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“Rights without Responsibilities”: Exploring the antithetical vernacularization of feminism in Korean anti-feminist forums

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Abstract

In this political moment of post-truth anti-feminism, far-right populists have gained immense support amid a global shift in young men’s voting habits. This paper uses Valesco’s (2023) theoretical framework for the transnational backlash to liberal norms to analyze how anonymous online forums (a prevalent means of networking within the manosphere) can facilitate the *antithetical vernacularization* of liberal norms for illiberal diffusion as a result of cultural friction. I use a post from the South Korean online community Nate Pann to show how the process of *antithetical vernacularization* translates feminism from its liberal meaning to entail female supremacy, relying on iterative citationality to naturalize patriarchy, and how this contributes to the gendered political divide capitalized on by populist politicians such as South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol.

Keywords: Neoliberalism, illiberalism, conservative, politics, feminism

SOUTH KOREA (HEREAFTER KOREA) is a rich site for political sociological research due to the country's prevailing traditional familism and subsequent friction with the institution of liberal norms (Jung, 2020; S Lee, 2024; Park & Jackson, 2022). "Gender equalism" (Kim, 2022, p. 116), Korea's localized version of equity feminism and men's rights activism, has become increasingly popular with young Korean men (Jung, 2020; Jung, 2024; S Lee, 2024). It proposes an alternative ideology reflective of liberal feminism—that gender inequality is no longer an issue, and policies institutionalized by women's rights activism are no longer legitimate (Kim, 2022; S Lee, 2024). Existing literature on contemporary Korean culture points to traditional roots in Confucianism and Christian Protestantism (Jung, 2020; S Lee, 2024; Park & Jackson, 2022). These ideologies collaborate to produce a cultural emphasis on filial piety and social hierarchy, in which heterosexual marriage and child-rearing are viewed as moral imperatives for the reproduction of a stable family, society, and collective good (Jung, 2020; S Lee, 2024). With the added dimension of Korean nationalism, particularly following liberation from colonial Japan in the mid-20th century, family is understood to be the core of social stability and Korea's strength as a nation (Jung, 2020; Park & Jackson, 2022).

However, gender roles enforced by a strong sense of patriarchal familism have become complicated by the influence of Western liberalism, which Korea sought to adopt in order to follow the progressive social development of the West (S-H Lee, 2019; T-H Kim, 2011). Park and Jackson (2022) note the lack of certainty surrounding the "effectiveness of implanting such foreign structures and programs on the nation's family-centred culture" (p. 295). From the 1980s to the 2000s, the Korean feminist movement prioritized "gender mainstreaming", a general policy implementation following the UN Beijing World Conference on Women in 1995 which sought to increase women's representation in politics and the workplace (S-H Lee, 2019). Gender mainstreaming did not have significant cultural influence despite successes in institutionalization (Jung & Moon, 2024; A-R Lee & Chin, 2007). Policy changes such as equal inheritance rights, the socialization of childcare, and the establishment of the Ministry of Gender Equality in 2001 were viewed from the anti-feminist lens as the institutionalization of misandry (Baik, 2019; A-R Lee & Chin, 2007; S-H Lee, 2019).

Backlash to institutionalized feminist norms, which have successfully increased women's participation in the Korean labour market in past decades, has culminated in perceived crises in

masculinity surrounding cultural beliefs of men's roles as familial breadwinners (Jung, 2024; S Lee, 2024). Many young Korean men blame feminism for their difficulties in participating in the job market or fulfilling traditional familial roles by marrying and starting a family, which are supported by heightened unemployment among young men and decreasing marriage and fertility rates (S Lee, 2024). This anti-feminist rhetoric is also complicated by the country's compulsory military service for men. By temporarily removing men from their career paths, women's advancements in education and the job market are seen as an unfair advantage despite the abysmal gendered wage gap (S Lee, 2024). Resentment against feminists grows on the belief that women want rights without responsibilities, especially as they put off marriage and motherhood for the sake of independence (Jung & Moon, 2024).

