le capitalisme. Dans les formes de vie précapitalistes, le travail pouvait encore être vécu comme un moyen de réalisation de soi. Il s'agissait essentiellement d'un moyen pour les individus d'extérioriser leurs capacités et

de trouver une reconnaissance dans leur activité. Marx fait ici écho à la notion hégélienne d'aliénation, selon laquelle l'aliénation est au cœur de la condition humaine, ce que Marx intensifie. Cependant, alors que Hegel envisage la réconciliation par la conscience de soi et l'État, Marx situe la possibilité de transcendance dans une transformation des relations matérielles de production.

De plus, la genèse historique de cette forme est révélée dans le récit de Marx consacré à ce qu'il appelle « l'accumulation primitive ». Contre la fiction des économistes classiques d'une formation pacifique du marché, Marx raconte l'histoire d'une expropriation violente : l'enclosure des communs, la séparation forcée des paysans de leurs moyens de subsistance et l'expropriation coloniale de peuples entiers. Le capital « est couvert de la tête aux pieds, de tous ses pores, de sang et de saleté » (Marx 1990, I.31). Cette violence passée n'est pas un prélude au capitalisme, mais une condition permanente de son existence, révélant l'égalité juridique de la société marchande comme une légitimation rétrospective de la conquête.

Dans ces conditions, le discours libéral sur l'égalité est structurellement incapable de rendre compte de la genèse et de la reproduction de la domination capitaliste. La critique économique de Marx ne révèle pas l'inégalité dans la distribution ; en fait, elle met au jour la violence ontologique inscrite dans le processus même de création de valeur. L'abstraction du travail, le formalisme des droits et la séparation entre l'économique et le politique ne sont pas des caractéristiques neutres de la modernité, mais des formes idéologiques constitutives.

## 5. *Au-delà de la justice distributive: transcender la forme marchande*

Supposons que la critique de l'exploitation réside dans le mode de production capitaliste. Cela signifie que toute théorie de l'égalité dans ce cadre qui se limite à la redistribution est intrinsèquement insuffisante. Dans la *Critique du programme de Gotha*, Marx critique la tendance sociale-démocrate à corriger les résultats du capitalisme sans en remettre en question les fondements. Il écrit : « La loi, par sa nature même, ne peut consister qu'en l'application d'une norme égale ; mais des individus inégaux (et ils ne seraient pas des individus différents s'ils n'étaient pas inégaux) ne peuvent être mesurés par une norme égale que dans la mesure où ils sont placés sur un pied d'égalité » (Marx 1978, partie I). Le point soulevé ici est dévastateur. Même les systèmes « équitables » mesurés en fonction du temps de travail impliquent toujours l'inégalité des capacités individuelles. Essentiellement, ils ignorent l'aliénation plus profonde enracinée dans les relations sociales de production.

Le problème n'est pas de distribuer le produit social de manière plus équitable, mais de surmonter le système qui fait de l'activité humaine un véhicule pour le capital . La vision radicale de l'égalité de Marx est indissociable de l'abolition de la forme marchande et de la dissolution du travail salarié en tant que principe fondamental de la vie sociale. Le travail doit cesser d'être une marchandise pour que l'égalité devienne réelle. Il ne s'agit pas simplement d'une exigence économique, mais d'une transformation de l'ontologie sociale. Comme le note William Clare Roberts dans *Marx's Inferno* (2017), la critique de Marx n'est pas une contribution à la tradition de la justice distributive. Il s'agit d'une attaque en règle contre les cadres moraux et institutionnels qui soutiennent l'ordre capitaliste.

Cet engagement distingue Marx des égalitaristes libéraux et des socialistes utopistes. Alors que les premiers cherchent à garantir des conditions plus équitables au sein du marché, les seconds imaginent des alternatives coopératives sans les fonder sur une critique du capital. Marx, quant à lui, insiste sur une explication matérialiste et historique de la manière dont les relations sociales produisent la domination. Il ne s'agit pas d'un appel moraliste à l'« égalité », mais d'un diagnostic scientifique des mécanismes par lesquels la société capitaliste reproduit la hiérarchie sous le couvert de la neutralité.

