Vol 1 No 2 (2017)

The Normativity of Blame

Published October 10, 2017
  • Normativity,
  • Metaethics,
  • Second-personal Standpoint,
  • Mutual Accountability,
  • Blame,
  • Humean,
  • Darwall
  • ...More


The following paper examines the relevance of both Reasons Basicness and The Second-Personal Standpoint as potential explanations as to the nature of accountability. I begin by recognizing the importance of blame as an ethical experience, and start a project that aims to uncover the normative implications of blame. Ultimately I regard that, due to an inextricable link to obligation, normative notions of blame are grounded in morally normative pressures. In doing so, I deny the thesis of Reasons Basicness, and ask the reader to adopt a position sympathetic to the concepts of mutual accountability in Stephen Darwall’s Second-Personal Standpoint.