Anonymous forums serve as the primary site for the dissemination of "fictitious factuality," which Kim (2022) describes as the "affective feedback loop" that generates confident confirmation bias within these spaces (p. 116). Anti-feminist backlash is not unique to Korea and has gained legitimacy transnationally with the emergence of the manosphere (Ging, 2017; Van Valkenburgh, 2018). According to Ging (2017), the Red Pill "philosophy" of the manosphere—which takes its name from the film *The Matrix*—has been rapidly propagated across platforms transnationally, arguing for the need for men to wake up to the reality of feminism's "misandry and brainwashing," (p. 640). Expanding on Ging's (2017) research, Van Valkenburgh (2018) conducted a systematic study of the original "Red Pill" forum and found that the philosophy integrates discourses of evolutionary psychology, rationality, and neoliberal market-value into existing cultural norms of sexual relationships. The ideology is described as an "extension" and "acceleration" of said norms, essentializing men as the only rational beings, dismissing women as opinionated and emotional, and denying the need for feminism at all (Van Valkenburgh, 2018).

Kim (2022) also discusses the "wikiality" of the manosphere, referring to "the notion that a thing can become true once a sufficient number of people agree with and repeat it on a wiki platform," (p. 99). This specifically refers to misinformation shared from a "reputable source", which complicates consumers' assumptions of truth. For example, the sudden entry of "gender equalism" to NamuWiki (Korea's "authoritative" right-wing online encyclopedia) in 2016 gave Korean anti-feminists a common cause to organize around: dismantling their country's institutionalized feminist policy (Kim, 2022). The entry fabricated the claim that gender equalism is replacing feminism in Western society due to feminism's inherent victimization of men, which was

then regarded as fact, and shared within anti-feminist circles to reinforce criticism before it was marked as falsified information (Kim, 2022). Kim (2022) also notes how the concept of gender equalism exploits “the language of feminism” by using terms such as “equality” and “equal opportunities” to reframe discourse about contemporary gender inequality (p. 105).

Yi-dae-nam, or men in their 20s, became the key demographic of right-wing populism in the 2022 presidential election of conservative anti-feminist Yoon Suk-yeol, the candidate who appealed to their dissatisfaction with the bleak labour market by promising to rid them of the disadvantages of feminism (Jung, 2024; S Lee, 2024). During his campaign, Yoon promised to "reorganize the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family Affairs and recalibrate the [budget]" to shift its priority from women's rights to “gender equality” (K-W Lee, 2021, para. 3). He claimed that the ministry “failed to properly perform its gender equality function and has disappointed the public with its publicity that treats men as potential criminals” (K-W Lee, 2021, para. 4). As a generation formerly united on the centre-left, the 2022 election marked a dramatic political divide between young men and women—62.9% of men in their 20s voted conservative, compared to only 26.1% of women in the same age group (S Lee, 2024). Young Korean men have leaned toward right-wing conservative views of gender and social politics, culminating in a reactionary, politicized collective identity as victims of feminism (Jung, 2024).

Exploring the relationship between gender and populism, Banet-Weiser (2021) conceptualizes feminism's threat in a “post-truth” world (referring to the increasing influence of social science in public discourse) and states that “gender is rarely acknowledged as a key context for the very notion of post-truth,” (p. 211). Misogyny and misinformation as mechanisms of control have always been mutually constitutive as women have been, and continue to be, the bearers of non-truths (Banet-Weiser, 2021). This is enabled by scientific assertions that sexual difference is perfunctory and devoid of racial or cultural context (Banet-Weiser, 2021; Butler, 1993). Misogyny is the central ethos of far-right misinformation campaigns, which posit that liberal feminism has emasculated society and call for the need to “reset” gender balance to its “natural patriarchal relation,” (Banet-Weiser, 2021, p. 213). The need for gender equality itself is then considered misinformation, and affective feedback confirms and continues to naturalize heterosexist rhetoric through the process of iterative citationality (Butler, 1993).

Antithetical Vernacularization, Transnational Backlash, and the Deinstitutionalization of Liberal Norms

Much of the literature on the manosphere studies masculinity in the context of the deterioration of white male privilege in the West, with conservative Christians particularly vocal about feminism's threat in the global "culture war" (Ging, 2017). The character of Korean-specific anti-feminism can be explored through Valesco's (2023) findings that liberal ideology's success and prominence in instituting norms transnationally can produce both liberal and illiberal outcomes. In his analysis, Valesco (2023) argues for a culture-based understanding of cross-national events and shifts in the institutionalization of norms. He argues for a subversion of the characterization of the international community as an inherently liberal or progressive body which transmits uni-directional political influence from the global to local spheres (Valesco, 2023). Rather, it is deeply cultural and *reciprocal* global-local feedback loops that are "instrumental to the consolidation and institutionalization of norms" in the form of domestic policy (Valesco, 2023, p. 5). This theoretical framework is best suited for describing the shift in feminist norms in Korea as it not only recognizes, but centralizes the importance of cultural context in the reception (or rejection) of norms. Understood as a foreign imposition with little success in the public sphere, feminism is construed as inherently incompatible with values of family and faith. Abolition of feminist policy is then a rationalized response to compounded fears surrounding status and economic stability.