De plus, la transition envisagée par Marx n'est pas la standardisation de tous les individus, mais l'organisation sociale du travail de manière à ce que les capacités et les besoins individuels puissent être satisfaits sans la médiation de la valeur. « De chacun selon ses capacités, à chacun selon ses besoins » n'est pas une maxime éthique, mais une formule pour un nouveau mode d'existence sociale, dans lequel le développement humain est libéré des impératifs du capital et de la concurrence.

## *6. Vers une critique matérialiste des droits et des horizons de l'émancipation*

La critique matérialiste de l'égalité par Marx trouve un écho supplémentaire lorsqu'elle est appliquée à la fonction des droits juridiques dans la société capitaliste. Dans *La question juive*, Marx fait la distinction entre l'émancipation politique, l'égalité devant la loi, et l'émancipation humaine, qui implique la réorganisation de la vie matérielle. Alors que la première est compatible avec une profonde inégalité structurelle, la seconde nécessite l'abolition

de la propriété privée en tant que principe d'organisation sociale. Pour Marx, les « droits de l'homme » ne sont pas des idéaux universels, mais des expressions historiquement spécifiques des intérêts bourgeois. Comme il l'écrit, « aucun des soi-disant droits de l'homme [...] ne dépasse l'homme égoïste, l'homme en tant que membre de la société civile, c'est-à-dire un individu replié sur lui-même, dans les limites de ses intérêts et de ses désirs privés » (Marx 1978).

L'égalité juridique ne constitue pas une transcendance de la domination, mais un mécanisme de reproduction de celle-ci. La loi traite les individus comme égaux en faisant abstraction des conditions mêmes qui les rendent inégaux : la propriété, le travail, la classe. Cette idée a des implications profondes pour la théorie juridique contemporaine, en particulier dans sa critique du formalisme. Des théoriciens juridiques critiques tels que Duncan Kennedy (1976) et Roberto Unger (1986) ont prolongé l'analyse de Marx. Ils ont montré comment la neutralité apparente des règles juridiques masque et perpétue les relations de domination. La forme juridique n'est pas un outil externe, mais une composante intégrante de la totalité capitaliste.

En outre, la distinction opérée par Marx entre émancipation politique et émancipation humaine anticipe les critiques ultérieures de l'incapacité du libéralisme à combattre les formes structurelles d'injustice. De la remise en question des « droits » coloniaux par Frantz Fanon à la critique de la division du travail selon le genre par Silvia Federici, la méthode matérialiste reste génératrice. L'égalité juridique des citoyens dans les régimes postcoloniaux masque souvent des mécanismes permanents de dépendance économique, d'endettement et de contrôle impérial. Cela fait écho à l'affirmation de Marx selon laquelle les droits politiques sans transformation sociale équivalent à une mystification idéologique.

Les implications normatives de la pensée de Marx ne peuvent être comprises indépendamment de son analyse économique. Pour Marx, l'égalité n'est pas une norme distributive à atteindre dans le cadre des structures existantes, mais un projet politique qui n'émerge qu'à travers la transformation de ces structures. Réifier les droits comme des fins en soi revient à confondre la surface avec la substance, l'apparence avec l'essence. L'émancipation humaine implique la création d'une forme de vie dans laquelle les droits ne sont pas nécessaires pour protéger les individus les uns des autres.

