Jove's Bodega https://journals.lib.sfu.ca/index.php/jovesbodega <p>Jove's Bodega is millennia old. Long before he was called Zeus, this mythic set up shop upon the most convenient mountain. A late-night purveyor of every philosophical desire, the shelves overflow with achievements from across humankind. And so it remains. A bell rings, the automatic doors retreat. The air smells an intoxicating mixture of metaphysics, ethics, epistemology and microwaved burritos. </p> Simon Fraser University en-US Jove's Bodega Structural Exploitation of Individual Vulnerabilities in the “Post-Truth Era” https://journals.lib.sfu.ca/index.php/jovesbodega/article/view/5326 <p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Many attempts have been made to understand the epistemic processes by which an individual is led to believe extreme and often dangerous conspiracy theories. The common view that conspiracy theorists simply lack information is demonstrably false, given the ease of access to information via the internet, so the issue lies in either the individuals themselves or the environment they find themselves in. However, upon reflection, it does not seem accurate to place the blame solely on either of these poles, as the epistemic practices of conspiracy theorists closely reflect those of non-believers, and clearly, not all individuals in a given environment end up with the same beliefs. In this paper, I consider two opposing diagnoses: Quassim Cassam’s argument for faulty individual thinking—namely, epistemic vices—as the root of conspiracy belief and Thi Nguyen’s case for the social-structural perspective—epistemic “luck”—as the catalyst for extreme beliefs. Ultimately, I reject both diagnoses and argue that the particular combination of individual “hero complexes” and for-profit media machines is to blame for the rise of extreme and corrosive conspiracy beliefs.</span></p> Taylor Ivan Copyright (c) 2024 Taylor Ivan https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2024-01-20 2024-01-20 1 20 A Problem of Perception https://journals.lib.sfu.ca/index.php/jovesbodega/article/view/6242 <p>Despite its conceptual palpability, intuitiveness, and common presumption, the Direct Realist theory of perception is not fully consistent with the scientific literature. If external stimuli are sufficient to produce percepts but unnecessary for their generation (as with dreams), then the veridicality of perception ought to be scrutinized as a valid scientific postulate. In this paper, I shall defend a Representationalist account of perception consistent with scientific literature, highlighting its empirical basis and its philosophical feasibility.</p> Zachery Nyvik Copyright (c) 2024 Zachery Nyvik https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2024-01-20 2024-01-20 21 38 The Role of Dreams In Moral Development https://journals.lib.sfu.ca/index.php/jovesbodega/article/view/5340 <p style="font-weight: 400;">Dreams can be perceived as a range of possible experiences - from imaginative scenarios revealing nothing but the abstract nature of the human mind to almost life-like experiences that mimic considerations we undertake daily. Dreams have long been a topic of interest in various fields - much of the discourse in philosophy historically centers on questioning if agency exists within dreaming states and how this may impact the application of notions of morality to dream scenarios. The status of dreams as experiences may even aid in the development of a person's moral character, cultivating possible benefits for personal growth and revealing certain characteristics that are inaccessible through the restricted reality of the waking world. Furthermore, the different states of dreaming raise an increasingly complex state of being; lucid dreaming can greatly impact considerations for the agency in moral decision-making in simulated worlds. This article aims to examine two aspects of morality within dreams: firstly, assessing the state of agency within dreams, and secondly, exploring the capacity of dreams to act as an avenue to advance the exploration of personal moral character for moral development.</p> Mahroo Shahbaz Copyright (c) 2024 Mahroo Shahbaz https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2024-01-20 2024-01-20 39 54 "Neither One Nor Two" https://journals.lib.sfu.ca/index.php/jovesbodega/article/view/6234 <p>Despite their differences, Simone de Beauvoir’s existentialist critique of the gender binary and Luce Irigaray’s model of sexuate difference run parallel in their resistance to absolute, gendered notions of activity and passivity. Both streams of thought—while ontologically distinct—are interested in presenting "relative" alternatives to the negated feminine subject. With attention to De Beauvoir’s vision of ambiguity, this paper will argue that Irigaray’s “vulvic” and “phallic” subjects are compatible with existentialism’s beings “for-itself” and “in-itself." Further, by embracing the potential for both sexes hold “finitude and transcendence,” Irigaray’s strategic essentialism may be read as radically continuous with (as opposed to departing from) The Second Sex. </p> Anna Pontin Copyright (c) 2024 Anna Pontin https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2024-01-20 2024-01-20 55 68