Through the study of 152 countries and their adoption of pro- or anti-LGBT+ policies between 1990–2018, Valesco (2023) details how gender and sexuality are focal points of the liberal/illiberal divide as categorizations that precede sexual reproduction. As a "dual strategy," illiberalism both undermines the logic of individualism while using its tools to antithetically promote "the supremacy of traditional corporate bodies," (Valesco, 2023, p. 12). The "sacralization of the individual" embedded in liberal discourse reconfigures bodies like the family or nation "away from a corporate whole greater than the sum of its parts to, instead, a collective built via the free association of individuals," (Valesco, 2023, p. 9). Individualism has shifted Western cultural beliefs surrounding sex, gender, and sexuality in regard to their conceived purpose for reproduction, however, it is crucial that sexual difference is still assumed to be essential in a way which presupposes race or cultural difference (Butler 1993; Valesco 2023). Despite its thoroughness in describing how backlash

is framed, this study does not identify essentialism as the normative logic (and constitutive flaw) of liberalism which enables illiberal backlash in the first place.

While Valesco's (2023) study analyzes LGBT+ norms, feminism follows a similar theme in that it also disrupts the hetero-patriarchal norm. *Antithetical vernacularization* is the framing for which illiberal actors or "norm brokers" pose their opposition to global liberal norms (like feminism) for local resonance (Valesco, 2023). By co-opting "the dominant language and structure of the liberal world society," illiberal networks such as the manosphere gain footing in mainstream political discourses (Valesco, 2023, p. 14). Anti-feminist men situate themselves as victims of gender equity policies that prioritize women, and affective feedback from other men (both globally and locally) increases the legitimacy of feminism as an existential, oppressive threat (Valesco, 2023).

Justification for the defense of heteropatriarchy is made possible by designating it as a natural hierarchy in which men have the right to fulfill their position, upheld through performative appeals to normative patriarchal relations (Butler, 1993). In *Bodies That Matter*, Butler (1993) "recasts" sex as a temporally-situated regulation of significant difference sustained and empowered through the citations it compels; I use this to explain how *antithetical vernacularization* relies on iterative citationality (that is, reference to and perpetuation of the self-reinforcing cycle of sex essentialism) to demarcate patriarchy as a natural social hierarchy. Iterative citationality is integral to the construction of *antithetical vernacularization*: it first demands legitimacy of the symbols referenced in order to convey the argument, and that its use, in turn, reattributes symbolic legitimacy. This critical discourse analysis aims to present how anonymous online forums, a prevalent platform for transnational anti-feminist networking, host the *antithetical vernacularization* of liberal norms for illiberal diffusion and rely on the performative citationality of heteropatriarchy to reinforce how Korean men conceptualize sex, gender, and socioeconomic relations.

Critical Discourse Analysis

The anonymous online bulletin website *Nate Pann* is described by NamuWiki as "an ordinary South Korean bulletin-board based community" with a user demographic that skews toward teenagers and adolescents (NamuWiki, 2025, para. 8). The board is discussed as having a "low entry barrier and a strong ripple effect," as well as a disproportionate amount of female users who engage in gossip and are "generally very angry at misogyny," (NamuWiki, 2025, paras. 15, 24). Additionally,

Nate Pann “has no separate political inclination,” which is explained to mean that there are no overarching restrictions on what is posted or appears to be trending (NamuWiki, 2025, para. 26). Users are able to “recommend” posts, a positive marker akin to a “like” which boosts the posts visibility according to the site’s algorithms, and a post’s view count also contributes to its popularity and increased circulation (NamuWiki, 2025).