## *7. L'endurance de l'exclusion structurelle: Race, genre et frontières de l'égalité bourgeoise*

L'analyse critique de Marx sur l'égalité libérale semble aujourd'hui d'autant plus prophétique que l'universalité formelle s'est invariablement accompagnée de profondes exclusions structurelles selon des axes raciaux, genrés et coloniaux. Comme Marx lui-même s'en est finalement rendu compte, le sujet supposé « universel » détenteur de droits était en réalité un citoyen blanc, mâle et détenteur de biens — une idée richement explicitée par les théoriciens critiques qui ont suivi. Carole Pateman, dans *The Sexual Contract* (1988), montre comment le contrat social libéral a créé une division sexuée de la citoyenneté, inscrivant la subordination des femmes au cœur même de la société civile. La sphère publique des droits et de la participation politique a été construite par la construction concomitante d'une sphère privée dans laquelle le corps et le travail des femmes sont restés sous la domination patriarcale. Cette opposition entre les sexes n'était pas accidentelle, mais constitutive de l'ordre libéral lui-même.

Parallèlement, Charles Mills, dans *The Racial Contract* (1997), affirme que l'idéologie autoproclamée de l'égalité et des droits « sans distinction de couleur » a historiquement servi de paravent à l'exclusion et à la domination raciales. Selon Mills (1997), « le contrat racial impose à ses signataires une épistémologie inversée, une réalité officiellement déformée imposée par les tropes de la société » (18). Cette observation rejoint l'affirmation de Marx selon laquelle la loi et les droits ne sont pas des arbitrages idéologiquement concrets, mais des formes sociales qui naturalisent les hiérarchies existantes. Les exclusions raciales persistantes — qu'il s'agisse du droit de vote, de la propriété ou de l'éducation — illustrent que l'égalité formelle peut être compatible avec une stratification sociale massive, voire contribuer à la faciliter.

La dimension coloniale met également en évidence les incohérences de l'égalité libérale. La critique de Frantz Fanon dans *Les damnés de la terre* (1961) rend visible le déni structurel des droits universels européens aux peuples colonisés, créant ce qu'Aimé Césaire a appelé un « pseudo-humanisme » qui « a réduit les droits de l'homme » tout en semblant les étendre. Ce double standard colonial n'était pas simplement un échec dans la mise en pratique des idéaux libéraux, mais une condition structurellement nécessaire pour étendre le capitalisme à l'échelle mondiale. Comme l'affirme Walter Rodney dans *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (1972), l'extraction des richesses par les colonisateurs était nécessaire à l'accumulation du capital européen, et l'incapacité des colonisés à entrer dans le domaine des droits n'était ni une déviation ni une anomalie, mais une exigence systémique.

Comme le démontrent abondamment Domenico Losurdo (2011) et Silvia Federici (2004), l'expansion libérale des droits s'est généralement accompagnée de l'exclusion ou de la subordination des autres, qu'il s'agisse des esclaves, des peuples colonisés, des femmes ou de la classe ouvrière. L'analyse de Federici sur l'accumulation primitive met en évidence les formes

par lesquelles la chasse aux sorcières au début de l'Europe moderne constituait moins une oppression religieuse qu'une attaque systématique contre la souveraineté et les savoirs reproductifs des femmes afin de les subordonner aux relations capitalistes émergentes. Cette violence à l'égard des femmes était aussi inhérente à la formation du capitalisme que Marx lui-même l'a souligné par le biais de l'enclosure des biens communs et du pillage colonial.

La critique marxiste est donc toujours pertinente pour comprendre comment les conditions matérielles et historiques du capitalisme sapent inévitablement la promesse d'égalité. L'idée de « justice anormale » développée par Nancy Fraser (2008) actualise la critique en montrant comment le capitalisme néolibéral peut produire une reconnaissance formelle des groupes opprimés tout en renforçant l'exploitation économique. La contradiction égalité abstraite et domination concrète, que Marx a diagnostiquée au XIXe siècle, se reproduit ainsi sous de nouvelles formes et nécessite non seulement un raffinement du discours sur les droits, mais aussi un changement radical des relations sociales qui génèrent l'exclusion structurelle.

## *L'endurance de l'exclusion structurelle: Race, genre et frontières de l'égalité bourgeoise*

La critique de l'égalité libérale par Marx n'est pas seulement une dénonciation de l'hypocrisie: c'est un démasquage systématique des formes juridiques et idéologiques qui constituent la domination capitaliste. Les droits libéraux, hérités des Lumières et institutionnalisés par la Révolution française, consacrent non pas l'universalité mais l'exclusion,

en mystifiant la propriété privée, en naturalisant le travail salarié et en rendant l'exploitation légale.

Cette critique reste indispensable dans un monde où les droits sont régulièrement invoqués pour justifier la guerre, l'exploitation et l'inégalité. Comme le montre Losurdo, le libéralisme a toujours contenu en lui sa propre contre-révolution : émancipation pour les uns, domination pour les autres. Marx nous oblige à nous confronter au fait que l'égalité sans transformation n'est pas la justice — c'est la continuation de la domination par d'autres moyens.

En ce sens, Marx ne rejette pas l'aspiration à l'égalité ; il la radicalise. Il n'appelle pas à l'extension du droit bourgeois, mais à l'abolition des relations sociales qui rendent ce droit à la fois nécessaire et faux. Ce n'est que dans cette négation qu'un véritable humanisme et une véritable égalité peuvent émerger.

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*La Théorie et Langue Politique*

# | Critique du texte: The Redman's Appeal for Justice, de Deskaheh

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**Mots clés:** *Iroquois, Six Nations, société des nations, empire britannique, justice, conflit*

Cette critique analyse The Redman's Appeal for Justice de Deskaheh en étudiant l'emploi du libéralisme par l'Empire britannique et le Dominion du Canada pour légitimer leurs pratiques coloniales plutôt que de décoloniser leur pensée et d'avancer la réconciliation avec les Autochtones. L'examen de la violation de la souveraineté iroquoise et de la reconnaissance de leurs droits est effectué dans le but d'évaluer les forces et les limites de l'argumentation de Deskaheh. Sa lettre emploie des stratégies rhétoriques qui renforcent l'argumentation, permettant de voir la progression dans le temps du conflit et des relations diplomatiques entre les Six Nations et l'Empire britannique. Cependant, la lettre de Deskaheh présente une limite discursive, notamment au niveau de l'usage d'un vocabulaire qui reconduit une vision eurocentrée du concept de souveraineté iroquoise. La limite analytique du texte réside dans le fait-même que l'autorité coloniale est sollicitée de justifier la souveraineté iroquoise.

## *Introduction*

Le contexte historique dans lequel *The Redman's Appeal for Justice* a été rédigé représente le conflit entre l'État des Six Nations, l'Empire britannique et le Canada, observé par le biais des informations fournies par Deskaheh. Puisque cette lettre a été écrite par un chef Autochtone, elle aborde uniquement le point de vue des Autochtones sur le conflit mentionné ci-dessus et le point de vue de l'Empire britannique et du Canada sur la situation est donc exclu tant du texte que de la critique. L'objectif de celle-ci est d'évaluer la construction du discours de Deskaheh par le biais du résumé de la lettre d'abord et de l'analyse de ses forces et limites par la suite. Les forces de la lettre sont évaluées sur la base de la cohérence, de l'organisation et de la fluidité de l'argumentation de l'auteur. Deux limites sont également mises en lumière. La limite discursive est liée à l'emploi du vocabulaire eurocentré qui, malgré le fait de rendre la lettre plus accessible au destinataire, compromet la reconnaissance de la nature inhérente de la souveraineté iroquoise. Quant à la limite analytique, elle expose que la souveraineté iroquoise, pour être considérée légitime, doit être validée par une entité coloniale qui continue de se placer supérieure aux Autochtones et ne les considère toujours pas comme des égaux. La critique se termine par l'énonciation de sa pertinence pour l'étude académique du domaine de la science politique. Cette analyse de la lettre de Deskaheh permet de situer son discours dans le cadre d'une thématique plus large qu'est la décolonisation. L'importance de cette critique réside dans la réflexion sur comment les peuples Autochtones utilisent des stratégies rhétoriques pour défendre leur souveraineté dans un monde marqué par les tensions entre les valeurs classiques libérales, comme la liberté et l'égalité, et les pratiques coloniales, comme le capitalisme.