With nearly 80,000 views, 322 recommendations, and 149 oppositional downvotes, the following post on the *Nate Pann* forum claims to explain the “universally valid social phenomenon” of how feminism has complicated traditional notions of the family and can be blamed for modern Korean women’s reluctance to marry (anonymous expert, 2012). The text was chosen for 1) its popularity among forum users as indicated by views and recommendations, taking into account that these have accumulated since its initial publishing in 2012; 2) the date on which it was posted, as it pre-dates the 2022 presidential election by ten years and provides a snapshot of growing anti-feminist sentiment in younger Korean men; 3) the notable absence of an identifier for the post’s author (such as a name, username, tag, etc.) other than “expert” speaks directly to the role of affective feedback in legitimizing illiberal discourse. Using Valesco’s (2023) framework for understanding transnational illiberal backlash, I will analyze excerpts to explain how this post utilizes *antithetical vernacularization* to rearticulate feminism as a threat to “natural” heteronormativity.

The post begins by addressing:

Those who are too tired of Korean women...

First, basic common sense about patriarchy.

The two pillars of patriarchy are

1. Men are responsible for the household economy.

=====> *Disadvantageous to men. Advantageous to women.*

2. Men have full authority and make decisions on all household matters. =====>

Advantageous to men, disadvantageous to women. (anonymous expert, 2012)

The author’s explanation of patriarchy sets the parameters for which it functions and designates itself within the frame of illiberal, antithetical discourse. It is not a denial of patriarchy, but an

assertion that (Korean) women's understanding of patriarchy as an unequal construction is misinformed. It is an explicitly citational statement in that the notion of patriarchal relations as "basic common sense" is used to delegitimize any opposition as that which stands to oppose *sense itself*; it is the reification of the assumed objectivity imagined by masculinist knowledge production which characterizes Other perspectives as inherently misinformed (Banet-Weiser, 2021; Butler, 1993; Kim, 2022).

Aside from the original poster's claim to "basic common sense" being indicative of the manosphere's reception of fictitious factuality, the "two pillars of patriarchy" are strategically presented as the cooperation between men and women to produce a stable household—and by extension, a stable society. Emphasis on the corporate body of the household/family in direct association with patriarchy again points to the performative citationality of heterosexual hegemony in constituting the bodies which it governs (Butler, 1993). This vernacularization constructs the family as the subject as opposed to the individual, antithetically promoting the notion of equal individual responsibilities necessary for its maintenance (Valesco, 2023). The advantages and disadvantages of patriarchy are acknowledged and framed so that they are understood to be different but equal for both men and women. The author engages in iterative citationality by defining patriarchal characterizations of labour, private property, and the very notion of "the public" as male by nature, and through *antithetical vernacularization*, translates individual privileges to instinctive responsibilities for the benefit of a greater whole.

Often looking internationally and to their parents' generation for social context, it becomes clear to young Korean men that the institutionalization of liberal feminist policy was what interrupted the possibility for them to afford a future (S Lee, 2024).

The United States was the first and most intense place where feminism spread... [Those] men fall into great despair. Why should I get married? In an era where divorce is common (after all, the rise of women's equality and feminism... the divorce rate has skyrocketed along with the improvement of women's economic status) [. . .] why should I get married? They fall into doubt. In the end, men are left with only a sense of duty to support and take responsibility for their families, and their rights as patriarchs have virtually disappeared. There is no need to get married anymore. As I explained earlier, "the advantages of patriarchy have disappeared, and only disadvantages remain." (anonymous expert, 2012)

The crux of the poster's argument is that in the West, but also anywhere that feminism has been institutionalized, "the advantages of patriarchy have disappeared, and only disadvantages remain," (anonymous expert, 2012). Both cultural norms and affective feedback are crucial here; young men view becoming the breadwinners of their families as a duty they must fulfill, and share the growing fear that marriage and economic security are not possible given the current job market (Jung, 2020; S Lee, 2024). Advocating for their individual "rights as patriarchs", illiberal anti-feminists once again appropriate the framework of liberal activism to promote the rights of a corporate body through *antithetical vernacularization* (Valesco, 2023). In discussing patriarchy as a natural hierarchy rather than structural, anti-feminists can use the language of liberal activism (for example, the position that there are innate individual "rights") to disseminate illiberal ideology by defending their right to patriarchal dominance. Not only does affective feedback in the manosphere's transnational community bolster the strength of their beliefs, but success in the local political realm also weakens the legitimacy of previously instituted feminist norms (Jung & Moon 2024; Valesco 2023).