## **Résumé:**

Deskaheh a été un Autochtone d'ascendance iroquoise qui a milité pour la protection des droits et de l'héritage culturel des Autochtones. Il a été chef du peuple des Goyogouins faisant partie de l'État des Six Nations iroquoises, ainsi que président du Conseil des Six Nations de 1922 à 1925. En 1923, Deskaheh rédige *The Redman's Appeal for Justice* pour s'adresser au Secrétaire Général de la Société des Nations et y parler des défis auxquels la souveraineté iroquoise fait face.

D'abord, la problématique du texte, constituant aussi le début de celui-ci, réside dans le fait que l'État des Six Nations est en conflit avec l'Empire britannique et le Canada. Les actions de l'Empire britannique et du Canada sont au cœur de ce conflit. Elles comprennent la violation de la souveraineté des peuples iroquois et la non-tenue de promesses faites à ces peuples. De plus, la problématique met en avant l'idée que, pour régler ce conflit, l'État des Six Nations doit devenir membre de la Société des Nations, tout comme l'Empire britannique et le Canada qui en sont déjà membres.

Ensuite, l'auteur rappelle au Secrétaire Général de la Société des Nations que les Six Nations ont pour des siècles été des nations souveraines exécutant leur autorité sur leurs territoires respectifs, ce qui a été reconnu par plusieurs puissances européennes, les États-Unis et le Canada. De plus, les Six Nations se sont retrouvées dans des alliances avec la France, les Pays-Bas et l'Empire britannique. Elles ont longtemps bénéficié de la protection que leur assurait l'Empire britannique, notamment durant la guerre entre la Grande-Bretagne et ses colonies nord-américaines. Deskaheh appuie cette souveraineté en nommant les traités clés - celui du wampum à deux rangs conclu en 1613, le traité de la Grande Paix de Montréal signé en 1701 et le Traité de Haldimand datant de 1784.

En outre, l'auteur énumère les circonstances ayant permis au conflit de prendre de l'ampleur, telles que la modification de la Loi sur les Indiens, l'imposition des lois pénales impériales et l'emprisonnement des Autochtones sans raison définie. Deskaheh souligne également la gestion abusive des fonds des Six Nations par l'Empire britannique et une tentative d'invasion des territoires des Six Nations. L'auteur déclare que ces mesures constituent une autre atteinte à cette souveraineté. Il pointe aussi le refus de l'Empire britannique d'accepter les solutions que proposent les Six Nations et qui comprennent surtout la soumission du conflit à l'arbitrage impartial.

Finalement, Deskaheh annonce que les Six Nations exigent l'action de la part de la Société des Nations afin de faire reconnaître leur droits, de leur allouer les fonds et de réparer les injustices subies.

### *Critique:*

La lettre de Deskaheh témoigne de l'emploi des stratégies rhétoriques efficaces. L'une des forces de l'argumentation est sa structure cohérente. Les arguments de Deskaheh s'enchaînent de manière logique, ce qui lui permet de faire convenir sa position efficacement. En effet, pour que son destinataire puisse comprendre pourquoi les Six Nations iroquoises condamnent les actions de l'Empire britannique, Deskaheh commence par détailler l'historique de la place des Six Nations sur les territoires nord-américains et dans leurs relations avec l'Empire britannique. L'auteur présente ensuite les circonstances dans lesquelles le conflit prend de l'ampleur et justifie les demandes que font les Six Nations par la suite. L'énonciation de ces demandes permet à Deskaheh de graduellement retourner à sa déclaration principale, soit celle selon laquelle l'État des Six Nations doit devenir membre de

la Société des Nations. De cette sorte, avec l'appui d'une telle cohérence de ce texte, le destinataire est en mesure de voir la progression dans le temps du conflit et des relations diplomatiques entre les Six Nations et l'Empire britannique. Grâce à cette progression que reconstruit Deskaheh, qui s'ajoute à la fluidité et au langage soutenu présents dans le texte, l'auteur possède des chances importantes de convaincre le destinataire de sa position.

Cela étant dit, l'argumentation de Deskaheh présente des limites discursives et analytiques, mettant en question la validité et l'efficacité de ses propos. Dans sa lettre, il dénonce la violation de la souveraineté iroquoise en employant régulièrement un vocabulaire politique de nature eurocentrée. Des exemples de celui-ci comprennent « Membership of the League » (Deskaheh 1), « State of the Six Nations of the Iroquois » (Deskaheh 1), « suzerain rights » (Deskaheh 2), « independent State » (Deskaheh 2) et « Dominion Government » (Deskaheh 4). Bien que Deskaheh emploie ce vocabulaire d'une manière stratégique, soit afin de s'adapter au destinataire de la lettre, le Secrétaire Général de Société des Nations, et de faire parvenir ses revendications d'une manière accessible à ce destinataire, un tel vocabulaire renforce une vision eurocentrée du concept de souveraineté. Ainsi, en absence de termes Autochtones pour définir ce concept, la Société des Nations ne sera pas incitée à réfléchir profondément aux moyens de changer le statu quo. Il ne pourrait donc pas y avoir de garanties que le discours de Deskaheh mènera à des actions concrètes de la part de la Société des Nations, plutôt qu'à un renforcement de la souveraineté iroquoise sur papier uniquement.

Une autre limite de l'argumentation de Deskaheh est de nature analytique. Le but de la lettre, à part de faire valider la souveraineté iroquoise, est de souligner que « The Six Nations of the Iroquois crave therefore invitation to accept the obligations of Membership of the League for

the purpose of such dispute<sup>61</sup> » (Deskaheh 1). Deskaheh affirme donc que les Six Nations iroquoises souhaitent faire partie de la Société des Nations pour régler la dispute, ainsi que restituer leurs droits souverains. Toutefois, la requête de Deskaheh sous-entend que la souveraineté iroquoise, pour être considérée légitime, doit être validée par l'autorité coloniale et non à travers la nature inhérente de cette souveraineté. L'aspect controversé de la demande de Deskaheh est davantage renforcé par l'affirmation suivante : Deskaheh évoque que « [the Imperial Government refused] to prevent the continued agressions upon the Six Nations practised by the Dominion of Canada<sup>62</sup> » (Deskaheh 5). Par conséquent, il convient de se poser la question suivante : comment est-ce que Deskaheh puisse être persuadé que la Société des Nations, l'entité coloniale dont les états avaient déjà conclu des traités avec les Six Nations iroquoises mais n'avaient pas tenu leurs promesses, répondra aux demandes de Deskaheh?

Cette question met en évidence les défis auxquels sont confrontés les peuples Autochtones pour faire reconnaître leur autonomie dans le monde qui se décolonise. Le texte de Deskaheh s'inscrit dans le cadre du mouvement de décolonisation qui va à l'encontre de l'idéologie politique du libéralisme. Plus spécifiquement, Deskaheh expose les contradictions qui existent entre la rhétorique libérale, définie par des concepts tels que la liberté et l'égalité, et les pratiques coloniales. En annonçant que « The Six Nations now invoke the action of the League of Nations to secure: [...] (5) Freedom of transit for the Six Nations across Canadian territory<sup>63</sup>» (Deskaheh 6), Deskaheh sous-entend que la liberté des Autochtones, celle de transit dans ce

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<sup>61</sup> Les Six Nations iroquoises demandent donc d'être invitées à accepter les obligations de l'adhésion à la Société des Nations aux fins de ce différend (traduction libre).