I know that feminism and gender equality are the main culprits that 'destroyed' the fact that women could secure their old age and live a stable life once they got married. What they received from gender equality was not a new world, but a life of having to work hard, being a single mother, and the anxiety of not knowing when they would be kicked out of their homes. That's why women who still talk about gender equality and feminism are ostracized and treated like ignorant fools.

*This is largely the same in Europe. In Italy and other countries, there are still macho men, but in France, men who freely date, live together, break up, and live together are already the norm. Likewise, feminists and women's equality advocates are ostracized among French women. As a result, the lives of French women have become very unstable. And there is **fierce competition** among women to marry a good man and find a stable life. They also want to be loved. They don't want a great man, and they think that even if [the men] are a bit macho or patriarchal, they just want to be domestic without divorce. However, most men are gentle and modern, but they don't want to get married. They want to be free from responsibility. I realized that it's okay.*

Japan is the same. Japanese men also have no sense of responsibility and don't bother dating women. They realized that women are a burden, a bondage, and a responsibility. Even if we treat women equally, [men] realized that it is unreasonable to have to take responsibility for their entire lives because of a love that won't last a few years, so the number of herbivore men who are not interested in women has increased dramatically, and even if they do date, they are not as detailed and romantic as

Korean men. They go Dutch, are blunt, and don't contact each other often. That's why Japanese women really prefer Korean men. (Korean women are the only ones busy looking down on Korean men.)

And what about Korea?

In Korea, the sex ratio of marriageable-age men and women has been normalizing since 2015. Japan is following the West, and Korea is following Japan. (anonymous expert, 2012, emphasis mine)

The manosphere's transnational connectivity enables affective feedback on a scale never before seen. With (notably unsupported) claims of anecdotal evidence from several international communities, the post derives legitimacy solely through affective resonance and confirmation bias. Coupled with the disadvantages of feminism for men are what the author claims to be the natural disadvantages of feminism for women; "*I know that feminism and gender equality are the main culprits that 'destroyed' the fact that women could secure their old age and live a stable life once they got married,*" (anonymous expert, 2012). The post discusses the ostracization of feminists as a result of creating an environment of instability where women must balance precarity and partnership now that the two no longer appear to be mutually exclusive. Gender and subsequent cultural performativity are understood on a basic level, but varying economic and socio-cultural contexts both uncritically support the claims that living in a way differential to traditional gender roles is the real source of societal instability. Once more, this is made possible by *antithetical vernacularization* and the performative citationality of sex as a constitutive category.

The terms "macho" and "patriarchal" are used interchangeably to refer to a man who assumes hegemonic masculinity and fulfills his responsibilities, which then denotes greatness. Due to Korean men's understanding of marriage as a social responsibility, committal men are regarded with higher value (and rarity) than those who do not want the financial responsibility of a family: "*In Italy and other countries, there are still macho men, but in France, men who freely date, live together, break up, and live together are already the norm*"; "*However, most men are gentle and modern, but they don't want to get married*". The author goes on to say that women "*don't want a great man*", a significant argument made within the manosphere based on a misappropriation of evolutionary psychology which denies women agency in forming romantic or sexual relationships by claiming that marriage and sex are solely for reproductive purposes (Ging, 2017). This argument significantly resonates with Korean Confucian-Christianity's proposition of marriage and childbearing as moral acts, confirming through affective feedback a sense of epistemological reason (Jung, 2020). As an illegitimate concept, feminism

wrongfully allows women to reject traditional gender roles conducive to the formation and maintenance of a corporate body; feminists and their advocates are foolish, especially when turning down romantic advances that preempt responsibility.

The author makes a curious statement regarding gender and the responsibility of upholding traditional gender roles, however. Speaking about men in France, Italy, the US, and Japan, it's stated "they want to be free from responsibility" and that the author "realized that it's okay," (anonymous expert, 2012). When the author says that "it's okay", they do not mean a lack of responsibility is necessarily beneficial—this is evident by the post's overall message arguing for responsibility to the family as a fundamental human concept. Rather, the remainder of the post indicates that Korean feminism will resolve itself as a temporary subversion of the natural order, for "the time will definitely come when women will be obsessed with marriage and men," (anonymous expert, 2012). By refusing the responsibility of marriage, Korean women will inevitably arrive at the culturally unsustainable social position of "the individual":

*In any case, it seems that the Korean flag will also follow the West. [...] Men had to endure humiliating relationships while listening to women's ridiculous arguments and demands because of the **fierce competition** among men, but after about 10 years, the situation completely changed. There is no country in the world where women have more economic power than men. There may be differences in degree, but in Korea, men will still have more economic power in 10 years. (Currently, the average income of all women is half of the average income of all men.) In other words, the economic power of single women who live alone without marrying a man will be very low. The time will definitely come when women will be obsessed with marriage and men. Although men are currently disappointed by the **fierce competition...***

And one more thing.