<sup>62</sup> Le gouvernement impérial a refusé d'empêcher les agressions continues contre les Six Nations pratiquées par le Dominion du Canada (traduction libre).

<sup>63</sup> Les Six Nations invoquent en ce moment l'action de la Société des Nations pour obtenir : [...] (5) La liberté de transit pour les Six Nations sur le territoire canadien (traduction libre).

cas-ci, est constamment violée par l'Empire britannique et le Dominion du Canada. En ce qui concerne la violation du principe de l'égalité entre les Six Nations et le Dominion du Canada, Deskaheh le souligne en évoquant que « large sums of the Six Nations' funds have been [...] wasted without consent of the Six Nations<sup>64</sup> » (Deskaheh 4). Cette déclaration montre aussi que la dynamique du pouvoir dans laquelle les Allochtones se placent comme supérieurs aux Autochtones est également renforcée à travers le capitalisme, ce que Deskaheh lie à l'idéologie libérale impériale. Comme l'auteur le démontre dans sa lettre, le fait de s'approprier des biens des Autochtones va de pair avec le fait d'enfreindre les droits et la souveraineté de ceux-ci. De cette sorte, Deskaheh dénonce que l'Empire britannique et le Dominion du Canada emploient l'idéologie du libéralisme pour légitimer leurs pratiques coloniales, au lieu de décoloniser leur pensée et de faire avancer la réconciliation avec les Autochtones.

La lettre de Deskaheh est donc pertinente pour l'étude académique parce qu'à ce jour, malgré les avancements dans le processus de réconciliation avec les Autochtones, ce processus continue de se tenir au Canada. En fait, les Autochtones ne cessent toujours pas de se battre pour la protection de leurs droits en lien avec leurs terres ancestrales, leurs pratiques culturelles et leurs langues. Ainsi, le texte de Deskaheh nous permet non seulement de prendre du recul et d'observer les progrès déjà réalisés en matière des enjeux de souveraineté, de réconciliation et de violence coloniale, mais aussi d'établir quels sont les domaines de réconciliation nécessitant plus d'action de notre part. Il est également pertinent d'étudier ce texte en raison de la représentation qu'il donne aux concepts du champ de la science politique tels que la souveraineté, le

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<sup>64</sup> D'importantes sommes d'argent des Six Nations ont été [...] gaspillées sans le consentement des Six Nations (traduction libre).

libéralisme, le colonialisme et la réconciliation. En menant l'étude des réformes et des mouvements de contestation ou de décolonisation, il est essentiel de pouvoir repérer ces sujets dans le monde réel grâce à de tels textes historiques pour pouvoir y réfléchir critiqueusement et mieux saisir l'importance de ces sujets dans le domaine de la science politique.

## *Conclusion*

La lettre que rédige Deskaheh, le chef du peuple des Goyogoins, pour s'adresser au Secrétaire Général de Société des Nations, représente un document dont la portée possède à la fois des forces et des limites. La cohérence et l'organisation claire de son contenu rend les déclarations de Deskaheh convaincantes. Les limites du discours de l'auteur comprennent la nature eurocentrée du vocabulaire employé et la nécessité de la validation coloniale pour justifier les demandes de Deskaheh. Néanmoins, sa lettre permet d'approfondir la compréhension des enjeux auxquels font face les Autochtones pour défendre leur souveraineté. Les revendications de Deskaheh mettent en lumière l'ambiguïté de la position des puissances coloniales dans leurs rapports avec les peuples Autochtones. La contradiction entre les idéaux libéraux de liberté et d'égalité et les pratiques coloniales qui enfreignent ces droits demeure cruciale pour évaluer l'état actuel du processus de la réconciliation, qui nécessite la prise en considération équilibrée des perspectives des deux parties.

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