Social problem of single women.

Of course, single women are not in good financial shape because they live alone. Since the West has tried such a social experiment, the number of women who say they will be single has decreased significantly compared to the past. They have no illusions about being single. They have a strong perception that they will only be poor and lonely in their later years.

Those who act like single women in Korea now will end up like that in 20 years. Furthermore, the economic power of men and women in Korea is much different from that of the West, and the social

safety net is weak. There is only one way out. (A rich married man?) (anonymous expert, 2012, emphasis mine)

As observers of the effects of the institutionalization of feminism, young Korean men rationalize their own anti-feminist positions by framing the gendered wage gap as evidence of patriarchy's natural supremacy. Discussed in the first excerpt is the author's observations that feminism has not guaranteed women financial independence, and this is explained further when comparing economic (labour) power. The post recognizes the gendered gap in economic power not as an effect of socially constructed inequality but a natural consequence of patriarchal defiance. Enabled by iterative citationality, capitalism's patriarchal structure is assumed to be natural in conceptualizing labour and economy as inherently male; feminized labour is not *undervalued* but merely valued, and unpaid care labour is an innate condition of womanhood. On average, women make less than men, therefore they are empirically worth less in the labour market. In referring to feminism as a "social experiment", the author further communicates its invalidity by mere association with that which is social instead of scientific or objectively rational.

"Fierce competition" is referenced three separate times in the context of romantic relationships, another instance of iterative citationality which connotes the heterosexist norm. In characterizing courtship as a neoliberal "sexual marketplace", the manosphere appropriates evolutionary psychology to make the claim that heterosexuality is not only normative but compulsory, and ideology which denies this is ignorant of objective truth (Ging, 2017). The use of *antithetical vernacularization* to problematize single women relies on essentialist assumptions of sex, and the phrasing also indicates the same underlying assumptions of patriarchy—those who "*act like single women*" are not perceived as independent despite individual rejection of such norms. The final sentiment that "*there is only one way out*" for women under feminism is reflective of Korean anti-feminists' naturalized patriarchal view, which essentializes sex and gender as categorizations necessary for the reproduction of a corporate whole.

Conclusion

The manosphere's emergence as a transnational anti-feminist network can be attributed to several factors including economic insecurity and the success of misogyny-based misinformation, relying on fear and uncertainty to accumulate support (Banet-Weiser, 2021). As a global network, anonymous online forums serve an important function as incredibly accessible spaces for

unregulated discourse within the manosphere. Ease of access and anonymity both enable the overload of misinformation and strength of belief in the content's validity.

Valesco's (2023) theoretical framework for backlash to the institutionalization of liberal norms calls for culture-focused analyses of norm adoption to conceptualize multi-directional feedback. With increasing transnational support for far-right populist campaigns, there is a pressing need for the analysis of illiberal backlash and its functional mechanisms as illiberal actors coordinate deinstitutionalization. The election of Yoon Suk-yeol in 2022 *because of* his disavowment of feminism shows the ability of populist strategies to use sexual difference as a tool for the deinstitutionalization of liberal norms.

In studying Korean anti-feminism, I was able to explore the rationality of *antithetical vernacularization* as it pertains to the articulation of norms which contradict cultural heritage. Illiberal *antithetical vernacularization* is the process by which liberal norms are rearticulated; in the case of the Nate Pann post, feminism is framed as a threat to the traditional and natural laws of the hetero-patriarchal family, and further, to men as individuals trying to fulfill responsibility. It is the antithetical promotion of the family as a corporate body through advocacy of the individuals' responsibility to it. This critical discourse analysis illustrates how *antithetical vernacularization* relies on iterative citationality as the discursive function of sex in order to naturalize patriarchy for the promotion of illiberal politics.

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